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19Divine Knowledge and Divine Control: A Response to Gordon and SadowskyReligious Studies 26 (2). 1990.
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39Miracles, Evil and Justified Belief: Further ClarificationSophia 34 (2). 1995.In an ongoing dialogue, Robert Larmer and I have been discussing whether the undisputed occurrence of certain conceivable events--for instance, astonishing healings--could require all honest, thoughtful individuals to acknowledge that God has supernaturally intervened in earthly affairs. I have not denied that a theist could justifiably consider the occurrence of certain possible (or even actual) events to be strong evidence for theism. But in this essay I continue to deny that the occurrence of…Read more
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9Bibliography: Recent Work on MolinismIn Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--303. 2011.
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39I What is a miracle?In Graham H. Twelftree (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Miracles, Cambridge University Press. pp. 19. 2011.
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106Why Petition an Omnipotent, Omniscient, Wholly Good God?Religious Studies 19 (1). 1983.Orthodox Christian theists frequently petition God in the sense that they ask him to bring about some state of affairs which they believe may not occur without divine intervention. Such petitions basically fall into three categories: requests in which the petitioner is asking God to influence significantly the natural environment – e.g. calm a hurricane, requests in which the petitioner is asking God to influence significantly the lives ofother individuals – e.g. reconcile the broken marriage of…Read more
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9Griffin and Pike on Divine PowerPhilosophy Research Archives 10 347-352. 1984.David Griffin and Nelson Pike recently had a spirited discussion on divine power. The essence of the discussion centered around what was labelled Premise X: “It is possible for one actual being's condition to be completely determined by a being or beings other than itself.” Pike maintains that ‘traditional’ theists have affirmed Premise X but denies that this entails that God has all the power there is and thus denies that Premise X can be considered incoherent for this reason. Griffin maintains…Read more
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77The challenge of religious diversity: A middle groundSophia 38 (1): 41-53. 1999.So where does all this leave us? The reality of religious diversity, I have argued, does notnecessitate the rejection of exclusivism. But this does not end the discussion, as some apparently believe. The reality of religious diversity, I have also argued, does justifiably remainfor many a significant challenge to exclusivistic thought and practice
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15Evil and a Finite GodPhilosophy Research Archives 13 285-287. 1987.P.J. McGrath has recently challenged the standard claim that to escape the problem of evil one need only alter one’s conception of God by limiting his power or his goodness. If we assume that God is infinitely good but not omnipotent, then God can scarcely be a proper object of worship. And if we assume that if God is omnipotent but limited in goodness, he becomes a moral monster. Either way evil remains a problem for theistic belief. I argue that McGrath fails to distinguish between the deducti…Read more
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1060Middle Knowledge and Human FreedomFaith and Philosophy 4 (3): 330-336. 1987.The concept of middle knowledge---God’s knowledge of what would in fact happen in every conceivable situation---is just beginning to receive the attention it deserves, For example, it is just now becoming clear to many that classical theism requires the affirmation of middle knowledge. But this concept is also coming under increasing criticism. The most significant of these, I believe, has been developed in a recent discussion by William Hasker, in which he argues that the concept of a true coun…Read more
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17Determinism and evil: Some clarificationsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (2). 1982.This Article does not have an abstract
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34Miracles and natural explanationsSophia 26 (3). 1987.IN A RECENT DISCUSSION ON THE MIRACULOUS, ROBERT LARMER ARGUES THAT THERE ARE CONCEIVABLE OCCURRENCES FOR WHICH IT WOULD BE MOST REASONABLE TO BELIEVE NO NATURAL EXPLANATION WILL BE FORTHCOMING. IN RESPONSE I ARGUE THAT THERE ARE NO SUCH OCCURRENCES. IT IS, IN PRINCIPLE, ALWAYS JUSTIFIABLE TO MAINTAIN THAT ANY CONCEIVABLE EVENT IS THE PRODUCT OF SOLELY NATURAL CAUSAL FACTORS
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29Anderson on PlantingaPhilosophy Research Archives 8 315-320. 1982.In a recent discussion, Susan Anderson argues that Alvin Plantinga’s version of the Free Will Defense has not shown that the existence of God is neither precluded nor rendered improbable by the existence of evil. She grants Plantinga that God cannot control free actions and that only free actions have moral worth but denies that this entails that God cannot insure a world containing only moral good. God could do so, she argues, simply by taking away the freedom of persons when he foresees they w…Read more
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31Human Freedom and Divine Providence: Some New Thoughts on an Old ProblemReligious Studies 15 (4). 1979.
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35Religious Diversity: A Philosophical AssessmentAshgate. 2002.Religious diversity exists whenever seemingly sincere, knowledgeable individuals hold incompatible beliefs on the same religious issue. Diversity of this sort is pervasive, existing not only across basic theistic systems but also within these theistic systems themselves. Religious Diversity explores the breadth and significance of such conflict. Examining the beliefs of various theistic systems, particularly within Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism, Basinger discusses seemingly incomp…Read more
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87Divine providence: The molinist accountPhilosophical Review 109 (2): 274-276. 2000.Christian theists have always been concerned with the relationship between God’s providential control and human freedom. Flint’s book is an explication and defense of what he sees as the best way for orthodox Christians to conceive of this relationship: the Molinist account.
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11Divine knowledge and divine control: A response to Gordon and Sadowsky: David BasingerReligious Studies 26 (2): 267-275. 1990.To say that God is omniscient is normally to say that God knows all true propositions and none that are false. But what exactly is knowable? Some believe that God possesses only ‘present knowledge’ . All that is know-able is that which is actual and that which follows deterministically from it. Others believe that God possesses ‘simple foreknowledge’ . God can also know what will actually happen, including what humans will freely do. And still others believe that God possesses ‘middle knowledge’…Read more
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43Must God Create the Best Possible World?International Philosophical Quarterly 20 (3): 339-341. 1980.
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50Christian theism and the concept of miracle: Some epistemological perplexitiesSouthern Journal of Philosophy 18 (2): 137-150. 1980.MANY ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN THEISTS CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED (OR AT LEAST HAVE THE CAPACITY TO IDENTIFY) OBSERVABLE PHENOMENA AS MIRACULOUS. I ARGUE THAT, ALTHOUGH THE CHRISTIAN THEIST CAN SUCCESSFULLY CIRCUMVENT THE STANDARD HUMEAN EPISTEMOLOGICAL BARRIER, HE CAN STIPULATE NO OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF A MIRACULOUS OCCURRENCE, EVEN IF IT IS GRANTED THAT THE CHRISTIAN GOD EXISTS AND THAT THE CHRISTIAN CANON ACCURATELY DESCRIBES HOW THIS BEING RELATES TO OUR PHYSICAL UNIVERSE…Read more
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135In what sense must God be omnibenevolent?International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1). 1983.
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37Evil as Evidence Against the Existence of GodPhilosophy Research Archives 4 55-67. 1978.Robert Pargetter has recently argued that, even if the theist cannot produce plausible explanations for the evil we experience, the atheologian has no justifiable basis for claiming that evil can in any sense count as strong evidence against God's existence. His strategy is to challenge as question-begging (1) the atheologian's assumption that a prima facie conflict between God and evil exists and (2) the atheologian's claim that God's nonexistence is a more plausible explanation for unresolved …Read more
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68Petitionary Prayer: A Response to Murray and MeyersReligious Studies 31 (4): 475-484. 1995.In a recent article in this journal, Michael Murray and Kurt Meyers offer us two innovative and thought-provoking responses to the important question of why God would, even occasionally, refrain from giving us that which he can and would like to give us until we request that he do so: to help the believer learn more about God and thus become more like him and to help the believer realize she is dependent on God. I argue that neither explanation is adequate and thus that more work on this signifi…Read more