Nick Huggett

This work first explicates the philosophy of classical and quantum fields and particles. I am interested in determining how science can have a metaphysical dimension, and then with the claim that the quantum revolution has an important metaphysical component. I argue that the metaphysical implications of a theory are properties of its models, as classical mechanics determines properties of atomic diversity and temporal continuity with its representations of distinct, continuous trajectories. ;It is often suggested that classical statistical physics requires that many particle states be represented so that permuting properties leads to distinct states; this implies that individuals can be reidentified across possible worlds in a non-qualitative way. I show there is no evidence for this conclusion, an important result, for it is claimed that quantum particles are not individuals. This claim is based on the misconception about classical statistics, but also on a conflation of notions of identity; I show that, while transworld identity is incompatible with quantum mechanics, other classical notions may be consistently ascribed. I also give a field-particle distinction that applies usefully in both quantum and classical domains. In the former the distinction helps defeat claims of underdetermined by data, in the latter it helps provide a minimal field metaphysics. ;Next I tackle renormalisation: I show how divergences occur in approximate, perturbative calculations, and demonstrate how finite, empirically verified, answers are obtained. These techniques seem to show that the predictions are not logical consequences of the exact theory. I use the techniques of the renormalisation group to establish that perturbative renormalised quantum field theory does indeed approximate the consequences of field theory. ;Finally, I discuss the idea that renormalisation proves that there can be no quantum theory of everything, only a patchwork of effective theories. The preceding chapter shows that renormalisation demonstrates only that the picture is consistent, and this is insufficient to show that physics must be phenomenological

In this paper we contrast the idea of a field as a system with an infinite number of degrees of freedom with a recent alternative proposed by Paul Teller in Teller (1990). We show that, although our characterisation lacks the immediate appeal of Teller's, it has more success producing agreement with intuitive categorisations than his does. We go on to extend the distinction to Quantum Mechanics, explaining the important role that it plays there. Finally, we take some time to investigate the way in which strings are to be considered fields, and the important differences with scalar fields. Overall, we aim to show that many types of systems may be viewed as fields, and to point out significant distinctions amongst them, thereby expanding our understanding of what it is to fall in this category.

This paper explains the phenomenon of `entanglement exchange' within the Bohmian approach to quantum mechanics. After explaining Bohmian mechanics and entanglement exchange, in which pairs of particles become entangled without ever interacting causally in the usual, unitary sense, our aim is to use this example, to illustrate how the `pilot wave' mediates non-local correlations. The discussion thus gives a useful new way to think about entanglement exchange, and clarifies the structure of Bohmian mechanics

This item is a chapter from a book in progress, entitled "True Motion". Leibniz’s mechanics was, as we shall see, a theory of elastic collisions, not formulated like Huygens’ in terms of rules explicitly covering every possible combination of relative masses and velocities, but in terms of three conservation principles, including (effectively) the conservation of momentum and kinetic energy. That is, he proposed what we now call (ironically enough) ‘Newtonian’ (or ‘classical’) elastic collision theory. While such a theory is, for instance, vital to the foundations of the kinetic theory of gases, it is not applicable to systems – like gravitational systems – in which fields of force are present. Thus, Leibniz’s mechanical principles never led to developments of the order of Newton’s in the Principia (additionally, he hamstrung their application by embedding them in a baroque philosophical system).

I criticize a certain view of the 'quanta' of quantum mechanics that sees them as fundamentally non-atomistic and fundamentally significant for our understanding of quantum fields. In particular, I have in mind work by Redhead and Teller (1991, 1992 and Teller 1990). I prove that classical particles do not have the rather strong flavour of identity often associated with them; permuting positions and momenta does not produce distinct states. I show that even the label free excitation formalism is compatible with a mild form of atomism. Finally, I summarise some of the principle objections to an 'oscillator' interpretation of quantum fields.

This paper investigates the mathematical representation of time in physics. In existing theories time is represented by the real numbers, hence their formal proper- ties represent properties of time: these are surveyed. The central question of the paper is whether the existing representation of time is adequate, or whether it can or should be supplemented: especially, do we need a physics incorporating some kind of ‘dynamical passage’ of time? The paper argues that the existing mathematical framework is resistant to such changes, and might have to be rejected by anyone seeking a physics of passage. Then it rebuts two common arguments for incorporating passage into physics, especially the claim that it is an element of experience. Finally the paper investigates whether, as has been claimed, ‘causal set theory’ provides a physics of passage.

Newton's arguments for the immobility of the parts of absolute space have been claimed to licence several proposals concerning his metaphysics. This paper clarifies Newton, first distinguishing two distinct arguments. Then, it demonstrates, contrary to Nerlich ([2005]), that Newton does not appeal to the identity of indiscernibles, but rather to a view about de re representation. Additionally, DiSalle ([1994]) claims that one argument shows Newton to be an anti-substantivalist. I agree that its premises imply a denial of a kind of substantivalism, but I show that they are inconsistent with Newton's core doctrine that not all motion is the relative motions of bodies, and so conclude that they are not part of his considered views on space. The Arguments The Identity Argument 2.1 Identity of indiscernibles for individuals 2.2 Identity of indiscernibles for worlds and states 2.3 Representation de re Kinematic Relationism Conclusion CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    What's this?

A number of commentators (especially French and Redhead, 1988, and Butterfield, 1993) have investigated the status of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII) for bosons and fermions. In this paper I extend that investigation to the full range of quantum particles of any allowed kind of statistics -- `quarticles', that is. I show that for any kind (except bosons and fermions) there are states in which PII is violated by every pair of particles, some pairs and not others, and by no pairs.

Where should we begin our story? Many books start with Newton, but Newton was responding to both Galileo1 and especially (for our purposes) Descartes. But Galileo and Descartes themselves were writing in the context of late Aristotelianism, and so were trained in and critical of that rich school of thought, so if we want to fully understand their work we would need to understand scholastic views on space and motion (see Grant, 1974, Murdoch and Sylla, 1978 and Ariew and Gabbey, 1998). But late scholasticism itself is the result of a long history tracing from Plato and Aristotle through Jewish, Arabic, Islamic and European thought. And of course Plato and Aristotle are explicitly reacting to their predecessors and contemporaries. In other words, we could start the story as early in recorded thought as we like.

Since antiquity, natural philosophers have struggled to comprehend the nature of three tightly interconnected concepts: space, time, and motion. A proper understanding of motion, in particular, has been seen to be crucial for deciding questions about the natures of space and time, and their interconnections. Since the time of Newton and Leibniz, philosophers’ struggles to comprehend these concepts have often appeared to take the form of a dispute between absolute conceptions of space, time and motion, and relational conceptions. This article guides the reader through some of the history of these philosophical struggles. Rather than taking sides in the (alleged) ongoing debates, or reproducing the standard dialectic recounted in most introductory texts, we have chosen to scrutinize carefully the history of the thinking of the canonical participants in these debates — principally Descartes, Newton, Leibniz, Mach and Einstein. Readers interested in following up either the historical questions or current debates about the natures of space, time and motion will find ample links and references scattered through the discussion and in the Other Internet Resources section below.

In this paper we critically review the various attempts that have been made to understand quantum field theory. We focus on Teller's (1990) harmonic oscillator interpretation, and Bohm et al.'s (1987) causal interpretation. The former unabashedly aims to be a purely heuristic account, but we show that it is only interestingly applicable to the free bosonic field. Along the way we suggest alternative models. Bohm's interpretation provides an ontology for the theory--a classical field, with a quantum equation of motion. This too has problems; it is not Lorentz invariant

Muller and Saunders ([2008]) purport to demonstrate that, surprisingly, bosons and fermions are discernible; this article disputes their arguments, then derives a similar conclusion in a more satisfactory fashion. After briefly explicating their proof and indicating how it escapes earlier indiscernibility results, we note that the observables which Muller and Saunders argue discern particles are (i) non-symmetric in the case of bosons and (ii) trivial multiples of the identity in the case of fermions. Both problems undermine the claim that they have shown particles to be physically discernible. We then prove two results concerning observables that are truly physical: one showing when particles are discernible and one showing when they are not (categorically) discernible. Along the way we clarify some frequently misunderstood issues concerning the interpretation of quantum observables. 1 Background2 Criticisms2.1 Bosons2.2 Fermions3 Reformulating the Insight3.1 What weakly discerns?3.2 General results4 Conclusion

This paper has two goals. (i) I explore the limits of the mathematical theory of spacetime (more generally, differential geometry) as an analytical tool for interpreting early modern thought. While it dramatically clarifies some issues, it can also lead to misunderstandings of some figures, and is a very poor tool indeed for others - Leibniz in particular. (ii) I will show how to blunt a very influential argument against a relational conception of spacetime - the view that the properties and relations of bodies exhaust the spatiotemporal.

A version of relationism that takes spatiotemporal structures—spatial geometry and a standard of inertia—to supervene on the history of relations between bodies is described and defended. The account is used to explain how the relationist should construe models of Newtonian mechanics in which absolute acceleration manifestly does not supervene on the relations; Ptolemaic and Copernican models for example. The account introduces a new way in which a Lewis-style ‘best system’ might capture regularities in a broadly Humean world; a defence is given against a charge of indeterminism that applies to any such approach to laws.