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822Recent Work on Radical SkepticismAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3): 215-257. 2002.This discussion surveys recent developments in the treatment of the epistemological problem of skepticism. These are arguments which attack our knowledge of certain truths rather than, say, our belief in the existence of certain entities. In particular, this article focuses on the radical versions of these skeptical arguments, arguments which purport to show that knowledge is, for the most part, impossible, rather than just that we lack knowledge in a particular discourse. Although most of the k…Read more
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162Radical scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic valueAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1): 19-41. 2008.It is argued that it is beneficial to view the debate regarding radical scepticism through the lens of epistemic value. In particular, it is claimed that we should regard radical scepticism as aiming to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us, and that this methodological constraint on our dealings with radical scepticism potentially has important ramifications for how we assess the success of an anti-sceptical strategy.
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218Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problemPhilosophical Studies 172 (1): 93-111. 2015.A certain construal of the Gettier problem is offered, according to which this problem concerns the task of identifying the anti-luck condition on knowledge. A methodology for approaching this construal of the Gettier problem—anti-luck epistemology—is set out, and the utility of such a methodology is demonstrated. It is argued that a range of superficially distinct cases which are meant to pose problems for anti-luck epistemology are in fact related in significant ways. It is claimed that with t…Read more
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202Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our BelievingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3): 70-90. 2016.Support is canvassed for a novel solution to the sceptical problem regarding our knowledge of the external world. Key to this solution is the claim that what initially looks like a single problem is in fact two logically distinct problems. In particular, there are two putative sceptical paradoxes in play here, which each trade on distinctive epistemological theses. It is argued that the ideal solution to radical scepticism would thus be a biscopic proposal—viz., a two-pronged, integrated, underc…Read more
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6IntroductionIn Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-8. 2016.
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61Extended Knowledge and Social EpistemologySocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (8): 105-120. 2013.The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radica…Read more
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245Relevant alternatives, perceptual knowledge and discriminationNoûs 44 (2): 245-268. 2010.This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so-called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recog…Read more
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222Contextualism, Skepticism and Warranted Assertibility ManoeuvresIn Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism, Mit Press. pp. 85-104. 2010.Attributer contextualists maintain that the verb 'knows' is context-sensitive in the sense that the truth conditions of a sentence of the form "S knows that p" can be dependent upon the ascriber's context. One natural objection against attributer contextualism is that it confuses the impropriety of certain assertions which ascribe knowledge to agents with the falsity of those assertions. In an influential article, Keith DeRose has defended attributer contextualism against this charge by proposin…Read more
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217Robust virtue epistemology and epistemic anti-individualismPacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1): 84-103. 2012.According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent's cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as age…Read more
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506 ABSTRACT. I outline GrecoÕs response to the Pyrrhonian challenge to 7 epistemic externalist theories of knowledge and offer two points of criticism. 8 I also argue, however, that there is an account of epistemic luck available 9 which can cast some light on the dispute that Greco is concerned with, and..
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10Chapter 7. Farewell to Epistemic AngstIn Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton University Press. pp. 167-188. 2016.
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115Extended cognition and epistemologyPhilosophical Explorations 15 (2). 2012.Philosophical Explorations, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 87-90, June 2012
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420Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesisSynthese 175 (1). 2010.This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforwa…Read more
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243Safety-Based Epistemology: Wither Now?Journal of Philosophical Research 34 33-45. 2009.This paper explores the prospects for safety-based theories of knowledge in the light of some recent objections.
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161Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic VertigoPhilosophia 41 (1): 27-35. 2013.We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva’s book, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the ‘framework reading’ that she offers of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and its anti-sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supplementation to the view—viz., that this way of dealing with radical scepticism needs to be augmented w…Read more
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206Resurrecting the Moorean response to the scepticInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3). 2002.G. E. Moore famously offered a strikingly straightforward response to the radical sceptic which simply consisted of the claim that one could know, on the basis of one's knowledge that one has hands, that there exists an external world. In general, the Moorean response to scepticism maintains that we can know the denials of sceptical hypotheses on the basis of our knowledge of everyday propositions. In the recent literature two proposals have been put forward to try to accommodate, to varying ext…Read more
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165Is `god exists' a `hinge proposition' of religious belief?International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (3): 129-140. 2000.There are parallels between certain responses to local epistemological scepticism about religious belief and an influential reply to radical epistemological scepticism. What ties both accounts together is that they utilise, either implicitly or explicitly, a “hinge” proposition thesis which maintains that the pivotal beliefs in question are immune to sceptical attack even though they lack sufficient epistemic grounds. It is argued that just as this strategy lacks any anti-sceptical efficacy in t…Read more
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 2000
Irvine, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |