Duncan Pritchard

Support is canvassed for a novel solution to the sceptical problem regarding our knowledge of the external world. Key to this solution is the claim that what initially looks like a single problem is in fact two logically distinct problems. In particular, there are two putative sceptical paradoxes in play here, which each trade on distinctive epistemological theses. It is argued that the ideal solution to radical scepticism would thus be a biscopic proposal—viz., a two‐pronged, integrated, undercutting treatment of both putative sceptical paradoxes. A particular biscopic proposal is then explored which brings together two apparently opposing anti‐sceptical theses: he Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation and epistemological disjunctivism. It is argued that each proposal enables us to gain a purchase on one, but only one, aspect of the two‐sided sceptical problem. Furthermore, it is argued that these proposals are not only compatible positions, but also mutually supporting and advanced in the same undercutting spirit. A potential cure is thus offered for epistemic angst.

Many of the proposals put forward to answer the radical sceptical paradox in the recent literature have involved either blocking the sceptic's highly intuitive use of the ‘closure’ principle that knowledge is closed under known entailment or, equally implausibly, ‘contextualizing’ the knowledge operator. In contrast, it is argued here that an externalist theory of knowledge, properly understood, holds the key to meeting the sceptical paradox in a manner that keeps our basic epistemological intuitions intact. In particular, it is shown how, far from failing in sceptical arguments, the sceptic's use of the closure principle is in fact validated by an externalist epistemology. A diagnosis of the main argument for non‐closure offered by Fred Dretske is then given in the light of these remarks.

This volume comprises three distinct investigations into the relationship between the nature and the value of knowledge. Each is written by one of the authors in consultation with the other two. 'Knowledge and Understanding' (by Duncan Pritchard) critically examines virtue-theoretic responses to the problem of the value of knowledge, and argues that the finally valuable cognitive state is not knowledge but understanding. 'Knowledge and Recognition' (by Alan Millar) develops an account of knowledge in which the idea of a recognitional ability plays a prominent role, and argues that this account enables us better to understand knowledge and its value. 'Knowledge and Action' (by Adrian Haddock) argues for an account of knowledge and justification which explains why knowledge is valuable, and enables us to make sense of the knowledge we have of our intentional actions.

A response to commentaries on my book, Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford University Press, 2012), by Sanford Goldberg, Clayton Littlejohn, and Ram Neta. The themes covered include: the viability of the epistemological disjunctivist response to radical skepticism (Goldberg); the extent to which epistemological disjunctivism has dialectical advantages over classical epistemic internalism from an anti-sceptical point of view (Neta); and whether epistemological disjunctivism incorporates the right view of the nature of reasons (Littlejohn).

One core kind of conversation is an argument. I take it that there is a prevailing consensus that these days people argue badly (i.e., even worse than previously). The general idea is that the information age seems to have corrupted us in core respects such that we are unable to enter into the kind of good faith arguments that drive social progress, leading us instead into a kind of intellectual dead-end whereby each shouts loudly at the other from their own cultural silo. This, at any rate, is how the issue is presented by various commentators, from mainstream media to intellectuals, and I suspect there is at least some truth in it. In any case, whatever the merits of this idea that there is a particular contemporary social malaise on this front, it is surely of philosophical interest to clarify what it would mean to argue well, if only to discern what we are presently doing wrong when we argue badly.

There seems to be an important intuition that there is a distinctive value associated with direct cognitive contact with reality, in the sense of a sensory experience of it. This intuition is unpacked. It is claimed that it is important to keep this thesis apart from related debates about the special value of first-hand knowledge, and cognate issues concerning the eudaimonic value of understanding and strong cognitive achievements. It is argued that there is an intellectual value associated with direct cognitive contact with reality. It is maintained that this thesis is not to be understood as a general preference for sensory experience of the world, but rather as the view that one desires to have a conception of reality that is experientially anchored to reality at critical junctures. It is argued that such a claim, while on the face of it in conflict with the veritist thesis that truth is the fundamental epistemic good, is in fact better understood as a natural consequence of veritism, at least insofar as that proposal is properly understood.

I have previously argued that John Henry Newman’s seminal monograph, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, was an important influence on the notebooks that make up Wittgenstein’s final work, On Certainty. In particular, I’ve argued that Newman’s brand of anti-evidentialism is a major stimulus for the radical ‘hinge’ conception of the structure of rational evaluation that Wittgenstein offers in these notebooks. I’ve also contended that taking this influence seriously lends impetus to the application of hinge epistemology to the religious case (a position I call quasi-fideism). Having made the case for Newman’s influence, I here consider some of the ways in which Newman’s anti-evidentialism diverges from a Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism, especially once we take seriously Newman’s proto-virtue epistemological remarks about how real assent can be the product of what he terms the illative sense. In an irenic spirit, I also consider what an epistemology of religious belief might look like that aims to incorporate insights from both Newman and Wittgenstein.

According to quasi-fideism, our most fundamental religious commitments are to be understood as being essentially arational. In short, they are hinge commitments, as Wittgenstein outlined in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. There seems to be a prima facie tension between quasi-fideism and the idea of virtuous intellectual character, in that one would naturally expect the virtuous intellectual subject to not have arational commitments. It is argued that this tension is illusory. When quasi-fideism and virtuous intellectual character are properly understood, there is no reason why an intellectually virtuous person could not be a quasi-fideist. This point is further illustrated by considering the specific case of the religious virtue epistemology offered by John Henry Newman, which as we will see can be shown to be in principle compatible with quasi-fideism (even though Newman was not himself a quasi-fideist).

Our overarching concern is mapping out the ramifications of the Wittgensteinian conception of hinge commitments to the religious case. More specifically, our aim is to use this conception to understand certain core features of fundamental religious commitment. Drawing on two important literary depictions of religious conviction – Anthony Burgess’s Earthly Powers, Shusaku Endo’s Silence – it is argued that a common phenomenon emerges, that of religious vertigo. This arises out of the recognition that one’s religious commitment, in its most fundamental form, is not like a regular belief at all, but rather plays a fulcrum, arational role in one’s worldview. Moreover, this recognition is usually occluded in everyday life. Fundamental religious commitment is thus revealed to be in a sense uncanny. It is argued that religious vertigo is a form of the more general epistemic vertigo that I have claimed is akey element of the later Wittgenstein’s conception of the structure of rational evaluations.

An overview is offered of Wittgenstein's groundbreaking discussion of knowledge and certainty, especially in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. The main interpretative readings of On Certainty are discussed, especially a non-propositional/non-epistemic interpretation and a variety of propositional and/or epistemic interpretations. Surveys are offered of the readings of On Certainty presented by such figures as Annalisa Coliva, John Greco, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Duncan Pritchard, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, P. F. Strawson, MichaelWilliams, and CrispinWright. This Element demonstrates how On Certainty has been especially groundbreaking for epistemology with regard to its treatment of the problem of radical scepticism.

In his final notebooks, published posthumously as _On Certainty_, Wittgenstein set forth a radical picture of the structure of rational evaluation, one that has arational hinge commitments at its heart. Much of the focus of discussion of hinge commitments has been on the commonsense, Moorean, factual commitments that fall into this class (such as that one has hands, one’s name is such-and-such, and so on). But on a plausible rendering of the Wittgensteinian position, there ought to also be hinge commitments of a broadly axiological nature, which express the subject’s fundamental values (moral, political, and so forth) that comprise her worldview. Various recent proposals for understanding axiological hinge commitments are considered, with most of them found to be problematic. A particular conception of axiological hinge commitments is offered, and their philosophical relevance is explored by considering how they relate to deep moral disagreements.

My interest is in an apparent tension between two epistemological theses. The first is veritism, which is roughly the claim that truth is the fundamental epistemic good. The second is the idea that understanding is the proper goal of inquiry. The two theses seem to be in tension because the former seems to imply that the proper goal of inquiry should be truth rather than understanding. And yet there is a strong prima facie case to be made for thinking that properly conducted inquiry aims at an elevated epistemic standing like understanding rather than merely true belief. I suggest that this putative tension is one of the reasons why veritism is these days not widely endorsed. As I show, however, there is in fact no tension between these two claims, at least once they are each properly understood. Indeed, I will be suggesting that there is a plausible conception of veritism which would explain why intellectual exemplars seek out understanding in inquiry.

I want to suggest a way of approaching On Certainty that treats what Wittgenstein is doing in the notebooks that make up this work as manifesting a kind philosophical practice that is broadly Pyrrhonian, at least on one reading of what this involves. Such a reading fits with the general philosophical quietism found in Wittgenstein’s work, particularly in his later writings, and is also supported by independent textual evidence that he was profoundly influenced by Pyrrhonian scepticism. Crucially, however, it also helps to clarify the sense in which the Pyrrhonian sceptical techniques, and hence the kind of philosophical quietism that goes along with them, can have an essentially disquieting effect on the subject.

Philosophy for Everyone begins by explaining what philosophy is before exploring the questions and issues at the foundation of this important subject. Key topics and their areas of focus include: Moral philosophy – the nature of our moral judgments and reactions, whether they aim at some objective moral truth, or are mere personal or cultural preferences; and the possibility of moral responsibility given the sorts of things that cause behavior; Political philosophy – fundamental questions about the nature of states and their relationship to the citizens within those states Epistemology – what our knowledge of the world and ourselves consists in, and how we come to have it; and whether we should form beliefs by trusting what other people tell us; Philosophy of mind – what it means for something to have a mind, and how minds should be understood and explained; Philosophy of science – foundational conceptual issues in scientific research and practice, such as whether scientific theories are true; and Metaphysics - fundamental questions about the nature of reality, such as whether we have free will, or whether time travel is possible. This book is designed to be used in conjunction with the free ‘Introduction to Philosophy’ MOOC (massive open online course) created by the University of Edinburgh’s _Eidyn_ research centre, and hosted by the Coursera platform ( www.coursera.org/course/introphil ).

What is knowledge? Where does it come from? What kinds of knowledge are there? Can we know anything at all? What is the practical relevance of learning about epistemology? This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology. Both traditional issues and contemporary ideas are discussed in twenty easily digestible chapters, each of which conclude with a useful summary of the main ideas discussed, study questions, annotated further reading and a guide to internet resources. Each chapter also features text boxes providing bite-sized summaries of key concepts and major philosophers, and clear and interesting examples are used throughout. The book concludes with an annotated guide to general introductions to epistemology, a glossary of key terms, and a summary of the main examples used in epistemology. This is an ideal first textbook in the theory of knowledge for undergraduates coming to philosophy for the first time. The fifth edition has been revised and updated throughout and features two new chapters on social epistemology. In addition, the text as a whole has been refreshed to keep it up to date with current developments.