Duncan Pritchard

A central research question in social epistemology concerns the nature of expertise, and the related question of how expertise in various domains (epistemic, moral, etc.) is to be identified. Entirely apart from this debate, recent research in bioethics considers whether and to what extent cognitive scaffolding via the use of artificial intelligence might be a viable non-pharmaceutical form of moral enhancement. A particularly promising version of this strategy takes the form of ‘Socratic AI’—viz., an ‘artificial intelligence (AI) assistant’ that engages in Socratic dialogue with users to assist in ethical reasoning non-prescriptively. My aim will be to connect these disparate strands of work in order to investigate whether Socratic-AI assisted moral enhancement is compatible with manifesting genuine moral expertise, and how the capacity of Socratic AI to improve moral reasoning might influence our criteria for identifying moral experts.

This chapter develops a novel Neo-Moorean view. The view falls squarely within the Radical Neo-Moorean camp, in that it holds that closure holds unrestrictedly, warrant transmits through Moore’s inference, and that there is nothing wrong – epistemically or dialectically – with Moore’s argument. Nevertheless, the account is superior to extant Radical Neo-Mooreanisms in explanatory power: it explains both the precise variety of epistemic failure exhibited by the sceptic, and the intuition of reasonableness when it comes to the sceptic’s resistance to Moore’s argument. It does so in terms of epistemic functions and contrary-to-duty obligations.

A liberal account of epistemic exemplarity for education is developed. Building on recent work in virtue epistemology, it is argued that the standard view of epistemic role models as exceptionally virtuous and imitable agents faces significant pedagogical limitations. We propose expanding this conception in two directions: by including _enkratic_ exemplars, who demonstrate virtuous conduct despite inner conflict and thus qualify as exemplars despite lacking full virtue; and by incorporating _injustice illuminators_, whose meta-lucidity reveals forms of epistemic oppression and who can serve as exemplars even when their conduct cannot be directly emulated. This enriched framework addresses key challenges facing traditional exemplarism while preserving its insight that we can learn to be better epistemic agents through engagement with appropriate role models. The resulting account equips educators with richer resources for fostering intellectual virtue development.

In his recent monograph—Ignorance: A Philosophical Study—Rik Peels offers a critique of the normative account of ignorance that I have developed and defended in recent work. I hereby respond to that critique. I argue that Peels’ response, even by its own lights, in fact concedes far more to the idea that there is a normative condition on ignorance than he realizes. Indeed, I conclude that Peels would be wise to embrace the normative condition on ignorance that I propose and try to incorporate it into his own theory of ignorance.

An account is offered of the nature of fake news, and it is explained how this account differs from the main proposals in the contemporary philosophical literature in this regard. One key feature of the account is the idea that fake news is not a genuine form of news. In particular, fake news is to be distinguished from genuine news that is epistemically problematic. It is argued that this point is important because it entails that what is required to differentiate news with a sound epistemic pedigree from news that has a poor epistemic pedigree is distinct from what is required to differentiate genuine news from fake news. This has implications for how we should manage the challenge posed by fake news, at both the individual and the structural levels.

This chapter investigates connections between Knowledge-First epistemology and a meta-epistemological thesis defended elsewhere by the authors (and in opposition to robust forms of virtue epistemology) under the description of _epistemic anti-individualism._ Epistemic anti-individualism is a denial of the epistemic individualist’s claim that warrant—i.e. what converts true belief into knowledge—supervenes on internal physical properties of individuals, perhaps in conjunction with local environmental properties. The chapter has two central aims. First, it argues that ‘epistemic twin earth’ thought experiments which reveal robust virtue epistemology (RVE) are problematically committed to epistemic individualism also show that _evidentialist mentalism_ is likewise committed to individualism. Second, it argues that, even though a _knowledge-first_ approach in epistemology is in principle (unlike RVE and evidentialist mentalism) consistent with epistemic _anti_-individualism, this approach fails to offer a plausible account of epistemic supervenience. The chapter suggests this point is a reason to pursue epistemic anti-individualism outside the knowledge-first framework.

One of the most important research programs in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition. In this area of study, features of a subject’s cognitive environment can, in certain conditions, become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. The aim of this volume is to explore the epistemological ramifications of this idea. The book brings together papers written by a range of distinguished and emerging academics, from a variety of different perspectives, to investigate the very idea of an extended epistemology. The first part of the volume explores foundational issues with regard to an extended epistemology as well as from a critical perspective. The second part of the volume examines the applications of this idea, and the new theoretical directions that it might take us. These include the relevance of Chinese philosophy, the ethical ramifications of extended epistemology, and its import to the epistemology of education, moral ethics, and emerging digital technologies.

Fumerton’s distinctive brand of metaepistemological scepticism is compared and contrasted with the related position outlined by Stroud. It is argued that there are at least three interesting points of contact between Fumerton and Stroud’s metaepistemology. The first is that both Fumerton and Stroud think that (1) externalist theories of justification permit a kind of non-inferential, perceptual justification for our beliefs about non-psychological reality, but it’s not sufficient for philosophical assurance. However, Fumerton claims, while Stroud denies, that (2) direct acquaintance with facts is sufficient for philosophical assurance. And this is important because Stroud thinks that (3) we have direct perceptual access or acquaintance with facts about the external world, while Fumerton denies this. What is key to understanding the metaepistemological scepticism offered by Fumerton and Stroud is an appreciation of the role that rule-circular explanations could potentially play in an account of how our knowledge of the world is possible.

A familiar kind of sceptical problem of both a local and a global variety is described. A popular strategy inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘hinge propositions’ in _On Certainty_ for dealing with this problem which makes appeal to the notion of _entitlement_ is then set out, and the core problem facing this strategy is outlined. It is argued that the local sceptical problem is in fact entirely illusory, and hence that the entitlement strategy is not needed for dealing with it. Furthermore, it is claimed that a deeper reflection on the kind of commitments we have to hinge propositions—a reflection that draws more heavily on Wittgenstein’s remarks in this regard—reveals that the global sceptical problem is ultimately illusory too. Again, then, the entitlement strategy is not required in order to deal with this problem. Still, it is argued that there is an important anti-sceptical role that the entitlement strategy—at least once suitably reconfigured—can play, in that it can offer us a rational basis on which we can embrace the limited power of our reasons (something which is highlighted by the sceptical problem). Moreover, this reconfigured version of the entitlement strategy does not face the core problem that the standard version of this strategy is susceptible to.

This chapter examines epistemic value—what is valuable from the epistemic point of view--and defends the thesis that truth is sole fundamental epistemic good. Recently it has become more commonplace reject this conception of the epistemic good for a variety of reasons, but this chapter argues that this move has been too hasty. It addresses three of the most prominent arguments against truth being the fundamental epistemic good, and finds each unpersuasive. First, it takes on the swamping problem, which alleges that knowledge is more valuable than true belief, and that this cannot be accounted for if truth is the fundamental epistemic good. The second objection addressed is the challenge of accounting for why we shouldn’t focus our inquiry on trivial truths if truth is the fundamental epistemic good. Finally, this chapter gives an account of why typically only once one has achieved knowledge inquiry appropriately closed off.

An anti-luck/anti-risk account of assertion is offered—the _safety_ account of assertion—and contrasted with the two leading accounts of assertion in the contemporary literature—viz., the _knowledge_ account and the _justification_ account. In section 8.1, it is argued that knowledge excludes epistemic luck, and that this claim is best understood in terms of the necessity of a particular formulation of the safety condition for knowledge. Section 8.2 considers the knowledge and justification accounts of assertion, and the respective problems that they face. Section 8.3 outlines the anti-luck/anti-risk safety account of assertion. It is shown that this view has important advantages over both the knowledge and justification accounts of assertion. Section 8.4 deals with some prima facie problems facing the safety account by appeal to the distinction between _primary_ and _secondary propriety_, a distinction introduced by proponents of the rival knowledge account of assertion. Section 8.5 concludes with a diagnosis of why assertion might require safety, as opposed to a distinct epistemic standing like justification or knowledge.

This chapter offers a new account of the nature of achievements, which can avoid the problems facing the old account put forward by robust virtue epistemology. It argues that achievements, so construed, are plausible candidates for final value. The relevance of this point for the value of understanding is then explored. A certain core kind of understanding is put forward for consideration, and it is argued that this form of understanding is factive. Interestingly, while this form of understanding is incompatible with ‘Gettier-style’ epistemic luck, it is (unlike knowledge) compatible with environmental epistemic luck. More generally, it is argued that understanding and knowledge come apart, and come apart precisely because understanding, unlike knowledge, is a form of cognitive achvievement, and hence is finally valuable. Some potential implications of the final value of understanding are explored concerning the problem of radical scepticism and the goal of inquiry.

This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as central, cannot accommodate the ability intuition, and that a robust virtue epistemology which takes the ability intuition as central cannot accommodate the anti-luck intuition. It is suggested that the proper moral to be extracted from this _impasse_ is that we need an _anti-luck virtue epistemology_ — a theory of knowledge which incorporates two separate epistemic conditions designed to accommodate each of the two master intuitions about knowledge. Such a view can accommodate a range of key examples of interest to epistemologists. A genealogical diagnosis of the structure of knowledge is offered which supports this proposal. Anti-luck virtue epistemology can adequately respond to those versions of the value problem for knowledge which do not trade on the intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.

This chapter describes two forms of virtue epistemology: modest and robust. The latter is uniquely able to make a plausible case for the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive form of achievement. Since achievements are, arguably, finally valuable, robust virtue epistemology thus seems uniquely able to offer a defence of the thesis that knowledge is finally valuable, and thereby resolve the various forms of the value of problem for knowledge. Unfortunately, the view faces some fatal problems. In particular, it is shown that there are cases of knowledge — such as testimonial knowledge that is gained via trust — which do not constitute achievements. There are also cases of cognitive achievement — such as the cognitive achievement on display in the barn facade case — which do not constitute knowledge because of the presence of environmental epistemic luck. In light of the failure of robust virtue epistemology to deal with the value problem(s) for knowledge, it is argued that knowledge is not finally valuable.

This chapter introduces the value problem for knowledge and distinguishes various forms of this problem. It shows that one such form of the problem — the swamping problem — poses a difficulty for a certain conception of epistemic value which is termed _epistemic value T-monism_. Various responses to this problem are canvassed. It is argued that the putative final value of knowledge is important to assessing the value problem, since if knowledge is indeed finally valuable then all the different forms of the value problem, including the swamping problem, are thereby seemingly resolved.

We investigate the explanatory role of epistemic virtue in accounting for the success of science as a social institution that is characterized by predominantly epistemic ends. We explore several structural explanations of the epistemic success of science that commonly rule out virtue attributions to scientists. These accounts underline the economic structure of science as the chief explanatory factor in its collective success, and endorse a common conclusion, namely that collective epistemic virtue can obtain in the absence of individual epistemic virtue. We call this position virtue radicalism. We analyze the credibility crisis in the social and behavioral sciences as an anomaly for the virtue radicalist position, as the same incentive structure is shared across all scientific fields but leads to different collective outcomes. We then argue for a stronger claim against virtue radicalism, namely that the collective success of science cannot be reduced to any social structure, because the presence of a significant proportion of epistemically virtuous scientists in a scientific community is a necessary condition for the establishment, maintenance, and reform of any social structure with a view to reliable and sustainable knowledge-production.

The Gettier Problem is conceived in a specific fashion as the problem of offering an informative (but not necessarily reductive) Gettier-proof analysis of knowledge. A solution is offered to this problem via _anti-luck virtue epistemology_. This is an account of knowledge which incorporates both an anti-luck condition and a virtue condition, and which is thereby able to avoid problems that face some of the main competing accounts of knowledge, particularly those offered by proponents of _robust virtue epistemology_. In particular, it is able to accommodate the _epistemic dependence_ of knowledge on external factors, where this has both a positive and a negative aspect. Relatedly, it can also avoid the problem posed by _epistemic twin earth_ cases. Anti-luck virtue epistemology is then motivated and defended in light of a range of objections, in order to demonstrate its potential as a resolution to the Gettier Problem, so conceived.

What is Knowledge? Where does it come from? Can we know anything at all? This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology including recent developments such as virtue epistemology and contextualism. Duncan Pritchard discusses traditional issues and contemporary ideas in thirteen easily digestible sections, including: the value of knowledge the structure of knowledge virtues and faculties perception testimony and memory induction scepticism. _What is this thing called Knowledge?_ contains many helpful student-friendly features including study questions, annotated further reading, a glossary and a guide to web resources. Clear and interesting examples are used throughout. This is an ideal first textbook in the theory of knowledge for undergraduates taking a first course in philosophy.

A brain in a vat (biv) has no inkling of its situation because it cannot distinguish between being a biv and having unenvatted experiences. It would thus unknowingly occupy what we might call the epistemic shadowlands, where one’s experiences seem verdicial but are in fact highly deceptive. What is the rational standing of one’s beliefs in the shadowlands? According to the new evil demon intuition (ned), it ought to be at least on par with the rational standing of the beliefs of one’s unenvatted counterpart. This intuition is in direct conflict with epistemological disjunctivism, which holds that the rational support that one’s beliefs enjoy, in the best case, can be factive reasons which entail the truth of the (empirical) belief in question. This kind of rational support will clearly be unavailable to a biv. This article explores the relationship between epistemological disjunctivism and the ned and argues for a principled account for why the rational standing of a biv’s beliefs is impoverished in comparison to one’s own’s. We also explore how epistemological disjunctivism is related to the more general, and distinct, project of offering a theory of knowledge.

Wittgenstein’s posthumously published work, On Certainty, has had a radical effect on contemporary epistemology. Since this text is composed of four notebooks that Wittgenstein wrote just before he died, and hence had no opportunity to edit, it is natural to suppose that the idea of a definitive overarching reading of this work that is supported by the text is chimerical. I want to propose, however, that a close reading of these notebooks reveals that this is not the case. In fact, I want to argue that Wittgenstein is progressively closing in on a particular account of the special kind of hinge certainty—what I call hinge commitment—that interested him, and which plays a framework role in our system of rational evaluation. Crucial to this interpretation is the idea that many of the certainties that Wittgenstein discusses in On Certainty are not hinge commitments. Accordingly, I call this account the restrictive reading.

A liberal account of epistemic exemplarity for education is developed. Building on recent work in virtue epistemology, it is argued that the standard view of epistemic role models as exceptionally virtuous and imitable agents faces significant pedagogical limitations. We propose expanding this conception in two directions: by including _enkratic_ exemplars, who demonstrate virtuous conduct despite inner conflict and thus qualify as exemplars despite lacking full virtue; and by incorporating _injustice illuminators_, whose meta-lucidity reveals forms of epistemic oppression and who can serve as exemplars even when their conduct cannot be directly emulated. This enriched framework addresses key challenges facing traditional exemplarism while preserving its insight that we can learn to be better epistemic agents through engagement with appropriate role models. The resulting account equips educators with richer resources for fostering intellectual virtue development.