-
123Is there an empirical answer to the explanatory gap argument?Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2): 202-205. 1998.
-
265The Second-Person PerspectiveInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1). 2012.Abstract The rise of social neuroscience has brought the second-person perspective back into the focus of philosophy. Although this is not a new topic, it is certainly less well understood than the first-person and third-person perspectives, and it is even unclear whether it can be reduced to one of these perspectives. The present paper argues that no such reduction is possible because the second-person perspective provides a unique kind of access to certain facts, namely other persons' mental s…Read more
-
40Revision der Moderne Th. W. Adorno und Jean-François LyotardDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 39 (11): 1266-1278. 1991.
-
69Nihilismus der höchsten ErwartungZeitschrift für Religions- Und Geistesgeschichte 44 (4): 322-344. 1992.
-
24Ludwig Klages: Heidnische GnosisIn Dithyrambiker des Untergangs: Gnostizismus in Ästhetik Und Philosophie der Moderne, Akademie Verlag. pp. 135-198. 1994.
-
1Il concetto kantiano della teleologiaRivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 75 (4): 571-589. 1998.
-
17TheodizeeIn Pessimismus: Geschichtsphilosophie, Metaphysik Und Moderne von Nietzsche Bis Spengler, De Gruyter. pp. 51-63. 1997.
-
28Pessimismus und UtopieIn Pessimismus: Geschichtsphilosophie, Metaphysik Und Moderne von Nietzsche Bis Spengler, De Gruyter. pp. 164-172. 1997.
-
74NCC research and the problem of consciousnessPhilosophy and the Mind Sciences 2. 2021.One of the reasons why the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Program could appear attractive in the 1990s was that it seemed to disentangle theoretical and empirical problems. Theoretical disagreements could thus be sidestepped in order to focus on empirical research regarding the neural substrate of consciousness. One of the further consequences of this dissociation of empirical and theoretical questions was that fundamental questions regarding the Mind Body Problem or the “Hard Problem of Con…Read more
-
28Metaphysischer PessimismusIn Pessimismus: Geschichtsphilosophie, Metaphysik Und Moderne von Nietzsche Bis Spengler, De Gruyter. pp. 103-143. 1997.
-
31KulturpessimismusIn Pessimismus: Geschichtsphilosophie, Metaphysik Und Moderne von Nietzsche Bis Spengler, De Gruyter. pp. 144-153. 1997.
-
25Zur Rolle des Individuums in Kants GeschichtsphilosophieIn Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 35-43. 2001.
-
18SchlußbemerkungIn Dithyrambiker des Untergangs: Gnostizismus in Ästhetik Und Philosophie der Moderne, Akademie Verlag. pp. 449-452. 1994.
-
74Neuroökonomie – Grundlagen und GrenzenAnalyse & Kritik 29 (1): 24-37. 2007.According to a widespread view, neuroscientific basic research tells us more about the essence of the mind than psychology and may, in the long run, even replace those higher level approaches. Contrary to this view, it is demonstrated that many features can only be observed and explained on a certain level of complexity. This is particularly obvious in the case of neuromarketing and neuroeconomics. In both cases, neuroscientific methods depend on behavioral paradigms. Still, neuroscientific rese…Read more
-
17Neue Experimente zu alten FragenIn Gerhard Gamm & Jens Kertscher (eds.), Philosophie in Experimenten: Versuche explorativen Denkens, Transcript Verlag. pp. 137-160. 2011.
-
227Is type identity incompatible with multiple realization?Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1): 37-49. 2002.It is commonly believed that there is a fundamental incompatibility between multiple realization and type identity in the philosophy of mind. This claim can be challenged, however, since a single neural type may be realized by different microphysical types. In this case, the identity statement would connect the psychological and the neural type, while the neural type, in turn, could be multiply realized by different microphysical types. Such a multiple realization of higher level types occurs qu…Read more
-
Selbstbewusstsein: Ein metaphysisches Relikt? Philosophische und empirische Befunde zur Konstitution von SubjektivitätSelbst Und Gehirn. Menschliches Selbstbewusstsein Und Seine Neurobiologischen Grundlagen, Paderborn. forthcoming.
-
26„Interpretationen der Wahrheit“. Bericht über die Tagung des Engeren Kreises der AGPD in Tübingen, 28. September – 1. Oktober 1998 (review)Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 24 (1): 81-88. 1999.
-
215. Spinoza und die Identitätstheorie (2p1–2p13)In Michael Hampe & Robert Schnepf (eds.), Baruch de Spinoza: Ethik in geometrischer Ordnung dargestellt, Akademie Verlag. pp. 81-100. 2006.
-
120Phenomenal experience and science: Separated by a “brick wall”?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6): 968-968. 1999.Palmer's principled distinction between first-person experience and scientific access is called into question. First, complete color transformations of experience and memory may be undetectable even from the first-person perspective. Second, transformations of (say) pain experiences seem to be intrinsically connected to certain effects, thus giving science access to these experiences, in principle. Evidence from pain research and emotional psychology indicates that further progress can be made.
-
27NeuroethikIn Ralf Stoecker, Christian Neuhäuser & Marie-Luise Raters (eds.), Handbuch Angewandte Ethik, Verlag J.b. Metzler. pp. 321-328. 2011.Angesichts der großen praktischen und theoretischen Bedeutung der Neurowissenschaften ist es nicht weiter verwunderlich, dass mit dem Aufstieg dieser Disziplinen bald auch schon die Frage nach der Notwendigkeit einer Neuroethik bzw. einer Angewandten Ethik der Neurowissenschaften gestellt wurde (Roskies 2002; Glannon 2007). Betrachtet man als Bedingung für die Notwendigkeit einer Angewandten Ethik, dass eine bestimmte wissenschaftliche Disziplin oder ein Handlungsfeld ethische Fragen aufwirft, d…Read more
-
21LiteraturIn Dithyrambiker des Untergangs: Gnostizismus in Ästhetik Und Philosophie der Moderne, Akademie Verlag. pp. 413-441. 1994.
-
179The Functional Mapping HypothesisTopoi 36 (1): 107-118. 2017.Dissociation thought experiments like Zombie and Inverted Spectrum cases play an essential role in the qualia debate. Critics have long since argued that these cases raise serious epistemic issues, undermining first person access to phenomenal states also in normal subjects. Proponents have denied this because, due to their phenomenal experience, normal subjects have epistemic abilities that Zombies don’t have. Here I will present a modified version of these thought experiments: Part-time Zombie…Read more
-
17IndexIn Dithyrambiker des Untergangs: Gnostizismus in Ästhetik Und Philosophie der Moderne, Akademie Verlag. pp. 442-448. 1994.
-
96Materialism, metaphysics, and the intuition of distinctnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8): 7-8. 2011.According to many philosophers, an 'explanatory gap' exists between third-person scientific theories and qualitative firstperson experience of mental states like pain feelings or colour experiences such that the former can't explain the latter. Here it is argued that the thought experiments that are invoked by this position are inconsistent, that the position requires a specific kind of first-person privilege which actually does not exist, and that the underlying argument is circular because it …Read more