•  265
    The Second-Person Perspective
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1). 2012.
    Abstract The rise of social neuroscience has brought the second-person perspective back into the focus of philosophy. Although this is not a new topic, it is certainly less well understood than the first-person and third-person perspectives, and it is even unclear whether it can be reduced to one of these perspectives. The present paper argues that no such reduction is possible because the second-person perspective provides a unique kind of access to certain facts, namely other persons' mental s…Read more
  •  40
    Revision der Moderne Th. W. Adorno und Jean-François Lyotard
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 39 (11): 1266-1278. 1991.
  •  69
    Nihilismus der höchsten Erwartung
    Zeitschrift für Religions- Und Geistesgeschichte 44 (4): 322-344. 1992.
  •  1
    Il concetto kantiano della teleologia
    Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 75 (4): 571-589. 1998.
  •  74
    NCC research and the problem of consciousness
    Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 2. 2021.
    One of the reasons why the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Program could appear attractive in the 1990s was that it seemed to disentangle theoretical and empirical problems. Theoretical disagreements could thus be sidestepped in order to focus on empirical research regarding the neural substrate of consciousness. One of the further consequences of this dissociation of empirical and theoretical questions was that fundamental questions regarding the Mind Body Problem or the “Hard Problem of Con…Read more
  •  25
    Zur Rolle des Individuums in Kants Geschichtsphilosophie
    In Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 35-43. 2001.
  •  74
    Neuroökonomie – Grundlagen und Grenzen
    Analyse & Kritik 29 (1): 24-37. 2007.
    According to a widespread view, neuroscientific basic research tells us more about the essence of the mind than psychology and may, in the long run, even replace those higher level approaches. Contrary to this view, it is demonstrated that many features can only be observed and explained on a certain level of complexity. This is particularly obvious in the case of neuromarketing and neuroeconomics. In both cases, neuroscientific methods depend on behavioral paradigms. Still, neuroscientific rese…Read more
  •  17
    Neue Experimente zu alten Fragen
    In Gerhard Gamm & Jens Kertscher (eds.), Philosophie in Experimenten: Versuche explorativen Denkens, Transcript Verlag. pp. 137-160. 2011.
  •  227
    Is type identity incompatible with multiple realization?
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1): 37-49. 2002.
    It is commonly believed that there is a fundamental incompatibility between multiple realization and type identity in the philosophy of mind. This claim can be challenged, however, since a single neural type may be realized by different microphysical types. In this case, the identity statement would connect the psychological and the neural type, while the neural type, in turn, could be multiply realized by different microphysical types. Such a multiple realization of higher level types occurs qu…Read more
  • Selbstbewusstsein: Ein metaphysisches Relikt? Philosophische und empirische Befunde zur Konstitution von Subjektivität
    Selbst Und Gehirn. Menschliches Selbstbewusstsein Und Seine Neurobiologischen Grundlagen, Paderborn. forthcoming.
  •  21
  •  120
    Phenomenal experience and science: Separated by a “brick wall”?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6): 968-968. 1999.
    Palmer's principled distinction between first-person experience and scientific access is called into question. First, complete color transformations of experience and memory may be undetectable even from the first-person perspective. Second, transformations of (say) pain experiences seem to be intrinsically connected to certain effects, thus giving science access to these experiences, in principle. Evidence from pain research and emotional psychology indicates that further progress can be made.
  •  27
    Neuroethik
    In Ralf Stoecker, Christian Neuhäuser & Marie-Luise Raters (eds.), Handbuch Angewandte Ethik, Verlag J.b. Metzler. pp. 321-328. 2011.
    Angesichts der großen praktischen und theoretischen Bedeutung der Neurowissenschaften ist es nicht weiter verwunderlich, dass mit dem Aufstieg dieser Disziplinen bald auch schon die Frage nach der Notwendigkeit einer Neuroethik bzw. einer Angewandten Ethik der Neurowissenschaften gestellt wurde (Roskies 2002; Glannon 2007). Betrachtet man als Bedingung für die Notwendigkeit einer Angewandten Ethik, dass eine bestimmte wissenschaftliche Disziplin oder ein Handlungsfeld ethische Fragen aufwirft, d…Read more
  •  101
    Measuring the mental
    Consciousness and Cognition 90 (C): 103106. 2021.
  •  179
    The Functional Mapping Hypothesis
    Topoi 36 (1): 107-118. 2017.
    Dissociation thought experiments like Zombie and Inverted Spectrum cases play an essential role in the qualia debate. Critics have long since argued that these cases raise serious epistemic issues, undermining first person access to phenomenal states also in normal subjects. Proponents have denied this because, due to their phenomenal experience, normal subjects have epistemic abilities that Zombies don’t have. Here I will present a modified version of these thought experiments: Part-time Zombie…Read more
  •  96
    Materialism, metaphysics, and the intuition of distinctness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8): 7-8. 2011.
    According to many philosophers, an 'explanatory gap' exists between third-person scientific theories and qualitative firstperson experience of mental states like pain feelings or colour experiences such that the former can't explain the latter. Here it is argued that the thought experiments that are invoked by this position are inconsistent, that the position requires a specific kind of first-person privilege which actually does not exist, and that the underlying argument is circular because it …Read more