Michael Walschots

This thesis is a discussion of Theodor Adorno's concept of the "addendum". In contrast to Immanuel Kant who claimed that free and moral action amounts to pure reason alone being the cause of action, Adorno believes that a physical impulse is required for action to take place. This thesis begins by discussing Kant's philosophy in the first chapter and moves to a discussion of the addendum in the second. In the third chapter I discuss the addendum's place in Adorno's moral philosophy. In that there is always a physical component involved in action, Adorno believes that some materially motivated action can be morally good. Specifically, it is the impulsive response to suffering and physical pain that Adorno believes is morally good because, as I suggest, it is only by so responding that the Holocaust can be prevented from happening again.

The primary method of evaluation in philosophy courses (both undergraduate and graduate) is usually some form of research paper or essay. There is an assumption, however, that the only kind of essay that philosophy students need to learn how to write is the argumentative essay. Indeed, philosophy instructors often consider other forms of writing less significant. This workshop intends to break down these introducing participants to a variety of essay styles, and to other forms of practical part of undergraduate philosophy coursework. The goal of this workshop is to encourage instructors to create more purposeful and creative writing assignments in their own future courses.

Kant did not initially intend to write the Critique of Practical Reason, let alone three Critiques. It was primarily the reactions to the Critique of Pure Reason and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that encouraged Kant to develop his moral philosophy in the second Critique. This volume presents both new and first-time English translations of texts written by Kant’s predecessors and contemporaries that he read and responded to in the Critique of Practical Reason. It also includes several subsequent reactions to the second Critique. Together, the translations in this volume present the Critique of Practical Reason in its full historical context, offering scholars and students new insight into Kant’s moral philosophy. The detailed editorial material appended to each of the eleven chapters helps introduce readers to the life and works of the authors, outlines the texts translated, and points to relevant passages across Kant’s works.

In this paper I critically engage with Pauline Kleingeld’s ‘volitional self-contradiction’ interpretation of Kant’s formula of universal law. I make three remarks: first, I seek to clarify what it means for a contradiction to be volitional as opposed to logical; second, I suggest that her interpretation might need to be closer to Korsgaard’s ‘practical contradiction’ interpretation than she thinks; and third, I suggest that more work needs to be done to explain how a volitional self-contradiction generates both a ‘contradiction in conception’ and a ‘contradiction in will.’

Throughout Theodor Adorno’s Negative Dialectics moral philosophy is discussed only indirectly, as a subject which is relevant to the more primary discussions of freedom and world history, among others. In the relatively recently released English translation of the History and Freedom lectures, however, moral philosophy is more explicitly discussed, but even there its subject matter is of secondary importance to the more fundamental discussions of the philosophy of history and of freedom. In fact, that moral philosophy is an auxiliary concern in these lectures reveals much about how Adorno views moral philosophy. Perhaps a trivial detail but revealing nonetheless, the lecture entitled ‘Transition to Moral Philosophy’ points to something quite essential about Adorno’s moral philosophy. In this lecture Adorno attempts to show that his previous discussions of the philosophy of history have direct bearing on the concept of freedom. He claims that his task is to articulate “what we [can glean]…about the problem of freedom, from the discussions of the philosophy of history” (HF, 177). Adorno rightfully believes that freedom, the ability to act (in some way) without being determined to do so, is a precondition of one’s actions being considered on moral grounds, of one being held morally accountable for such actions. Surely, therefore, it is appropriate that a transition takes place from discussing freedom to discussing moral philosophy. There is something else going on here, however, that reveals the peculiar nature of Adorno’s moral philosophy. The above quote reveals that the philosophy of history conditions the problem of freedom, and therefore moral philosophy for Adorno. The following paper attempts to show how Adorno’s moral philosophy is situated within his more foundational considerations of the philosophy of history and of freedom. As a result of it being so situated it also attempts to argue that the History and Freedom lectures reveal that the task for moral philosophy is the critique of moral philosophy.

This is a collection of sixteen essays by a diverse group of international scholars that offers a wide-ranging and contemporary perspective on the major aspects of Christian Wolff’s ethics. The volume focuses on Wolff’s German Ethics, arguably his most important and influential text on moral philosophy, but many of the chapters also consider the development of the basic tenets of Wolff’s moral theory in his later Latin writings. The contributions cover a range of topics, including the systematic structure of the text itself and the relation between Wolff’s ethics and the preceding natural law tradition. Many chapters pay special attention to the core concepts of Wolff’s moral philosophy, such as obligation, perfection, the highest good, and happiness. Other notable topics include Wolff’s conception of moral judgment and moral education, as well as the role of psychology and anthropology in his ethical thought. The volume also contains discussion of the influence of Wolff’s ethics on subsequent figures such as C.A. Crusius, G.F. Meier, and Kant. As a whole, the volume seeks to establish the importance of Wolff’s German Ethics within the history of ethics as well as inspire others to engage with his thought.