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129Brink, Kagan, Utilitarianism and Self-SacrificeUtilitas 3 (2): 263. 1991.Act-utilitarianism claims that one is required to do nothing less than what makes the largest contribution to overall utility. Critics of this moral theory commonly charge that it is unreasonably demanding. Shelly Kagan and David Brink, however, have recently defended act-utilitarianism against this charge. Kagan argues that act-utilitarianism is right, and its critics wrong, about how demanding morality is. In contrast, Brink argues that, once we have the correct objective account of welfare an…Read more
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22FairnessEthical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4): 329-352. 2005.The main body of this paper assesses a leading recent theory of fairness, a theory put forward by John Broome. I discuss Broome's theory partly because of its prominence and partly because I think it points us in the right direction, even if it takes some missteps. In the course of discussing Broome's theory, I aim to cast light on the relation of fairness to consistency, equality, impartiality, desert, rights, and agreements. Indeed, before I start assessing Broome's theory, I discuss two very …Read more
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19Publicity in moralityRatio 23 111-117. 2010.Consider the idea that moral rules must be suitable for public acknowledgement and acceptance, i.e., that moral rules must be suitable for being ‘widely known and explicitly recognized’, suitable for teaching as part of moral education, suitable for guiding behaviour and reactions to behaviour, and thus suitable for justifying one’s behaviour to others. This idea is now most often associated with John Rawls, who traces it back through Kurt Baier to Kant.[1] My book developing ruleconsequentialis…Read more
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45Theory vs anti-theory in ethicsIn Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Value, Luck, and Commitment, Oxford University Press. pp. 19-40. 2012.
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14Moral particularism and the real worldIn M. Lance, M. Potrc & V. Strahovnik (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism, Routledge. pp. 12-30. 2007.
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58The demandingness objectionIn Tim Chappell (ed.), The Problem of Moral Demandingness, Palgrave. pp. 148-62. 2009.
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121Sidgwick and Common–Sense MoralityUtilitas 12 (3): 347. 2000.This paper begins by celebrating Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. It then discusses Sidgwick's moral epistemology and in particular the coherentist element introduced by his argument from common-sense morality to utilitarianism. The paper moves on to a discussion of how common-sense morality seems more appealing if its principles are formulated as picking out pro tanto considerations rather than all-things-considered demands. Thefinal section of the paper considers the question of which version of …Read more
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412The demandingness objectionIn T. Chappell (ed.), The Problem of Moral Demandingness, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 148-162. 2009.This paper’s first section invokes a relevant meta-ethical principle about what a moral theory needs in order to be plausible and superior to its rivals. In subsequent sections, I try to pinpoint exactly what the demandingness objection has been taken to be. I try to explain how the demandingness objection developed in reaction to impartial act-consequentialism’s requirement of beneficence toward strangers. In zeroing in on the demandingness objection, I distinguish it from other, more or less c…Read more
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21Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to OughtsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 114-120. 2003.
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33Rule consequentialismIn R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory: An Anthology, . pp. 482-495. 2007.
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1196Utilitarianism and fairnessIn Ben Eggleston & Dale E. Miller (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, Cambridge University Press. pp. 251-271. 2014.
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42Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to OughtsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 114-120. 2003.
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88Promises and rule consequentialismIn Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), Promises and Agreements, Oxford University Press. pp. 235-252. 2011.The duty to keep promises has many aspects associated with deontological moral theories. The duty to keep promises is non-welfarist, in that the obligation to keep a promise need not be conditional on there being a net benefit from keeping the promise—indeed need not be conditional on there being at least someone who would benefit from its being kept. The duty to keep promises is more closely connected to autonomy than directly to welfare: agents have moral powers to give themselves certain obli…Read more
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92The Golden RuleThink 4 (10): 25-29. 2005.Should you always do unto others as you would have them do unto you? Brad Hooker investigates a seemingly plausible-looking moral principle: the Golden Rule
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9Mark Overvold’s Contribution to PhilosophyJournal of Philosophical Research 16 333-344. 1991.The prevailing theory of self-interest (personal utility or individual welfare) holds that one’s Iife goes well to the extent that one’s desires are fulfilled. In a couple of seminal papers, Overvold raised a devastating objection to this theory---namely that the theory (added to commonsensical beliefs about the nature of action) makes self-sacrifice logically impossible. He then proposed an appealing revision of the prevailing theory, one which provided adequate logical space for self-sacrifice…Read more
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14Some Questions Not to Be Begged in Moral TheoryInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 277-284. 2005.This paper starts by considering Sterba’s argument from non-question-beggingness to morality. The paper goes on to discuss his use of the “ought” implies “can” principle and the place, within moral theorizing, of intuitions about reasonableness.
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American moral philosophyIn Cheryl Misak (ed.), The Oxford handbook of American philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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157Is Rule-Consequentialism a Rubber Duck?Analysis 54 (2). 1994.Some things aren't what their names suggest. This is true of rubber ducks, stool pigeons, clay pigeons, hot dogs, and clothes horses. Frances Howard-Snyder's "Rule Consequentialism is a Rubber Duck" ("APQ", 30 (1993) 271-78) argues that the answer is Yes. Howard-Snyder thinks rule-consequentialism is a form of deontology, not a form of consequentialism. This thought is understandable: many recent definitions of consequentialism are such as to invite it. Thinking rule-consequentialism inferior to…Read more
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144Ross-style pluralism versus rule-consequentialismMind 105 (420): 531-552. 1996.This paper employs (and defends where needed) a familiar four-part methodology for assessing moral theories. This methodology makes the most popular kind of moral pluralism--here called Ross-style pluralism--look extremely attractive. The paper contends, however, that, if rule-consequentialism's implications match our considered moral convictions as well as Ross-style pluralism's implications do, the methodology makes rule-consequentialism look even more attractive than Ross-style pluralism. The…Read more
Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Value Theory |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics |
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |