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88Agency and self-awareness: Mechanisms and epistemologyIn Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2003.
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155Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-AwarenessReview of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3): 541-557. 2015.This paper has two themes. One is the question of how to understand the relation between inner speech and knowledge of one’s own thoughts. My aim here is to probe and challenge the popular neo-Rylean suggestion that we know our own thoughts by ‘overhearing our own silent monologues’, and to sketch an alternative suggestion, inspired by Ryle’s lesser-known discussion of thinking as a ‘serial operation’. The second theme is the question whether, as Ryle apparently thought, we need two different ac…Read more
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22Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and PsychologyPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (220): 528-530. 2005.
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63Self-knowledge and communicationPhilosophical Explorations 18 (2): 153-168. 2015.First-person present-tense self-ascriptions of belief are often used to tell others what one believes. But they are also naturally taken to express the belief they ostensibly report. I argue that this second aspect of self-ascriptions of belief holds the key to making the speaker's knowledge of her belief, and so the authority of her act of telling, intelligible. For a basic way to know one's beliefs is to be aware of what one is doing in expressing them. This account suggests that we need to re…Read more
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464Perceptual attention and the space of reasonsIn Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 274. 2011.
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21Counterfactuals, and Special Causal ConceptsIn Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation, Oxford University Press. pp. 75. 2011.
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IntroductionIn Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Clarendon Press. 2003.
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468The silence of self-knowledgePhilosophical Explorations 16 (1): 1-17. 2013.Gareth Evans famously affirmed an explanatory connection between answering the question whether p and knowing whether one believes that p. This is commonly interpreted in terms of the idea that judging that p constitutes an adequate basis for the belief that one believes that p. This paper formulates and defends an alternative, more modest interpretation, which develops from the suggestion that one can know that one believes that p in judging that p.
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93Reason explanation and the second-person perspectivePhilosophical Explorations 17 (3): 346-357. 2014.On a widely held view, the canonical way to make sense of intentional actions is to invoke the agent's ‘motivating reasons’, where the claim that X did A for some ‘motivating reason’ is taken to be neutral on whether X had a normative reason to do A. In this paper, I explore a challenge to this view, drawing on Anscombe's ‘second-personal’ approach to the nature of action explanation.
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IntroductionIn Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity, Oxford University Press. 2011.
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |