Jean-Yves Beziau

In a first section, we discuss Quine’s claim according to which identity is a logical notion. We point out that Quine mixes up various types of identities: trivial (or diagonal) identity, Leibniz identity, etc.; and this leads him to commit several mistakes. In a second section, we review Quine’s criticisms to various philosophers (Wittgenstein, Whitehead, Leibniz, etc.), who ac-cording to him made confusion between names and objects in defining identity. We show that in fact only Korzybski can be accused of such confusion. In a third section, we analyze the relation between identity and entity. We notice that for Quine a river is the result of the identification of river stages, but that he admits it as an entity by opposition to squareness, which according to him is a result of an identification process of higher abtraction.

We present the logic K/2 which is a logic with classical implication and only the left part of classical negation.We show that it is possible to define a classical negation into K/2 and that the classical proposition logic K can be translated into this apparently weaker logic.We use concepts from model-theory in order to characterized rigorously this translation and to understand this paradox. Finally we point out that K/2 appears, following Haack's distinction, both as a deviation and an extension of K.

This is a volume containing papers honoring Patrick Suppes (1922-2014). All contributors have worked directly with Suppes or/and with his ideas. The book also contains one of the last papers by Suppes (co-authored by two of his collaborators). The work of Suppes touches many different areas, ranging from meteorology to physics, through logic, mathematics, psychology, neuroscience, education, painting, but he was first of all and above all a philosopher, always questioning, but not in vain. There are not many philosophers who can be proud of having written influential math textbooks, contributed decisively to the philosophical foundations of science, helped to develop research in real labs, promoted new forms o education (computer-assisted learning and the EGPY – Education Program for Gifted Youth). Since the range of interest of Suppes was very broad, so is the variety of topics dealt with in this volume. The work of a researcher is certainly not limited to his own writings, but also has to be appreciated through the work of the people he has been working with and influenced. From this point of view the work of Suppes is very impressive, and the present book contributes to show that. This is a follow up of a special issue of the journal Synthese, New Directions in the Foundations of Science, edited by Béziau and Krause, after a meeting they organized with Suppes in Florianópolis (Brazil) in 2002 for his 80th birthday. Jean-Yves Béziau worked with Suppes at Stanford University for two years (2000 and 2001) and has been continuously working in the Suppes tradition of logic, methodology and philosophy of science, which emphasizes structures and models. Décio Krause has used Suppes’ approach to the axiomatization of scientific theories in many fields. With J.C.M. Magalhães, he presented a ``Suppes predicate” for genetics and natural selection and with S. French he developed a Suppes predicate for quantum field theories via Fock spaces.

A collection of papers from Paul Hertz to Dov Gabbay - through Tarski, Gödel, Kripke - giving a general perspective about logical systems. These papers discuss questions such as the relativity and nature of logic, present tools such as consequence operators and combinations of logics, prove theorems such as translations between logics, investigate the domain of validity and application of fundamental results such as compactness and completeness. Each of these papers is presented by a specialist explaining its context, import and influence.

The present book discusses all aspects of paraconsistent logic, including the latest findings, and its various systems. It includes papers by leading international researchers, which address the subject in many different ways: development of abstract paraconsistent systems and new theorems about them; studies of the connections between these systems and other non-classical logics, such as non-monotonic, many-valued, relevant, paracomplete and fuzzy logics; philosophical interpretations of these constructions; and applications to other sciences, in particular quantum physics and mathematics. Reasoning with contradictions is the challenge of paraconsistent logic. The book will be of interest to graduate students and researchers working in mathematical logic, computer science, philosophical logic, linguistics and physics.

Trois sortes de définitions sont présentées et discutées: les définitions nominales, les définitions contextuelles et les définitions amplificatrices. On insiste sur le fait que I’elimination des definitions n’est pas forcement un procede automatique en particulier dans le cas de la logique paraconsistante. Finalement on s’int’resse à la théorie des objets de Meinong et l’on montre comment elle peut êrre considéréecomme une théorie des descripteurs.Three kinds of definitions are presented and discussed: nominal definitions, contextual definitions, amplifying definitions. It is emphasized that the elimination of definitions is not necessarily straightforward in particular in the case of paraconsistent logic. Finally we have a look at Meinong’s theory objects and we show how it can be considered as a theory of descriptors.

We discuss some logico-mathematical systems which deviate from classical logic and mathematics with respect to the concept of identity. In the first part of the paper we present very general formulations of the principle of identity and show how they can be ‘relativized’ to objects and to properties. Then, as an application, we study the particular cases of physics and logic. In the last part of the paper, we discuss the alphabar logics, that is, those logical systems which violate a formulation of one of the most fundamental versions of the principle of identity; in these logics, there are formulas which are not deducible from themselves.

Trois sortes de définitions sont présentées et discutées: les définitions nominales, les définitions contextuelles et les définitions amplificatrices. On insiste sur le fait que I’elimination des definitions n’est pas forcement un procede automatique en particulier dans le cas de la logique paraconsistante. Finalement on s’int’resse à la théorie des objets de Meinong et l’on montre comment elle peut êrre considéréecomme une théorie des descripteurs.Three kinds of definitions are presented and discussed: nominal definitions, contextual definitions, amplifying definitions. It is emphasized that the elimination of definitions is not necessarily straightforward in particular in the case of paraconsistent logic. Finally we have a look at Meinong’s theory objects and we show how it can be considered as a theory of descriptors.

In this paper we address some central problems of combination of logics through the study of a very simple but highly informative case, the combination of the logics of disjunction and conjunction. At first it seems that it would be very easy to combine such logics, but the following problem arises: if we combine these logics in a straightforward way, distributivity holds. On the other hand, distributivity does not arise if we use the usual notion of extension between consequence relations. A detailed discussion about this phenomenon, as well as some possible solutions for it, are given.

We answer Slater's argument according to which paraconsistent logic is a result of a verbal confusion between «contradictories» and «subcontraries». We show that if such notions are understood within classical logic, the argument is invalid, due to the fact that most paraconsistent logics cannot be translated into classical logic. However we prove that if such notions are understood from the point of view of a particular logic, a contradictory forming function in this logic is necessarily a classical negation. In view of this result, Slater's argument sounds rather tautological.

Trois sortes de définitions sont présentées et discutées: les définitions nominales, les définitions contextuelles et les définitions amplificatrices. On insiste sur le fait que I’elimination des definitions n’est pas forcement un procede automatique en particulier dans le cas de la logique paraconsistante. Finalement on s’int’resse à la théorie des objets de Meinong et l’on montre comment elle peut êrre considéréecomme une théorie des descripteurs.Three kinds of definitions are presented and discussed: nominal definitions, contextual definitions, amplifying definitions. It is emphasized that the elimination of definitions is not necessarily straightforward in particular in the case of paraconsistent logic. Finally we have a look at Meinong’s theory objects and we show how it can be considered as a theory of descriptors.

We analyse the behaviour of definite descriptions and proper names terms in mathematical logic. We show that in formal arithmetic, wether some axioms are fixed or not, proper names cannot be considered rigid designators and have the same behaviour as definite descriptions. In set theory, sometimes two names for the same object are introduced. It seems that this can be explained by the notion of meaning. The meaning of such proper names can be considered as fuzzy sets of equivalent co-designative definite descriptions and their references as sets of all equivalent co-designative definite descriptions.