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Jean-Yves Beziau

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    130
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  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
University of São Paulo
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1996
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Aesthetics
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
General Philosophy of Science
3 more
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
  • All publications (130)
  •  54
    Théorie legislative de la négation pure
    Logique Et Analyse 147 (148): 209-225. 1994.
    Negation
  •  119
    From consequence operator to universal logic: a survey of general abstract logic
    In Jean-Yves Béziau (ed.), Logica Universalis: Towards a General Theory of Logic, Birkhäuser Verlog. pp. 3--17. 2005.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  •  47
    Preface of this special issue: The Challenge of Combining Logics
    Logic Journal of the IGPL 19 (4): 543-543. 2011.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsAreas of Mathematics
  • La véritable portée du théoreme de Lindenbaum-Asser
    Logique Et Analyse 167 (168): 341-359. 1999.
  •  93
    A sequent calculus for Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic based on Suszko's bivalent semantics
    Bulletin of the Section of Logic 28 (2): 89-97. 1999.
    Nonclassical LogicsProof Theory
  • Théorie de la valuation
    with Newton Ca da Costa
    Logique Et Analyse 146 (146): 95-117. 1994.
    Value TheoryValue Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  355
    What is “Formal Logic”?
    Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13 9-22. 2008.
    “Formal logic”, an expression created by Kant to characterize Aristotelian logic, has also been used as a name for modern logic, originated by Boole and Frege, which in many aspects differs radically from traditional logic. We shed light on this paradox by distinguishing in this paper five different meanings of the expression “formal logic”: (1) Formal reasoning according to the Aristotelian dichotomy of form and content, (2) Formal logic as a formal science by opposition to an empirical science…Read more
    “Formal logic”, an expression created by Kant to characterize Aristotelian logic, has also been used as a name for modern logic, originated by Boole and Frege, which in many aspects differs radically from traditional logic. We shed light on this paradox by distinguishing in this paper five different meanings of the expression “formal logic”: (1) Formal reasoning according to the Aristotelian dichotomy of form and content, (2) Formal logic as a formal science by opposition to an empirical science, (3) Formal systems in the sense of Hilbert, Curry and the formalist school, (4) Symbolic logic, a science using symbols, such as Venn diagrams, (5) Mathematical logic, a mathematical approach to reasoning. We argue that these five meanings are independent and that the meaning (5) is the one which better characterized modern logic, which should therefore not be called “formal logic”
    Kant: Philosophy of LogicKant: Philosophy of MathematicsLogic and Philosophy of Logic, General Works
  • Was Frege Wrong when Identifying Reference with Truth-Value?
    Sorites 11 15-23. 1999.
    We discuss Sengupta's argumentation according to which Frege was wrong identifying reference with truth-value.After stating various possible interpretations of Frege's principle of substitution, we show that there is no coherent interpretation under which Sengupta's argumentation is valid.Finally we try to show how Frege's distinction can work in the context of modern mathematics and how modern logic grasps it.
    Frege: Bedeutung
  •  234
    Non truth-functional many-valuedness
    Many-valued logics are standardly defined by logical matrices. They are truth-functional. In this paper non truth-functional many-valued semantics are presented, in a philosophical and mathematical perspective.
    Many-Valued LogicTruth-Values
  •  233
    Sentence, proposition and identity
    Synthese 154 (3): 371-382. 2007.
    In this paper we discuss the distinction between sentence and proposition from the perspective of identity. After criticizing Quine, we discuss how objects of logical languages are constructed, explaining what is Kleene’s congruence—used by Bourbaki with his square—and Paul Halmos’s view about the difference between formulas and objects of the factor structure, the corresponding boolean algebra, in case of classical logic. Finally we present Patrick Suppes’s congruence approach to the notion of …Read more
    In this paper we discuss the distinction between sentence and proposition from the perspective of identity. After criticizing Quine, we discuss how objects of logical languages are constructed, explaining what is Kleene’s congruence—used by Bourbaki with his square—and Paul Halmos’s view about the difference between formulas and objects of the factor structure, the corresponding boolean algebra, in case of classical logic. Finally we present Patrick Suppes’s congruence approach to the notion of proposition, according to which a whole hierarchy of congruences leads to different kinds of objects.
    Propositions, Misc
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