We answer Slater's argument according to which paraconsistent logic is a result of a verbal confusion between «contradictories» and «subcontraries». We show that if such notions are understood within classical logic, the argument is invalid, due to the fact that most paraconsistent logics cannot be translated into classical logic. However we prove that if such notions are understood from the point of view of a particular logic, a contradictory forming function in this logic is necessarily a clas…
Read moreWe answer Slater's argument according to which paraconsistent logic is a result of a verbal confusion between «contradictories» and «subcontraries». We show that if such notions are understood within classical logic, the argument is invalid, due to the fact that most paraconsistent logics cannot be translated into classical logic. However we prove that if such notions are understood from the point of view of a particular logic, a contradictory forming function in this logic is necessarily a classical negation. In view of this result, Slater's argument sounds rather tautological
