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41Making "Reasons" Explicit: How Normative is Brandom's InferentialismAbstracta 5 (2): 79-99. 2009.This paper asks whether Brandom (1994) has provided a sufficiently clear account of the basic normative concepts of commitment and entitlement, on which his normative inferentialism seems to rest, and of how they contribute to explain the inferential articulation of conceptual contents. I show that Brandom's claim that these concepts are analogous to the concepts of obligation and permission cannot be right, and argue that the normative character of the concept of commitment is dubious. This lea…Read more
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23L'analyse théologique du contenu intentionnelRevue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (4): 660-690. 1998.
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50Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind George Lakoff Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 614 p. 29, 95 $The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason Mark Johnson Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 233 p. 27, 50 $ (review)Dialogue 29 (3): 477-. 1990.
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20Between Phenomenalism and ObjectivismJournal of Philosophical Research 30 189-214. 2005.Brandom (1994) claims to have succeeded in showing how certain kinds of social practices can institute objective deontic statuses and confer objective conceptual contents on certain performances. This paper proposes a reconstruction of how, on Brandom’s views, this is supposed to come about, and a critical examination of the explicit arguments offered in support for this claim.
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42La logique: une introduction Michel J. Blais Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1985. 234 pDialogue 25 (2): 385-. 1986.
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60Intentional Normativism Meets Normative Supervenience and the Because ConstraintDialogue 50 (2): 315-331. 2011.ABSTRACT: I explain and rebut four objections to the claim that attributions of intentional attitudes are normative judgments, all stemming, directly or indirectly, from the widespread assumption that the normative supervenes on the non-normative
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12Pragmatics, Pittsburgh stylePragmatics and Cognition 13 (1): 141-160. 2005.I give a rough outline of Brandom’s scorekeeping account of conceptual content. The account is meant to be phenomenalist, normativist, expressively complete and non-circular; the question is how and to what extent it succeeds in meeting these goals.
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Fred Dretske's teleological analysis of the semantic properties of intentional states: explaining the semantic content of desiresRevue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (4): 660-690. 1998.
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73Nonconceptual contents vs nonconceptual statesGrazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1): 23-43. 2005.The question to be discussed is whether the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual is best understood as pertaining primarily to intentional contents or to intentional states or attitudes. Some authors have suggested that it must be understood in the second way, in order to make the claim that experiences are nonconceptual compatible with the idea that one can also believe what one experiences. I argue that there is no need to do so, and that a conceptual content can be underst…Read more
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35Mind-Dependence, Irrealism and SuperassertibilityPhilosophia Scientae 12 (1): 143-157. 2008.Dans la section 1, j’explique pourquoi une conception Dummet-tienne du réalisme n’a de pertinence que dans certains cas particuliers. Dans la section 2, j’indique qu’il est raisonnable de penser que Crispin Wright soutient que la vérité de certains jugements dépend de notre capacité de la connaître (si et) seulement si leur vérité consiste dans le fait qu’ils sont superassertables. Dans la section 3, je souligne qu’insister, avec Dummett et Wright, sur la connaissabilité, nous empêche de voir qu…Read more
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78La publicité et l'interdépendance du langage et de la penséeDialogue 43 (2): 281-316. 2004.I clarify in what sense one might want to claim that thought or language are public. I distinguish among four forms that each of these claims might take, and two general ways of establishing them that might be contemplated. The first infers the public character of thought from the public character of language, and the second infers the latter from the former. I show that neither of these stategies seems to be able to dispense with the claim that thought and language are interdependent, and that …Read more
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29Tarski, Davidson et la significationDialogue 22 (4): 595-620. 1983.Depuis 1967, Donald Davidson defend l'idée qu'une théorie de la signification pour une langue naturelle doit prendre la forme d'une théorie tarskienne de la vérité. Je me propose ici d'exposer les grandes lignes de l a conception davidsonienne de la sémantique des langues naturelles et de chercher à préciser en quel sens une theorie tarskienne de la vérité pour une langue L constitue, selon Davidson, une théorié de la signification pour L. Je ferai pour cela abstraction des obstacles qu'il pourr…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
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Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |