•  2
    Qu’est-ce qui est non-conceptuel, l’etat ou son contenu?
    Facta Philosophica 6 (1): 77-95. 2004.
  •  1
    Quatorze observations topographiques sur les contenus et les normes
    Facta Philosophica 4 (2): 177-199. 2002.
  •  10
    Making „Reasons " Explicit. How Normative is Brandom's Inferentialism?
    Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 13 (1): 127-145. 2008.
    This paper asks whether Brandom has provided a sufficiently clear account of the basic normative concepts of commitment and entitlement, on which his normative inferentialism seems to rest, and of how they contribute to explain the inferential articulation of conceptual contents. I show that Brandom's claim that these concepts are analogous to the concepts of obligation and permission cannot be right, and argue that the normative character of the concept of commitment is dubious. This leads me t…Read more
  • Reasons and Supervenience
    In B. Brozek, Antonino Rotolo & J. Stelmach (eds.), Supervenience and Normativity, Springer. 2017.
  • Essais sur l'intentionnalité et le langage (edited book)
    Vrin-Bellarmin. 1992.
  •  2
    Mind, Davidson and Reality
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2). 2005.
    The aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irreal-ism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general characterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show that most candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of in-tentional realism which is not, is a restricted one whic…Read more
  •  6
    Que Sera Sera
    Dialectica 54 (4): 247-264. 2000.
    Having suggested that a salient feature of philosophical naturalism is to deny that there are non‐natural norms, I make a distinction between a moderate naturalism, which admits the existence of natural norms, and a radical naturalism which denies it. On the assumption that intentional facts are irreducibly normative, their existence would thus seem to raise a problem for moderate epistemological naturalism. I argue that no non‐trivial naturalistic explanation of conceptual intentionality is to …Read more
  •  9
    Between Phenomenalism and Objectivism
    Journal of Philosophical Research 30 189-214. 2005.
    Brandom (1994) claims to have succeeded in showing how certain kinds of social practices can institute objective deontic statuses and confer objective conceptual contents on certain performances. This paper proposes a reconstruction of how, on Brandom’s views, this is supposed to come about, and a critical examination of the explicit arguments offered in support for this claim.
  • Essais sur le langage et l'intentionnalité, coll. « Analytiques »
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 184 (4): 525-527. 1994.
  •  59
    Names and beliefs: A puzzle lost
    Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142): 37-49. 1986.
  • Le langage. Une approche philosophique
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 184 (4): 533-536. 1994.
  •  4
  •  24
    Le paradoxe de Wittgenstein et le communautarisme
    Dialogue 39 (2): 263-. 2000.
    The solution to the paradox which Kripke attibutes to Wittgenstein is supposed to lead to the conclusion that there is a sense in which thought and language are essentially social phenomena. In the following, I argue that both the and the character of this solution can be questioned, though without having to agree with Davidson, according to whom the solution to this paradox does not depend on any notion of a common language
  • Qu'est-ce qui est non-conceptuel, l'etat ou son contenu?
    Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 6 77-9. 2004.
  •  169
    The purpose of this paper is to offer an account of what an agent's being rational to do or think something might amount to, which doesn't reduce to saying that it consists in this agent's doing or thinking something that is rational for him. In the first section, I call attention to the fact that such a distinction between agent rationality and action or belief rationality is widely admitted, I reject the idea that it could be interpreted as a distinction between the rationality of tokens and t…Read more
  •  38
    Essential Dependence and Realism
    Sorites 19 41-50. 2007.
    It has recently been suggested that realism about some subject matter is best construed as the claim that the facts pertaining to this subject matter are essentially independent from the mind, in a sense to be explained, and not as the admittedly weaker claim that they are modally independent from the mind. In this paper, I argue that this proposal is liable to trivialize the realist's position and is biased against his irrealist opponent
  •  73
    The Publicity of Thought and Language
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 32 54-61. 1998.
    I try to clarify the ways in which one would seek to hold that language and/or thought are public. For each of these theses, I distinguish four forms in which they can be framed, and two ways of establishing them. The first will try to make the publicity of thought follow from that of language; the second will try to make the publicity of language follow from that of thought. I show that none of these strategies can do without the thesis that language and thought are interdependent, and that eve…Read more
  •  2
    Dans quelle mesure les caractéristiques fondamentales des êtres humains, telles que leur capacité de penser, de raisonner, de vouloir et de communiquer, peuvent-elles être complètement expliquées à l'aide des seules ressources des sciences naturelles? En s'appuyant sur l'analyse rigoureuse de quelques-uns des travaux les plus significatifs de la philosophie de l'esprit, en particulier ceux de R. Millikan, F. Dretske, W. Quine et D. Davidson, Daniel Laurier révèle les limites d'un tel programme d…Read more
  • Pangloss, L’Erreur et La Divergence
    Journal of Philosophical Research 19 345-372. 1994.
    The theory of radical interpretation, as based on the principle of charity, sets a priori limits on the possibility that different agents have different beliefs, and on the possibility that one has false beliefs. David Papineau put forward a teleological approach to intentional states which, he claims, doesn’t have these unacceptable consequences. Having distinguished half a dozen of different forms that the problem of radical interpretation might take, I show that Papineau’s approach is not rad…Read more
  • François Récanati, Les énoncés performatifs (review)
    Philosophy in Review 2 187-190. 1982.
  •  52
    Non-conceptually contentful attitudes in interpretation
    Sorites 13 (October): 6-22. 2001.
    Brandom's book Making It Explicit defends Davidson's claim that conceptual thought can arise only on the background of a practice of mutual interpretation, without endorsing the further view that one can be a thinker only if one has the concept of a concept. This involves giving an account of conceptual content in terms of what Brandom calls practical deontic attitudes. In this paper, I make a plea for the conclusion that these practical attitudes are best seen as intentional, but non-conceptual…Read more