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2599Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive ControlPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1): 101-26. 2016.This essay argues that current theories of action fail to explain agentive control because they have left out a psychological capacity central to control: attention. This makes it impossible to give a complete account of the mental antecedents that generate action. By investigating attention, and in particular the intention-attention nexus, we can characterize the functional role of intention in an illuminating way, explicate agentive control so that we have a uniform explanation of basic cases …Read more
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1940Being in the workspace, from a neural point of view: comments on Peter Carruthers, 'On central cognition'Philosophical Studies 170 (1): 163-174. 2014.In his rich and provocative paper, Peter Carruthers announces two related theses: (a) a positive thesis that “central cognition is sensory based, depending on the activation and deployment of sensory images of various sorts” (Carruthers 2013) and (b) a negative thesis that the “central mind does not contain any workspace within which goals, decisions, intentions, or non-sensory judgments can be active” (Carruthers 2013). These are striking claims suggesting that a natural view about cognition, n…Read more
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2442The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience, by Jesse Prinz (review)Mind 122 (488): 1174-1180. 2013.
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1841Perplexities of Consciousness, by Eric Schwitzgebel (review)Mind 121 (482): 524-529. 2012.In this review of Eric Schwitzgebel's "Perplexities of Consciousness", we discuss the book's arguments in light of the role of attention in introspection
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971What is Conscious Attention?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1): 93-120. 2010.Perceptual attention is essential to both thought and agency, for there is arguably no demonstrative thought or bodily action without it. Psychologists and philosophers since William James have taken attention to be a ubiquitous and distinctive form of consciousness, one that leaves a characteristic mark on perceptual experience. As a process of selecting specific perceptual inputs, attention influences the way things perceptually appear. It may then seem that it is a specific feature of percept…Read more
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1613Is inner speech the basis of auditory verbal hallucination in schizophrenia?Frontiers in Psychiatry 14 1-3. 2014.We respond to Moseley and Wilkinson's defense of inner speech models of AVH.
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308Mechanisms of auditory verbal hallucination in schizophreniaFrontiers in Schizophrenia 4. 2013.Recent work on the mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) has been heavily informed by self-monitoring accounts that postulate defects in an internal monitoring mechanism as the basis of AVH. A more neglected alternative is an account focusing on defects in auditory processing, namely a spontaneous activation account of auditory activity underlying AVH. Science is often aided by putting theories in competition. Accordingly, a discussion that systematically contrasts the two mo…Read more
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3053The Case for Zombie AgencyMind 122 (485): 217-230. 2013.In response to Mole 2009, I present an argument for zombie action. The crucial question is not whether but rather to what extent we are zombie agents. I argue that current evidence supports only minimal zombie agency
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602Confronting Many-Many Problems: Attention and Agentive ControlNoûs 45 (1): 50-76. 2011.I argue that when perception plays a guiding role in intentional bodily action, it is a necessary part of that action. The argument begins with a challenge that necessarily arises for embodied agents, what I call the Many-Many Problem. The Problem is named after its most common case where agents face too many perceptual inputs and too many possible behavioral outputs. Action requires a solution to the Many-Many Problem by selection of a specific linkage between input and output. In bodily action…Read more
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515AttentionRoutledge. 2014.A systematic overview and assessment of different empirical and philosophical aspects of attention.
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3091Mental Action and the Threat of AutomaticityIn Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillmann Vierkant (eds.), Decomposing the Will, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 244-61. 2013.This paper considers the connection between automaticity, control and agency. Indeed, recent philosophical and psychological works play up the incompatibility of automaticity and agency. Specifically, there is a threat of automaticity, for automaticity eliminates agency. Such conclusions stem from a tension between two thoughts: that automaticity pervades agency and yet automaticity rules out control. I provide an analysis of the notions of automaticity and control that maintains a simple conne…Read more
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2535Shaking Up the Mind’s Ground Floor: The Cognitive Penetration of Visual AttentionJournal of Philosophy 114 (1): 5-32. 2017.In this paper, I argue that visual attention is cognitively penetrated by intention. I present a detailed account of attention and its neural basis, drawing on a recent computational model of neural modulation during attention: divisive normalization. I argue that intention shifts computations during divisive normalization. The epistemic consequences of attentional bias are discussed.
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University of PittsburghHistory and Philosophy of Science
Center for the Neural Basis of CognitionProfessor
APA Central Division
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Action |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
1 more
| Epistemology |
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Action |
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |