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21Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honor of G. E. M. AnscombePhilosophical Review 90 (4): 624. 1981.
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21Ethics, imagination and the method of Wittgenstein's TractatusIn Alice Crary & Rupert J. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein, Routledge. pp. 149-173. 2000.
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21Criticising from “Outside”Philosophical Investigations 36 (2): 114-132. 2013.I look at a disagreement between Elizabeth Anscombe, on the one hand, and Peter Winch and Ilham Dilman, on the other, about whether it is legitimate to call something an error that counts as knowledge within some alien system of belief; and I look also at the question what Wittgenstein's view was. I try to show that our understanding of what is real cannot be adequately elucidated if we consider only its role within language‐games, and I argue that an important element in our thinking about what…Read more
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19E se x non è il numero delle pecore? Wittgenstein e gli esperimenti mentali in eticaIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 16 (1): 47-66. 2003.
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19Rules: Looking in the right placeIn Dayton Z. Phillips & Peter G. Winch (eds.), Wittgenstein, . 1989.
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17Response to McNaughtonRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 29 83-84. 1991.David McNaughton argues that in footnote 48 of my paper I provide justification for including the severely retarded among those whom we think of as with us in being human. Let me fill in the background to that note
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15How Old Are These Bones? Putnam, Wittgenstein and VerificationAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 99-150. 1999.Hilary Putnam has argued against philosophical theories which tie the content of truth-claims closely to the available methods of investigation and verification. Such theories, he argues, threaten our idea of human communication, which we take to be possible between people of different cultures and across periods of time during which methods of investigation change dramatically. Putnam rejects any reading of Wittgenstein which takes him to make a close tie between meaning and method of verificat…Read more
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14Henry James, moral philosophers, moralismIn Garry Hagberg & Walter Jost (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature, Wiley-blackwell. 2007.
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11Croyance, compréhension et incompréhension : Wittgenstein et la religionThéoRèmes 1 (1). 2011.Wittgenstein avait, pourrait-on dire, une « sensibilité religieuse ». Dans un essai vaste et perspicace sur Wittgenstein et la religion, Peter Winch a décrit l’attitude de Wittgenstein à l’égard de la vie ainsi que son regard sur sa propre vie d’une façon qui met en lumière leur caractère religieux [Winch 1994, p. 109-110]. Mais il n’est pas aisé de voir clairement quelles furent les opinions de Wittgenstein au sujet de la religion et de la croyance religieuse, opinions qui, de fait, changère...
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11Injustice and animalsIn Carl Elliott (ed.), Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers: Essays on Wittgenstein, Medicine, and Bioethics, Duke University Press. pp. 118--148. 2001.
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11Wittgenstein, mathematics, and ethics: Resisting the attractions of realismIn Hans D. Sluga & David G. Stern (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Cambridge University Press. pp. 226--260. 1996.
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8Does Bismarck Have a Beetle in His Box?In Alice Crary & Rupert J. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein, Routledge. 2000.
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7Wittgenstein. Ce qui ne peut être que vraiRevue Internationale de Philosophie 300 (2): 15-35. 2022.Dans son Introduction au Tractatus de Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Anscombe considérait que le livre avait le défaut d’exclure la proposition « “Quelqu’un” n’est pas le nom de quelqu’un » qu’elle considérait comme évidemment vraie. Ce n’est pas une proposition bipolaire et sa négation n’est pas intelligible. J’examine la question de savoir si elle a raison de dire que le Tractatu s exclut de telles propositions, et je considère son exemple en relation avec d’autres propositions qui, du moins en théor…Read more
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6Intention and intentionality: essays in honour of G. E. M. Anscombe (edited book)Cornell University Press. 1979.
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5Introduction to 'Having a Rough Story About What Moral Philosophy Is'In John Gibson Wolfgang Huemer (ed.), The Literary Wittgenstein, Routledge. pp. 127--132. 2004.
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5Criss-cross philosophyIn Erich Ammereller & Eugen Fisher (eds.), Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the Philosophical Investigations, Routledge. pp. 201--220. 2004.
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4The tractatus and the limits of senseIn Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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3How many legsIn Peter Winch & Raimond Gaita (eds.), Value and Understanding: Essays for Peter Winch, Routledge. 1990.
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3Moral Differences and Distances: Some QuestionsIn Lilli Alanen, Sara Heinämaa & Thomas Wallgren (eds.), Commonality and particularity in ethics, St. Martin's Press. pp. 197--223. 1997.
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1What can you do with the general propositional form?In José L. Zalabardo (ed.), Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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1Eating Meat and Eating PeopleIn Cass R. Sunstein & Martha Craven Nussbaum (eds.), Animal rights: current debates and new directions, Oxford University Press. 2004.
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1Truth Before TarskiIn Edited by Erich H. Reck (ed.), From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy, Oup Usa. 2002.I start from Hans Sluga's paper “Truth before Tarski”, in which he argues that the establishing of Tarski's approach to truth brought loss as well as gain to analytic philosophy: what was lost was our understanding of the problem of truth. To recover what was lost, he says, we must examine the variety of pre‐Tarskian views. My paper picks up that task and focuses on Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I interweave ideas borrowed from Thomas Ricketts, P. T. Geach, Warren Goldfarb, Peter Hylton, and Juliet …Read more
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