Trudy Rose Govier

Until very recently the topic of nuclear armaments and the prospects of global nuclear war have been relatively inconspicuous in the work of philosophers. With some exceptions, these and related themes have not figured prominently in the academic writings of philosophers; nor have they occupied space commensurate with their importance in courses and anthologies on applied ethics. Helen Caldicott's widely circulated film, ‘If You Love This Planet,’ and Jonathan Schell's moving book, The Fate of the Earth, have brought the nuclear arms race and its problems to the attention of the wider public. This paper was written in the hope of influencing moral and political philosophers to pursue nuclear morality and related subjects in their philosophical writing and teaching.

Alice Ambrose once criticized Moore for treating the proposition ‘There are external objects’ as an empirical one. She said that those who denied that we could know this proposition to be true would not accept any evidence as going against their denial of it, and were not regarding the issue of its truth as empirical. She also maintained that one could not point out an external object in the way in which one could point out a dime or nickel and alleged on these grounds that saying that there are external objects is not the same sort of thing as saying that there are coins. The issue arose concerning Moore's paper, “Proof of an External World.“In “Reply to My Critics,” Moore pointed out that he had been concerned in “Proof of an External World” not to prove that we know that there are external objects, but rather to prove that there are external objects. But he applied Ambrose's remarks to that proposition. Moore rightly asserted that the fact that someone denies that there are external objects and treats all evidence as irrelevant to the issue does not show that the proposition he denies fails to be empirical.

In this paper I explore Ralph Johnson's proposal that in addition to premises and conclusion every argument should have a dialectical tier in which the arguer addresses objections to the argument, and considers alternative positions. After exploring several reasons for thinking that Johnson's proposal is a good one, I then raise a number of objections against it and move ahead to respond to those objections, which I do by distinguishing making out a case for a conclusion from offering an argument for it, and distinguishing supplementary arguments from one's main argument. I contend that it is not realistic to see arguers as having an obligation to respond to all objections and to address all alternative positions; we must somehow discriminate those which need and merit a reply from those which do not

Beginning with my 1999 account in The Philosophy of Argument, this essay explores views about adversariality in argument. Although my distinction between minimal and ancillary adversariality is widely accepted, there are flaws in my defense of the claim that all arguments exhibit minimal adversariality and in a lack of sensitivity to aspects of gender and culture. Further discussions of minimal adversariality, including those of Scott Aikin, John Casey, Katharina Stevens and Daniel Cohen, are discussed. The claim that all argument are adversarial in at least a minimal sense is defended due to its connection with arguers’ intent to support their conclusions.

Concerning Harald Wohlrapp’s theories, many fascinating issues arise. I shall concentrate here on aspects especially relevant to the treatment of pro and con argumentation, a type of what has been called conductive argument. Though initially intrigued by my efforts to describe and explore conductive argument, Harald Wohlrapp later concluded that my treatments were seriously flawed and that an alternative approach can serve to replace that problematic and much contested conception. Much of the difference between our approaches concerns what he deems to be a logicistic approach on my part.

How do Humans Think? How should we think? Almost all of philosophy and a great deal else depends in large part on the answers that we provide to such questions. Yet they are almost impossible to deal with in isolation; notions about nature of thought are almost bound to connect with metaphysical notions about where ideas come from, with notions about appropriate arenas for certainty, doubt, and belief, and hence with moral and religious ideas. The Western tradition of thinking about thinking takes shape with Socrates; among the other important strands covered in this book are Descartes’ recipe for discovering truth through systematic doubt, Hume’s notion that all our ideas are copies of sense impressions, Wollstonecraft’s introduction of the perspective of gender into such questions, and Wittgenstein’s claim that much of the traditional terrain of Western philosophy should be thought of as the proper domain only of linguistic assertion, possessing no content beyond the words. With each philosopher and school of thought dealt with, Govier shows how ideas about thinking connect to the other elements of the particular philosophy, and brings to life the social and intellectual context that the ideas spring from. Socrates’ Children is thus not only an investigation of notions of thinking and knowing in Western culture; it is a selective general history of much of Western philosophy, from a unique and fascinating perspective

I would first like to congratulate Harald Wohlrapp on the substantial success of his book on the philosophy of argument. The learning, originality, and energetic dedication shown in this work are impressive indeed. Concerning Harald Wohlrapp’s theories, many fascinating issues arise, as we will be hearing today and in further conversations. In this presentation I shall concentrate on two aspects especially relevant to the treatment of pro and con argumentation; as will be apparent, even on this single topic more could be said. What I will discuss today are the themes of logicism and objectivity.

I consider several outstanding questions about analogies. These include the following: issues of interpretation especially with regard to whether an analogy should be considered argumentative, as distinct from serving as an illustration, explanation, or matter of rhetorical interest; whether and how to draw a distinction between inductive analogies and a priori analogies; and whether a priori analogies should be reconstructed as deductively valid arguments. The discussion will explore broader themes such as the distinction between the a priori and the deductive, and whether a priori analogies offer reasons for a choice, as distinct from a basis for inferring an inference. Referring to the recent work of Harald Wolhrapp, I will explore the allegation that a faulty logicism is involved when argument analysis is based on an explicit statement of premises and conclusion. In developing this account, reference will also be made to the work of Douglas Walton, Marcello Guarini, Trudy Govier, and Lilian Bermejo-Luque.

Can God’s existence be proven by logic? Are computers smart enough to follow rules—or to cheat? What is an out-of-body experience? How can tables be solid when physicists say they’re made of subatomic particles that are only probability functions? Does science depend on trust? What is conscience? Does it come from God? From religious teaching? Social training? Is it rational to pursue your own self-interest? Can we all survive if we do this? In this collection of stories and dialogues Trudy Govier shows how these old and new philosophical questions arise, and offers imaginative and striking depictions of some of the theories and arguments they have inspired.

Beginning with my 1999 account in The Philosophy of Argument, this essay explores views about adversariality in argument. Although my distinction between minimal and ancillary adversariality is widely accepted, there are flaws in my defense of the claim that all arguments exhibit minimal adversariality and in a lack of sensitivity to aspects of gender and culture. Further discussions of minimal adversariality, including those of Scott Aikin, John Casey, Katharina Stevens and Daniel Cohen, are discussed. The claim that all argument are adversarial in at least a minimal sense is defended due to its connection with arguers’ intent to support their conclusions.

Alice Ambrose once criticized Moore for treating the proposition ‘There are external objects’ as an empirical one. She said that those who denied that we could know this proposition to be true would not accept any evidence as going against their denial of it, and were not regarding the issue of its truth as empirical. She also maintained that one could not point out an external object in the way in which one could point out a dime or nickel and alleged on these grounds that saying that there are external objects is not the same sort of thing as saying that there are coins. The issue arose concerning Moore's paper, “Proof of an External World.“In “Reply to My Critics,” Moore pointed out that he had been concerned in “Proof of an External World” not to prove that we know that there are external objects, but rather to prove that there are external objects. But he applied Ambrose's remarks to that proposition. Moore rightly asserted that the fact that someone denies that there are external objects and treats all evidence as irrelevant to the issue does not show that the proposition he denies fails to be empirical.