Trudy Rose Govier

Beginning with my 1999 account in The Philosophy of Argument, this essay explores views about adversariality in argument. Although my distinction between minimal and ancillary adversariality is widely accepted, there are flaws in my defense of the claim that all arguments exhibit minimal adversariality and in a lack of sensitivity to aspects of gender and culture. Further discussions of minimal adversariality, including those of Scott Aikin, John Casey, Katharina Stevens and Daniel Cohen, are discussed. The claim that all argument are adversarial in at least a minimal sense is defended due to its connection with arguers’ intent to support their conclusions.

Beginning with my 1999 account in The Philosophy of Argument, this essay explores views about adversariality in argument. Although my distinction between minimal and ancillary adversariality is widely accepted, there are flaws in my defense of the claim that all arguments exhibit minimal adversariality and in a lack of sensitivity to aspects of gender and culture. Further discussions of minimal adversariality, including those of Scott Aikin, John Casey, Katharina Stevens and Daniel Cohen, are discussed. The claim that all argument are adversarial in at least a minimal sense is defended due to its connection with arguers’ intent to support their conclusions.

Beginning with my 1999 account in The Philosophy of Argument, this essay explores views about adversariality in argument. Although my distinction between minimal and ancillary adversariality is widely accepted, there are flaws in my defense of the claim that all arguments exhibit minimal adversariality and in a lack of sensitivity to aspects of gender and culture. Further discussions of minimal adversariality, including those of Scott Aikin, John Casey, Katharina Stevens and Daniel Cohen, are discussed. The claim that all argument are adversarial in at least a minimal sense is defended due to its connection with arguers’ intent to support their conclusions.

We are pleased to publish this WSIA edition of Trudy’s Govier’s seminal volume, Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Originally published in 1987 by Foris Publications, this was a pioneering work that played a major role in establishing argumentation theory as a discipline. Today, it is as relevant to the field as when it first appeared, with discussions of questions and issues that remain central to the study of argument. It has defined the main approaches to many of those issues and guided the ways in which we might respond to them. From this foundation, it sets the stage for further investigations and emerging research. This is a second edition of the book that is corrected and updated by the author, with new prefaces to each chapter.

Concerning Harald Wohlrapp’s theories, many fascinating issues arise. I shall concentrate here on aspects especially relevant to the treatment of pro and con argumentation, a type of what has been called conductive argument. Though initially intrigued by my efforts to describe and explore conductive argument, Harald Wohlrapp later concluded that my treatments were seriously flawed and that an alternative approach can serve to replace that problematic and much contested conception. Much of the difference between our approaches concerns what he deems to be a logicistic approach on my part.

I would first like to congratulate Harald Wohlrapp on the substantial success of his book on the philosophy of argument. The learning, originality, and energetic dedication shown in this work are impressive indeed. Concerning Harald Wohlrapp’s theories, many fascinating issues arise, as we will be hearing today and in further conversations. In this presentation I shall concentrate on two aspects especially relevant to the treatment of pro and con argumentation; as will be apparent, even on this single topic more could be said. What I will discuss today are the themes of logicism and objectivity.

I consider several outstanding questions about analogies. These include the following: issues of interpretation especially with regard to whether an analogy should be considered argumentative, as distinct from serving as an illustration, explanation, or matter of rhetorical interest; whether and how to draw a distinction between inductive analogies and a priori analogies; and whether a priori analogies should be reconstructed as deductively valid arguments. The discussion will explore broader themes such as the distinction between the a priori and the deductive, and whether a priori analogies offer reasons for a choice, as distinct from a basis for inferring an inference. Referring to the recent work of Harald Wolhrapp, I will explore the allegation that a faulty logicism is involved when argument analysis is based on an explicit statement of premises and conclusion. In developing this account, reference will also be made to the work of Douglas Walton, Marcello Guarini, Trudy Govier, and Lilian Bermejo-Luque.

An analysis of necessary condition and presupposition reveals that, as logical relations, these notions are basically similar to each other and different from the notion of entailment or other ‘if-then’ relations of logical consequence. Both necessary condition and presupposition seem to be two-directional in a rather peculiar way. Appreciating this is helpful in interpreting philosophers such as Kant and Strawson who have relied extensively on these relations in constructing the philosophical arguments often referred to as transcendental arguments. It also suggests some fundamental shortcomings in Strawson's account of presupposition and in the logician's way of presenting necessary condition using ‘⊂'.In the discussion which follows I shall exhibit some of the differences between necessary condition and presupposition on the one hand and entailment on the other. I shall then go on to offer an explanation of these differences in conjunction with an analysis of necessary condition and presupposition which diverges from other contemporaty accounts. Once these distinctions and explanations have been stated, I shall make some suggestions about their relevance to the interpretation and assessment of philosophical texts and arguments.

Trust facilitates communication, love, friendship, and co-operation and is fundamentally important to human relationships and personal development. Using examples from daily life, interviews, literature, and film, Govier describes the role of trust in friendship and in family relationships as well as the connection between self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem. She examines the reasons we trust or distrust others and ourselves, and the expectations and vulnerabilities that accompany those attitudes. But trust should not be blind. Acknowledging that distrust is often warranted, Govier describes strategies for coping with distrust and designing workable relationships despite it. She also examines situations in which the integrity of interpersonal relationships has been violated by serious breaches of trust and explores themes of forgiveness, reconciliation, and the restoration of trust. By encouraging reflection on our own attitudes of trust and distrust, this fascinating book points the way to a better understanding of our relationships and ourselves.

In the context of redressing wrongs of the past, the importance of acknowledgement is often urged. It figures significantly, for instance, in the final report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and in the 1996 Canadian Royal Commiss ion Report on Aboriginal Peoples. In both documents a central theme is that acknowledging wrongs of the past is a key first step towards healing and reconciliation. Several recent statements about public apology also urge that moral apologies are signif icant because of the ways in which they acknowledge wrongdoing and responsibility. However, there seem to be few explanations of what, exactly, acknowledgement amounts to and why one would expect it to be an important stage in the healing of victims or in the reconciliation between victim and perpetrator groups. I suggest that ackno wledgement is a kind of spelling out, or articulation, of something that we already know or are in a position to know. When we acknowledge something we avow or accept it as something attached to ourselves. I distinguish between granted acknowledgement, received acknowledgement, and self-acknowledgement. Often acknowledgement is partial and compromised, a situation which may be confusing and harmful to those who have been wronged. I propose explanations as to why the acknowledgement that they are worth y human beings who were wronged and deserved better tends to be profoundly important to groups such as Blacks in South Africa and native peoples in Canada. I also address difficulties which we face when we are pressed to acknowledge injustice and wrongdo ing which we would rather not accept as part of our social history.

How can we respond in the aftermath of wrongdoing? How can social trust be restored in the wake of intense political conflict? In this challenging work, philosopher Trudy Govier explores central dilemmas of political reconciliation, employing illustrative material from Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Australia, Canada, Peru, and elsewhere. Govier stresses that reconciliation is fundamentally about relationships. Whether through means of truth commissions, apologies, community processes, or criminal trials, the basic goal of reconciliation is improved social trust among alienated individuals and groups. A major strength of Govier's approach is her creative practical framework for reflection. She explains that people should not to be identified with the roles they may have played, and she points out that, with reference to wrongs committed in political conflicts, individuals often play several roles. The perpetrators of some acts can be the victims of others; the victims in some circumstances may become responsive interveners in others. Rare is the political conflict in which one group commits all wrongs. Govier argues that, to build social trust and sustainable peace, acknowledgment of past wrongs is crucial. The need for mutuality in acknowledgment is an underappreciated aspect of the aftermath of conflicts. She further examines the themes of responsibility ; apology; forgiveness; reparations; the rehabilitation of child soldiers; the problems of monetary compensation; and truth-telling and truth commissions. Govier's lucid style and willingness to explore counterarguments make this a lively and thought-provoking work.

On most views of the nature of moral judgments, it is possible for a person to be mistaken in the belief that it is right to act in a certain way. When someone believes that it is right to do something, does that thing on the basis of such a belief, and yet in so doing commits deeds which are wrong by moral standards other than his own, we do not quite know whether to praise him for his conscientiousness while condemning his actions. He acts according to his conscience and does what he believes to be right, but his beliefs are erroneous and his actions wrong. Shall we praise the man for his conscientiousness while condemning his actions?

The authors propose a conception of national reconciliation based on the building or rebuilding of trust between parties alienated by conflict. It is by no means obvious what reconciliation between large groups of people amounts to in practice or how it should be understood in theory. Lack of conceptual clarity can be illustrated with particular reference to postapartheid South Africa, where reconciliation between whites and blacks was a major goal of the Mandela government and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The authors argue that a conception of reconciliation in terms of trust offers a promising solution to prominent conceptual confusions surrounding the notion of “national reconciliation” or reconciliation between large groups. By emphasizing the centrality of contextually variable trust in viable relationships, the authors accommodate an emphasis on human relationships and attitudes, as stressed by Desmond Tutu. They argue, however, against any simplistic application of purely individualistic or spiritual concepts to large groups and institutional contexts