Jaime Nubiola

The article focuses on the concept of reasonableness as described by American philosopher Charles S. Peirce in his writings dating between 1899 and 1908. Pierce's writings considered by the author are found in the books "Contributions to The Nation," vols. 1-4, edited by K. L. Ketner and J. E. Cook, and "Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce," vols. 1-8, edited by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss and A. W. Burks. The author considers 20th century Western philosophies of reason, pragmatism, scientism, thirdness, postmodernism, and philosopher Walker Percy's criticisms of Peirce's arguments regarding reasonableness.

As suggested in the subtitle, A New Philosophical Reading, the editor aspires in his Introduction and his notes to “facilitate a deeper understanding and a critical evaluation (...) of this crucial and difficult philosophical work” (p. ix). This was the last important book which James published during his lifetime. With it James aims at a critical evaluation of Hegelian monism and an exploration of the philosophical and theological alternatives. “Our world of some one hundred years on”—the editor says (p. ix)—“is much the better for James’ contribution, and understanding William James on pluralism deeply contributes even now to America’s self-understanding.”

The aim of this paper is to describe Dewey’s reception in the Spanish-speaking countries that constitute the Hispanic world. Without any doubt, it can be said that in the past century Spain and the countries of South America have been a world apart, lagging far behind the mainstream Western world. It includes a number of names and facts about the early translation of Dewey’s works in Spain, Chile, Cuba, Mexico and Argentina in the first half of the century and a brief explanation of the decline of Dewey in the second half. To a great extent, Dewey’s conception of education was immersed in the international movement of reform that started at the turn of the century and would eventually slowly but surely, renovate the structure of the educational system throughout the entire century, including that of South America. But it is equally clear that the Spanish-speaking countries have displayed a general ignorance of Dewey and, by extension, of American pragmatism during most of the century. In spite of mutual incomprehension, a deep affinity between Dewey’s pragmatism and Hispanic philosophy is suggested in this paper, anticipating that the gradual process of democratization of Spain and the Hispanic countries of South America may be in some sense related to the rediscovery of Dewey and to the application of his key ideas in education. After decades of neglect of Dewey and of his contribution, there is a strong feeling not only that his conception of things is important to understand the last century but that Dewey – along with Peirce and other American classical pragmatists – may very well prove to be a key thinker for the XXIst century also in the Hispanic world. Along this vein, the recent resurgence of pragmatism can be understood not as the latest academic fashion but the occasion to start to close the gap between the two worlds.

This paper aims, above all, to invite a direct reading of the article that Charles S. Peirce published in 1908 with the title “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God.” More than a century after its original publication, that article by Peirce has not lost its relevance: its careful reading continues to provide a lot to think about. To this end, my presentation is organized in six sections: 1) introduction; 2) presentation of “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God”; 3) the notion of reality; 4) the heart of the “Neglected Argument”; 5) contemporary discussion: a response to Oya ; and 6) conclusion.

This contribution describes—with some documentary support from Peirce’s correspondence of his first and second European trips—Peirce’s conception of science as a collective and co-operative activity of all those whose lives are animated by the desire to find out the truth, whose lives are animated by “an impulse to penetrate into the reason of things.” The paper has two sections: first, Peirce as an inventor and builder of research instruments around which scientific communities are formed, and, second, Peirce’s own experience of cooperation within science.

Understanding Peirce requires dealing with Peirce's religious concerns, which are increasingly recognized as being as philosophically relevant as his scientific concerns. In recent times, even Peirce's regular religious practice in his Milford years has been documented (L 244), including, at least occasionally, week-day Eucharist services, which were "the hallmark of Tractarian or Anglo-Catholic parishes". I have argued elsewhere that for Peirce, scientific activity is a genuine religious enterprise, perhaps even the religious activity par excellence, and that to divorce religion from science is antithetical to both the scientific spirit and the genuine Peirce. In this vein, I have also held that Peirce's framework for the relations between science and religion, reason and faith, seems congenial to the Roman Catholic tradition. Perhaps the strongest conflict between Peirce's view on science and Roman Catholic faith may be epitomized in the dogma of papal infallibility, declared by the Vatican Council I and Pius IX on July of 1870, only eleven weeks before Peirce's first visit to Rome. Since the first moment, papal infallibility has been a permanent object of mockery and derision in the cultivated circles of Anglo-American intellectuals. As the late Rorty wrote, Pius's decision "was making Catholicism look ridiculous". In this broad framework, the aim of my paper is to provide some context for Peirce's letter about papal infallibility, as the doctrine was presented by his former colleague George M. Searle in his 1895 book "Plain Facts for Fair Minds", which Peirce came across almost by chance. According to Peirce, there is a deep contrast between the genuine scientific attitude and the putative metaphysical notion of 'absolute truth' that was behind Searle's defense of infallibility. "I would with all my heart join the ancient church of Rome if I could. But your book," —Peirce writes to Searle (L 397) — "is an awful warning against doing so." In order to explain Peirce's position, the paper is arranged into four sections: 1) a brief presentation of George M. Searle and his book Plain Facts for Fair Minds; 2) a description of Peirce's letter to Searle; 3) Peirce's fallibilism and infallibility; and 4) an attempt to guess how Searle might have responded to Peirce. I will try to collect some of Peirce's texts and to quote them extensively, since it is possible to learn a lot from the exploration of this debate.

We show how Peirce's architectonics folds on itself and finds local consequences that correspond to the major global hypotheses of the system. In particular, we study how the pragmaticist maxim can be technically represented in Peirce's existential graphs, well-suited to reveal an underlying continuity in logical operations, and can provide suggestive philosophical analogies. Further, using the existential graphs, we formalize — and prove one direction of — a “local proof of pragmaticism,” trying thus to explain the prominent place that existential graphs can play in the architectonics of pragmaticism, as Peirce persistently advocated. Finally, we present a web of “continuous iterations” of some key Peircean concepts that supports a “lattice of partial proofs” of pragmaticism

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Cosmopolitan Peirce:The Impact of His European ExperienceJaime Nubiola, Guest EditorKeywordsCharles S. Peirce, Europe, ScienceThe common image of Charles Sanders Peirce as an isolated thinker writing in Arisbe without any contact with the world is not only historically inaccurate, but also makes it difficult to understand some key elements of his philosophy. Charles S. Peirce traveled to Europe on five different occasions. The five trips occurred between the years 1870 and 1883, all of them in the service of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, at that time the chief scientific agency of the United States. Those trips—which covered a total of thirty-eight months—were a rich mixture of scientific research and tourism, of communication with other scientists and also of enjoying the artistic treasures of Europe. The impact of this extensive travelling was so relevant in Peirce’s life and thought that it makes perfect sense to identify this period of time as his “cosmopolitan period”—to use Max Fisch’s expression (Fisch 1986, 227).Peirce’s experiences of his European trips are lively reflected in his broad correspondence (professional and family letters), which until now has been unduly neglected by the scholarship, due in part to the difficulties accompanying access to it and in part to the general lack of interest from the analytic tradition in the biographical aspects of philosophy. We are convinced that the feelings that Peirce experienced in Europe were seeds which bore fruit in later years. A close study of Peirce’s letters and other documents of those years will help in avoiding a number of misunderstandings about his thought and its evolution by highlighting his active participation in the first line of several fields of cooperative scientific research (astronomy, geodesy, etc.). [End Page 425]In this issue we collect three papers presented at the 2014 Charles S. Peirce International Centennial Congress, authored respectively by Nathan Houser, Sara Barrena and myself. The first paper, written by Nathan Houser, describes how Peirce’s European experiences influenced the development of his thought and helped shape his philosophy. It appears likely that his thought was decidedly influenced by his intellectual and personal contact with European scientists and philosophers. So to understand Peirce as an American philosopher it is necessary to grasp that he was profoundly influenced by European thought and culture and to inquire how his American and European experiences worked together to form his ideas and shape him into the world-renowned philosopher he became.Sara Barrena’s paper focuses on Peirce’s aesthetics. While Peirce claims to not be well acquainted with aesthetics, he always was interested in that field. In spite of the fact that Peirce did not develop the issue in depth, aesthetics is at the foundation of the other normative sciences. Barrena suggests that the trips through Europe and the contemplation of so many works of art and of historic places left in his memory impressions that are at the basis of the importance that Peirce would assign to art and aesthetics in his later years.The final paper, by Jaime Nubiola, describes—with documental support from Peirce’s correspondence from his first and second European trips—Peirce’s conception of science as a collective and cosoperative activity of people whose lives are animated by the desire to find out the truth and by “an impulse to penetrate into the reason of things” (CP 1.44, c.1896). The paper deals with Peirce as an inventor and builder of research instruments around which scientific communities are built, and with Peirce’s own experience of cooperation in science.In sum, a close study of Peirce’s letters and other documents of his “cosmopolitan period” will help avoid certain misunderstandings about his thought and its evolution, highlighting his active participation in the first line of several fields of cooperative scientific research (astronomy, geodesy, etc.). A better understanding of Peirce’s activity in those years will provide a richer and more sympathetic approach to him, and correct that all too common but inaccurate image of Peirce as an isolated thinker.Jaime Nubiola, Guest EditorUniversidad de Navarra [email protected], Charles S. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders...

By the time of his death in 1910 at the age of 68 years, William James had become the most influential thinker not just of his own period, but indeed of any period. As the sociologist Jack Barbalet has written: “His European reputation was possibly even higher than his standing in America. James not only represented to European thinkers the American advances in psychology and philosophy, for which he was largely responsible, but he entered into the formation of contemporary European thought as much as he did American.” The aim of this paper is to provide a vivid sense of James’s personal involvement with European thought generally and continental philosophy specifically, giving some indications about various European countries, but with particular attention to Spain as a case study. Accordingly, the talk divides into three sections: (1) Europe in James; (2) James in Europe: friends and translations; and (3) James in Spain: translations and readers. A number of names and facts will be mentioned, since they provide the general framework for understanding the reception of William James in Continental Europe, but in particular the personal relations between William James and some of the most relevant European thinkers of his time are highlighted.

Charles S. Peirce traveled to Europe on five different occasions.1 The five trips took place between 1870 and 1883, all of them in the service of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, at the time the chief scientific agency of the United States. Those trips—which covered a total of thirty-eight months—were a rich mixture of scientific research and tourism, of communication with other scientists and of enjoyment of the artistic treasures of Europe. The impact of this extensive travelling was so important in Peirce's life and thought that it makes perfect sense to identify this period of time as his "cosmopolitan period"—to use Max Fisch's expression.Peirce's experiences of his European voyages are vividly...

The year 1908 is particularly relevant in the process of reception of pragmatism in Europe due to the 3rd International Congress of Philosophy held in September in Heidelberg. On that international event the "new philosophy" coming from America was in the center of the European stage. In this study, some of the evidence available about the reception of pragmatism in Europe on the occasion of the Heidelberg International Congress of Philosophy held in 1908 are collected and summarizes. The paper is arranged in the following sections: 1) The reception of pragmatism in Europe; 2) The preparation of the congress and the opening lecture by Josiah Royce; 3) The development of the congress; 4) Several echoes and afterthoughts, and 5) A brief conclusion. The main conclusion is to highlight the relevance of the III International Congress of Philosophy in order to understand this complex process of affinity and hostility between pragmatism and the different European interlocutors. The Congress was really a milestone in that process and it is worthwhile to study with attention the lectures and communications, and in particular the discussions that followed them.

In a world of ever-growing specialization, the issue of complexity attracts a good amount of attention from cross-disciplinary points of view. Charles S. Peirce’s thought may help not only to shoulder once again philosophical responsibility which has been largely abdicated by much of 20th century philosophy, but also to tackle some of the most stubborn contemporary problems. The founder of pragmatism identified one century ago most of these problems, and he also mapped out some paths that may be followed to overcome the poverty of contemporary scientistic reductionism. One of these paths is related with the issue of complexity that lies at the heart of all his conception. Along this line, the aim of this article is to describe what Peirce can teach about complexity to contemporary researchers from different scientific backgrounds. The article is divided in three sections: 1) a brief presentation of Peirce, stressing his personal authority as a scientist philosopher; 2) the theory of categories as the heart of complexity according to Peirce and, finally, 3) some consequences of Peirce’s notion of complexity in relation with abduction and creativity, semiosis, cross-disciplinarity and communication.

Résumé Depuis 1959, Pierre Parlebas tente de développer une éducation physique scientifique centrée sur la personne qui se meut et non plus sur le mouvement produit ou observé. La pierre angulaire de ce virage copernicien est un concept plein de résonances sémiologiques: la conduite motrice, entendue comme « organisation signifiante du comportement moteur ». En fait, sa proposition pédagogique est toujours allée de pair avec un projet épistémologique dont le noyau dur est une sémiologie de la motricité, c’est à dire une « semiotricité ». Si l’action motrice est le fer de lance de l’éducation physique la sémiotricité, c’est le fer de lance de la praxéologie motrice. Cinquante ans après son démarrage, nous proposons revisiter les fondements de cette conception de l’éducation physique qui reste aujourd’hui révolutionnaire. La sémiologie de la motricité est née sous l’égide de la Sorbonne du milieu du XXe siècle. Les principes du sémiologie linguistique de Saussure inspirent les concepts et les modèles de « un champ du signe discordant » qui bénéficie également des contributions d’autres auteurs pertinents du moment. Cependant, à cette époque, le pragmatisme et la sémiotique américains étaient bien connus. Une question se pose aussitôt: à quoi ressemblerait une sémiotricité triadique? Les processus de communication praxique déclenchent phénomènes d’anticipation et préaction motrices basés en une continuelle interprétation des intentions d’autrui. Paradoxalement, autant ces phénomènes communicatifs que les signes propres des situations ludomotrices peuvent être plus facilement conçus et analysés avec un modèle plus complexe, voire triadique, que nous aimerions partager avec sémioticiens et praxéologues.

Résumé Considéré comme l’action individuelle par excellence, le dribble renvoie le plus souvent à l’exercice d’une maîtrise technique que seuls quelques protagonistes d’exceptions sont à même d’exécuter. Cette image purement descriptive, centrée sur le seul pratiquant, n’entretient qu’un lointain rapport avec la réalité de ce qui constitue la raison d’être profonde de cette action motrice. Le dribble, entendue comme un acte qui consiste à conduire un objet, – une balle, un palet –, en alternant des temps de contact et de non contact, est avant tout à envisager dans sa dimension collective. Là est le point aveugle des analyses menées à son propos. Dans cette étude, on considérera le dribble comme un type de conduite motrice porteur d’intentions auxquelles sont attachées des significations de nature essentiellement sociale. Fondamentalement le dribble est relation, c’est-à-dire interaction. Il doit être envisagé sous l’angle de la sémiotricité, autrement dit des significations que les pratiquants lui accordent. Sa fonction est essentiellement d’annoncer les actions futures. À ce titre, il renvoie à une classe de comportements tactiques dont les significations relèvent d’une interprétation en situation sous la dépendance directe des règles du jeu sportif considéré. Loin d’être univoque, le dribble doit être envisagé comme un « signe » qui doit être décodé par les pratiquants en fonction de la grammaire du jeu considéré selon un double axe ; syntagmatique et sémantique. Ce travail à pour objectif de repérer les différentes significations possibles du « signe-dribble », considéré comme un praxème.

La obra de Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), considerado por muchos como un filósofo del siglo XIX para el siglo XXI, constituye una verdadera mina de aportaciones originales para entender el complejo y cambiante mundo que nos rodea. Gracias a un permanente empeño de colaboración, los autores de este libro han podido observar el conjunto de una situación dada alrededor de Peirce, concentrándose específicamente en el vaivén comunicativo producido alrededor de la díada Peirce-Mundo Hispánico. En la primera parte se contiene la información disponible sobre el viaje de Peirce a España en 1870, y sus anotaciones sobre España y los españoles dispersas en sus escritos. La segunda parte provee una amplia perspectiva sobre “todo lo que el mundo hispánico ha dicho sobre Peirce” entre los años 1883 y 2000. El trabajo de revisión de la bibliografía consiste en un catálogo razonado de la producción hispánica sobre Peirce y un estudio crítico previo donde se delinean los aportes fundamentales, las carencias y las líneas de tensión de esa producción.

It is not easy to explain what pragmatism is. Everybody who has had to teach pragmatism to university students has found herself or himself in a difficult situation trying to make a clear exposition. Moreover, it was not easy for Charles S. Peirce himself to explain in a simple manner the pragmatic maxim. In this contribution, I will not go into the technicalities of the pragmatic maxim, but I will share the fruits of my reflection of many years about how pragmatism can be more easily understood and taught. The article is arranged in two parts: the first one is dedicated to the old logical rule of the gospel, “By their fruits ye shall know”, which appears in two texts of Peirce; and the second one to what I call the “logic of the kitchen”, in which I will pay attention also to Peirce’s example of the apple pie. I will add a final consideration about how to teach philosophy today, according to Peirce.