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572Aesthetic creationOxford University Press. 2007.What is the purpose of art? What drives us to make it? Why do we value it? Nick Zangwill argues that the function of art is to have certain aesthetic properties in virtue of its non-aesthetic properties, and this function arises because of the artist's insight into the nature of these dependence relations and her intention to bring them about.
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284Feasible aesthetic formalismNoûs 33 (4): 610-629. 1999.Aesthetic Formalism has fallen on hard times. At best it receives unsympathetic discussion and swift rejection. At worst it is the object of abuse and derision. But I think that there is something to be said for it. In this paper, I shall try to find and secure the truth in formalism. I shall not try to defend formalism against all of the objections to it.1 Instead I shall articulate a moderate formalist view that draws on aesthetic0nonaesthetic determination and Kant’s distinction between free …Read more
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173Quasi-quasi-realismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3): 583-594. 1990.I. Projcctivism, Subjcctivism, and Error (i) According to Simon Blackburn, somconc who wants t0 avoid a ‘rcalistic’ account of our motal thought faces a choice} Thc choicc is bctwccn his non-rcductionist ‘projcctivism’ and rcductionist ‘subjcctivism’. Thc foymcr is thc vicw that moral judgments cxprcss attitudcs (approval, disapproval, liking or disliking, for example), which wc ‘projcct’ or ‘sprcad’ onto thc world, while thc latter is thc vicw that moral judgments arc bclicfs about attitudes. B…Read more
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193The indifference argumentPhilosophical Studies 138 (1). 2008.I argue against motivational internalism. First I recharacterise the issue over moral motivation. Second I describe the indifference argument against motivation internalism. Third I consider appeals to irrationality that are often made in the face of this argument, and I show that they are ineffective. Lastly, I draw the motivational externalist conclusion and reflect on the nature of the issue.
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241Daydreams and Anarchy: A Defense of Anomalous Mental CausationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2): 253-289. 2006.Must mental properties figure in psychological causal laws if they are causally efficacious? And do those psychological causal laws give the essence of mental properties? Contrary to the prevailing consensus, I argue that, on the usual conception of laws that is in play in these debates, there are in fact lawless causally efficacious properties both in and out of the philosophy of mind. I argue that this makes a great difference to the philosophical relevance of empirical psychology. 1 begin by …Read more
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222Non-cognitivism and motivationIn Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 416--24. 2009.In sum, the non-cognitivist account of motivation is far from unproblematic. The non-cognitivist has trouble telling us what moral attitudes are in a way that is consistent with the phenomenon of variable motivation. Given that the cognitivist has an easy explanation of variable motivation, it seems that cognitivism is preferable to non-cognitivism on the score of motivation, which is a reversal of the way the issue is usually perceived.
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96Supervenience, reduction, and infinite disjunctionPhilosophia 26 (1-2): 321-330. 1998.Can a certain sort of property supervene on another sort of property without reducing to it? Many philosophers find the superveniencel irreducibility combination attractive in the philosophy of mind and in moral philosophy (Davidson 1980 and Moore 1903). They think that mental properties supervene upon physical properties but do not reduce to them, or that moral properties supervene upon natural properties without reducing to them. Other philosophers have tried to show that the combination is ul…Read more
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95BeautyIn Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Oxford Companion to Aesthetics, Oxford University Press. 2003.I shall discuss several related issues about beauty. These are: (1) The place of beauty among other aesthetic properties. (2) The general principle of aesthetic supervenience. (3) The problem of aesthetic relevance. (4) The distinction between free and dependent beauty. (5) The primacy of our appreciation of free beauty over our appreciation of dependent beauty. (6) Personal beauty as a species of beauty. (7) The metaphysics of beauty.
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217Moral epistemology and the Because ConstraintIn James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, Blackwell. pp. 263--281. 2006.
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158Science and ethics: Demarcation, holism and logical consequencesEuropean Journal of Philosophy 18 (1): 126-138. 2008.Philosophers have often wanted to state a principled way of demarcating empirical from non-empirical thought. This was a major concern of the Vienna Circle. In my view, this is an important intellectual project. Although it is not so common now to address the issue directly, it hovers in the background of many discussions. Non-empirical thought comes in different kinds. Perhaps some is a priori. Common candidates are mathematical, logical, modal and moral thought. Some non-empirical thought migh…Read more
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178Rocks and Sunsets: A Defence of Ignorant PleasuresRivista di Estetica 45 (2). 2005.§1. How much do we have to know about what we evaluate? Many aestheticians say that all or most aesthetic evaluations of artworks and natural things require that we know not just about its immediately perceivable aspects but also about its history or deeper nature or wider role. I agree that quite a lot of aesthetic evaluation is like this. But I also think that much is not. Much of our aesthetic life is a matter of a relatively uninformed aesthetic appreciation of what is immediately given in o…Read more
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331Against emotion: Hanslick was right about musicBritish Journal of Aesthetics 44 (1): 29-43. 2004.I argue that Hanslick was right to think that music should not be understood in terms of emotion. In particular, it is not essential to music to possess emotions, arouse emotions, express emotions, or represent emotions. All such theories are misguided.
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180In defence of extreme formalism about inorganic nature: Reply to ParsonsBritish Journal of Aesthetics 45 (2): 185-191. 2005.I defend extreme formalism about inorganic nature against arguments put forward by Glenn Parsons. I begin by laying out the general issue over aesthetic formalism, and I describe the position of extreme formalism about inorganic nature. I then reconsider -Ronald Hepburn's beach/seabed example. Next I discuss the notions of function in play in our thinking about inorganic nature. And lastly I consider Parsons's flooding river example. I conclude that extreme formalism about inorganic nature is sa…Read more
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241Art and audienceJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57 (3): 315-332. 1999.D0 works 0f an essentially involve a relation t0 an audience'? Many otherwise very different theories of art agree than they do. S0 the question ‘Wha1 is art?" has no be answered by describing than relation. I shall argue 10 the ccmmrary [hm a theory of wha; ir is m be art should nm invoke any relacicm m an audience. Art has nothing esscmial to do with an audience.
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366The normativity of the mentalPhilosophical Explorations 8 (1): 1-19. 2005.I describe and defend the view in a philosophy of mind that I call 'Normative Essentialism', according to which propositional attitudes have normative essences. Those normative essences are 'horizontal' rational requirements, by which I mean the requirement to have certain propositional attitudes given other propositional attitudes. Different propositional attitudes impose different horizontal rational requirements. I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this doctrine and argue for the…Read more
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99Epistemic/Non‐epistemic DependenceNoûs 836-857. 2018.I foreground the principle of epistemic dependence. I isolate that relation and distinguish it from other relations and note what it does and does not entail. In particular, I distinguish between dependence and necessitation. This has many interesting consequences. On the negative side, many standard arguments in epistemology are subverted. More positively, once we are liberated from the necessary and sufficient conditions project, many fruitful paths for future epistemological investigation ope…Read more
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143Dilemmas and Moral RealismUtilitas 11 (1): 71. 1999.I distinguish two different arguments against cognitivism in Bernard Williams’ writings on moral dilemmas. The first turns on there being a truth of the matter about what we ought to do in moral a dilemma. That argument can be met by appealing to our epistemic shortcomings and to pro tanto obligations. However, those responses make no headway with the second argument which concerns the rationality of the moral regret that we feel in dilemma situations. I show how the rationality of moral regret …Read more
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154The concept of the aestheticEuropean Journal of Philosophy 6 (1). 1998.Can the contemporary concept of the ‘aesthetic’ be defended? Is it in good shape or is it sick? Should we retain it or dispense with it? The concept of the aesthetic is used to characterize a range of judgements and experiences. Let us begin with some examples of judgements which aestheticians classify as aesthetic, so that we have some idea of what we are talking about. These paradigm cases will anchor the ensuing discussion. Once we have some idea of which judgements are classified as aestheti…Read more
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10I ask four questions. Why should we think that our hominid ancestor’s predation is not just a causal influence but the main causal factor responsible for human cruelty? Why not think of human cruelty as a necessary part of a syndrome in which other phenomena are necessarily involved? What definitions of cruelty does he propose that we operate with? And what about the meaning of cruelty for human beings?
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146Moore, Morality, Supervenience, Essence, EpistemologyAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2). 2005.riety of necessity that binds moral and natural his conception of mental properties has no metaphysical consequences. Descartes is properties because the necessity is neither..
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9Skin Deep or In the Eye of the Beholder?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3): 595-618. 2000.I begin this paper by describing and making attractive a physicalist aesthetic realist view of aesthetic properties. I then argue against this view on the basis of two premises. The first premise is thesis of aesthetic/sensory dependence that I have defended elsewhere. The second premise is the denial of a mind-independence thesis about sensory properties. I give an argument for that denial. Lastly, I put these two premises together and conclude that physicalist aesthetic realism is false. I art…Read more
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62Against the sociology of artPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (2): 206-218. 2002.Aesthetic theories of art refuse to go away. In spite of decades of criticism and derision, a minority of thinkers stubbornly persist in maintaining that we need a general theory of art that makes essential appeal to beauty, elegance, daintiness, and other aesthetic properties.1 However, those who approach the theory of art from a sociological point of view tend to be skeptical about any account of art that appeals to aesthetic properties in a fundamental way. This skepticism takes two overlappi…Read more
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95Music seems mysterious, and our experience of some can have a peculiar depth. I think we should embrace this mysteriousness and not try to explain it away. There is something about music and our experience of it that is indescribable, and sometimes wonderfully indescribable. I here explore a view of music that is unashamedly mystical. However, this mysticism takes a particular form. Near the entry on “music” in Robert Audi’s Dictionary of Philosophy (Audi 1999) is an entry on “mysticism” by Will…Read more
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136I very much appreciate Daniel Nathan’s thoughtful commentary on Aesthe- tic Creation. He describes my view accurately, with a full understanding of what is moving me, and with some sympathy for my methodological concerns, even if he thinks that I over emphasize some desiderata and even if he cannot endorse the particular aesthetic theory that I argue emerges from the methodological reflections. He makes a number of interesting criticisms. (A) Nathan worries about doodles being classified as art …Read more
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