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115Good advice and rational actionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 561-569. 2000.This paper launches a new criticism of Michael Smith’s advice model of internalism. Whereas Robert Neal Johnson argues that Smith’s advice model collapses into the example model of internalism, the author contends that taking advice seriously pushes us instead toward some version of externalism. The advice model of internalism misportrays the logic of accepting advice. Agents do not have epistemic access to what their fully rational selves would advise them to do, and so it is necessary for a mo…Read more
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106The Incoherence Objection in Moral TheoryActa Analytica 25 (3): 279-284. 2010.J.J.C. Smart famously complained that rule utilitarianism is incoherent, and that rule utilitarians are guilty of rule worship . Much has been said about whether Smartâs complaint is justified, but I will assume for the sake of argument that Smart was on to something. Instead, I have three other goals. First, I want to show that Smartâs complaint is a specific instance of a more general objection to a moral theoryâwhat I will call the Incoherence Objection. Second, I want to illustrate how…Read more
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62On Indirectly Self-defeating Moral TheoriesJournal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3): 384-393. 2008.Derek Parfit has notably argued that while a moral theory should not be directly self-defeating, there is nothing necessarily wrong with a moral theory that is only indirectly self-defeating. Here I resist this line of argument. I argue instead that indirectly self-defeating moral theories are indeed problematic. Parfit tries to sidestep the oddities of indirectly self-defeating theories by focusing on the choice of dispositions rather than actions. But the very considerations that can make it i…Read more
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136How Indirect Can Indirect Utilitarianism Be?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2): 275-301. 2007.Most act‐utilitarians now reject the direct utilitarianism of Bentham. They do so because they are convinced of what I call the paradox of utilitarianism—the thought that one cannot maximize happiness if one is trying to maximize happiness. Instead, they adopt some form of indirect utilitarianism (IU), arguing that the optimal decision procedure may differ markedly from the criterion of rightness for actions. Here I distinguish between six different versions of indirect utilitarianism, arguing t…Read more
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21Personal Identity and Quasi-ResponsibilityIn A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 77--87. 2000.
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164Monkeys, typewriters, and objective consequentialismRatio 18 (3). 2005.There have been several recent attempts to refute objective consequentialism on the grounds that it implies the absurd conclusion that even the best of us act wrongly. Some have argued that we act wrongly from time to time; others have argued that we act wrongly regularly. Here I seek to strengthen reductio arguments against objective consequentialism by showing that objective consequentialism implies that we almost never act rightly. I show that no matter what you do, there is almost certainly …Read more
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43Theories of Practical ReasonMetaphilosophy 33 (4): 450-467. 2002.Leading theories of practical reason can be grouped into one of four families: psychologism, realism, compatibilism, and Aristotelianism. Although there are many differences among the theories within each family, I ignore these in order to ask which family is most likely to deliver a satisfactory philosophical account of reasons for action. I articulate three requirements we should expect any adequate theory of practical reason to meet: it should account for how reasons explain action, how reaso…Read more