Vasso Kindi

In the present chapter, I argue that commentators who criticize Kuhn’s work are most often fighting a straw man. Their target is a stereotype that is not to be found in Kuhn’s texts. I will consider the charge based on the stereotype that the Kuhnian schema is not borne out by historical evidence and will argue that Kuhn’s model, which is not actually what his critics take it to be, was not supposed to be based on, or accurately depict, historical facts. It was not a historical representation but a philosophical model that was used to challenge an ideal image of science. I suggest that giving a more accurate account of Kuhn’s model will not only do justice to Kuhn’s work but also draw attention to issues that, because of the stereotype, have remained in obscurity.

In the paper I examine Collingwood’s historical metaphysics, i.e., the fusion Collingwood attempts between history and philosophy. Collingwood’s metaphysical analysis aims to identify and uncover the absolute presuppositions of a particular type of discourse or phase in history and, in so doing, it arrives at historical facts recorded by metaphysical/ historical propositions. I present Collingwood’s account and, to further explicate it, I compare it to two other approaches which also involve, or ultimately terminate at, some kind of description of facts, Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics and Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigations. I bring out the differences between these three approaches but I also argue that their emphasis on assembling particular facts does not yield empirical but rather logical accounts which fold in historical and linguistic considerations. In Collingwood’s case, the historical dimension of his logical investigation is hermeneutical and developmental and highlights diversity.