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Concept as vessel and concept as ruleIn Uljana Feest (ed.), Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice, De Gruyter. pp. 23-46. 2012.
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The Role of Evidence in Judging Kuhn’s Model: On the Mizrahi, Patton, Marcum ExchangeSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (11): 25-33. 2015.
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Collingwood, Wittgenstein, Strawson: Philosophy and descriptionBritish Idealism Studies 22 (1): 19-43. 2016.In the paper I examine Collingwood’s historical metaphysics, i.e., the fusion Collingwood attempts between history and philosophy. Collingwood’s metaphysical analysis aims to identify and uncover the absolute presuppositions of a particular type of discourse or phase in history and, in so doing, it arrives at historical facts recorded by metaphysical/ historical propositions. I present Collingwood’s account and, to further explicate it, I compare it to two other approaches which also involve, or…Read more
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The Kuhnian Straw ManIn The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation?, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 95-112. 2017.In the present chapter, I argue that commentators who criticize Kuhn’s work are most often fighting a straw man. Their target is a stereotype that is not to be found in Kuhn’s texts. I will consider the charge based on the stereotype that the Kuhnian schema is not borne out by historical evidence and will argue that Kuhn’s model, which is not actually what his critics take it to be, was not supposed to be based on, or accurately depict, historical facts. It was not a historical representation bu…Read more
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30Collingwood, Wittgenstein, Strawson: Philosophy and DescriptionCollingwood and British Idealism Studies 22 (1): 15-39. 2016.
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1The Problem of Conceptual Change in the Philosophy and History of ScienceIn Stella Vosniadou (ed.), Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change, Routledge. pp. 343-359. 2013.
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Kuhn, the duck and the rabbit — Perception, theory-ladenness and creativity in scienceIn Interpreting Kuhn, Cambridge University Press. pp. 169-184. 2021.
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196Kuhn's Controversial LegacyRevue Roumaine de Philosophie 67 (2): 197-210. 2023.In the paper I will, first, address certain apparent tensions in relation to Kuhn’s legacy in the history of science. Kuhn was a historian before he became a philosopher of science. He had done and published historical work, he only had history graduate students, he imbued philosophy of science with historical considerations. And, yet, his widely acknowledged influence on the history of science came mostly through his philosophical work which is, nevertheless, brushed off by historians of scienc…Read more
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87Kuhn’s the Structure of Scientific Revolutions Revisited (edited book)Routledge. 2012.The present paper argues that there is an affinity between Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" and Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is maintained, in particular, that Kuhn's notion of paradigm draws on such Wittgensteinian concepts as language games, family resemblance, rules, forms of life. It is also claimed that Kuhn's incommensurability thesis is a sequel of the theory of meaning supplied by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As such its assessment is not fallacious, since it is not …Read more
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7Wittgenstein and Philosophy of ScienceIn Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein, Wiley-blackwell. 2017.Philosophy of science was formed as a distinct discipline in the early twentieth century around the work of the logical positivists, or logical empiricists, originally in Vienna in the mid‐twenties and in other European cities such as Berlin and Prague. It further developed in the United States, where most logical positivists moved to escape persecution by the Nazis or World War II and met the American pragmatist philosophers of science. Logical positivism, or logical empiricism, is the school o…Read more
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9Editorial Report 2020International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (4): 259-260. 2020.2020 was the year of the Covid-19 pandemic. The challenges it presented brought science to the fore in a multitude of ways. The world economy depended on science, governments consulted it, the publ...
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29The Quest for Physical Theory (QPT) comprises the eight Lowell lectures that Kuhn gave on Tuesdays and Fridays in March 1951 in the Lecture Hall of the Boston Library. He was 28 years old at the time, a member of the Harvard Society of Fellows, a recent Harvard PhD in Physics (1949), and an instructor in the general-education course on science set up by James Conant, Harvard’s President. Kuhn seized the opportunity of the Lowell Lectures to present his new, and ground-breaking at the time, take …Read more
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11Editorial Report 2019International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (3-4): 235-236. 2019.International Studies in the Philosophy of Science aims to publish original articles, book reviews and discussion notes that fall within what is currently understood as philosophy of science and th...
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6Presuppositions and the Logic of Question and AnswerIn Karim Dharamsi, Giuseppina D'Oro & Stephen Leach (eds.), Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology, Springer Verlag. pp. 111-130. 2018.Vasso Kindi examines, first, whether Collingwood’s logic of question and answer, which was to replace the symbolic logic of the logical positivists, does indeed bear similarities to Bacon’s and Kant’s use of questions, as Collingwood claims. She argues that Collingwood’s emphasis on questions is more similar to Kant’s concern with presuppositions that make knowledge possible than to Bacon’s interest in pursuing and questioning nature to divulge her secrets. She, then, explains how Collingwood’s …Read more
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3EditorialInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (1): 1-1. 2019.Volume 32, Issue 1, March 2019, Page 1-1.
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154The Structure’s Legacy: Not from Philosophy to DescriptionTopoi 32 (1): 81-89. 2012.In the paper I consider how empirical material, from either history or sociology, features in Kuhn’s account of science in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and argue that the study of scientific practice did not offer him data to be used as evidence for defending hypotheses but rather cultivated a sensitivity for detail and difference which helped him undermine an idealized conception of science. Recent attempts in the science studies literature, appealing to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, ha…Read more
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42A Reconsideration of the Relation Between Kuhnian Incommensurability and TranslationInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (4): 397-414. 2017.Up to the introduction of the term and concept of incommensurability by T. S. Kuhn and P. K. Feyerabend in the early 1960s, scientific texts were supposed to pose no problem as regards their translation, unlike literature, which was thought very difficult to translate. After the introduction of the term, translation of scientific language became equally problematic because, due to conceptual and perceptual incommensurability, there was no common observation basis to ground linguistic equivalence…Read more
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35James A. Marcum. Thomas Kuhn’s Revolutions: A Historical and an Evolutionary Philosophy of Science? London: Bloomsbury, 2015. Pp. ix+304. $94.00 ; $29.95 ; $21.99 (review)Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (1): 233-236. 2018.
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41Review of James A. Marcum: Thomas Kuhn's revolutions: a historical and an evolutionary philosophy of science? (review)Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (1): 233-236. 2018.
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75The Challenge of Scientific Revolutions: Van Fraassen's and Friedman's ResponsesInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (4): 327-349. 2011.This article criticizes the attempts by Bas van Fraassen and Michael Friedman to address the challenge to rationality posed by the Kuhnian analysis of scientific revolutions. In the paper, I argue that van Fraassen's solution, which invokes a Sartrean theory of emotions to account for radical change, does not amount to justifying rationally the advancement of science but, rather, despite his protestations to the contrary, is an explanation of how change is effected. Friedman's approach, which ap…Read more
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253Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions revisitedJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1). 1995.The present paper argues that there is an affinity between Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" and Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is maintained, in particular, that Kuhn's notion of paradigm draws on such Wittgensteinian concepts as language games, family resemblance, rules, forms of life. It is also claimed that Kuhn's incommensurability thesis is a sequel of the theory of meaning supplied by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As such its assessment is not fallacious, since it is not …Read more
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26Should science teaching involve the history of science? An assessment of Kuhn's viewScience$Education 14 (7-8): 721-731. 2005.
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37Concept as Vessel and Concept as UseIn Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice, De Gruyter. pp. 23-46. 2012.
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174The Relation of History of Science to Philosophy of Science in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Kuhn's later philosophical workPerspectives on Science 13 (4): 495-530. 2005.In this essay I argue that Kuhn's account of science, as it was articulated in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was mainly defended on philosophical rather than historical grounds. I thus lend support to Kuhn's later claim that his model can be derived from first principles. I propose a transcendental reading of his work and I suggest that Kuhn uses historical examples as anti-essentialist Wittgensteinian "reminders" that expose a variegated landscape in the development of science