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86The atomic number revolution in chemistry: a Kuhnian analysisFoundations of Chemistry 20 (3): 209-217. 2017.This paper argues that the field of chemistry underwent a significant change of theory in the early twentieth century, when atomic number replaced atomic weight as the principle for ordering and identifying the chemical elements. It is a classic case of a Kuhnian revolution. In the process of addressing anomalies, chemists who were trained to see elements as defined by their atomic weight discovered that their theoretical assumptions were impediments to understanding the chemical world. The only…Read more
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7Reflections on the origins and importance of our fieldsMetascience 26 (3): 353-354. 2017.This is an editorial.
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103Book Review: Cogent Science in Context: The Science Wars, Argumentation Theory, and HabermasRehgWilliamCogent Science in Context: The Science Wars, Argumentation Theory, and HabermasCambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009. 360 pp. $40 (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1): 152-154. 2012.This is a book review of Regh's Cogent Science in Context.
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46A new philosophy of science from the history of arcane natural science: Eric Scerri’s: A tale of seven scientists and a new philosophy of science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016 (review)Foundations of Chemistry 19 (3): 281-285. 2017.This is a book review of Eric Scerri's book, A Tale of Seven Scientists.
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99Kuhn’s Social Epistemology and the Sociology of ScienceIn William J. Devlin & Alisa Bokulich (eds.), Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Vol. 311. Springer. pp. 167-183. 2015.This chapter discusses Kuhn’s conception of the history of science by focussing on two respects in which Kuhn is an historicist historian and philosopher of science. I identify two distinct, but related, aspects of historicism in the work of Hegel and show how these are also found in Kuhn’s work. First, Kuhn held tradition to be important for understanding scientific change and that the tradition from which a scientific idea originates must be understood in evaluating that idea. This makes Kuhn …Read more
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244A selectionist explanation for the success and failures of scienceErkenntnis 67 (1): 81-89. 2007.I argue that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science is superior to the realists’ explanation. Whereas realists argue that our current theories are successful because they accurately reflect the structure of the world, the selectionist claims that our current theories are successful because unsuccessful theories have been eliminated. I argue that, unlike the explanation proposed by the realist, the selectionist explanation can also account for the failures of once succ…Read more
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98Scientific authorship in the age of collaborative researchStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3): 505-514. 2006.I examine two challenges that collaborative research raises for science. First, collaborative research threatens the motivation of scientists. As a result, I argue, collaborative research may have adverse effects on what sorts of things scientists can effectively investigate. Second, collaborative research makes it more difficult to hold scientists accountable. I argue that the authors of multi-authored articles are aptly described as plural subjects, corporate bodies that are more than the sum …Read more
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169Philosophy of Science: What are the Key Journals in the Field?Erkenntnis 72 (3): 423-430. 2010.By means of a citation analysis I aim to determine which scholarly journals are most important in the sub-field of philosophy of science. My analysis shows that the six most important journals in the sub-field are Philosophy of Science , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , Journal of Philosophy , Synthese , Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , and Erkenntnis . Given the data presented in this study, there is little evidence that there is such a field as the history and phil…Read more
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1Meaning and Convention and the Sociology of ScienceEidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 15 (2): 57-67. 1998.
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96Kuhn and the Discovery of ParadigmsPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (3): 380-397. 2011.I present a history of Kuhn’s discovery of paradigms, one that takes account of the complexity of the discovery process. Rather than emerging fully formed in Structure , the concept paradigm emerged through a series of phases. Early criticism of Structure revealed that the role of paradigms was unclear. It was only as Kuhn responded to criticism that he finally articulated a precise understanding of the concept paradigm. In a series of publications in the 1970s, he settled on a conception of a p…Read more
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71A Critical Introduction to Scientific Realism, by Paul Dicken : London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016, pp. vii + 214, £28.99 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1): 205-206. 2018.
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127The Future of The Structure of Scientific RevolutionsTopoi 32 (1): 75-79. 2013.I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research communities. Kuhn’s later work p…Read more
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27Social Selection, Agents' Intentions, and Functional ExplanationAnalyse & Kritik 24 (1): 72-86. 2002.Jon Elster and Daniel Little have criticized social scientists for appealing to a mechanism of social selection in functional explanations of social practices. Both believe that there is no such mechanism operative in the social world. I develop and defend an account of functional explanation in which a mechanism of social selection figures centrally. In addition to developing an account of social selection, I clarify what functional hypotheses purport to claim, and re-examine the role of agents…Read more
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142The pessimistic induction and the exponential growth of science reassessedSynthese 190 (18): 4321-4330. 2013.My aim is to evaluate a new realist strategy for addressing the pessimistic induction, Ludwig Fahrbach’s (Synthese 180:139–155, 2011) appeal to the exponential growth of science. Fahrbach aims to show that, given the exponential growth of science, the history of science supports realism. I argue that Fahrbach is mistaken. I aim to show that earlier generations of scientists could construct a similar argument, but one that aims to show that the theories that they accepted are likely true. The pro…Read more
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33History of Epistemic Communities and Collaborative ResearchIn James D. Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), Elsevier. pp. 867-872. 2015.Studies of epistemic communities and collaborative research in the social sciences have deepened the understanding of how science works, and more specifically how the social dimensions of scientific practice both enable and impede social scientists in realizing their epistemic goals. Two types of studies of epistemic communities are distinguished: general theories of epistemic communities aim to construct accounts of theoretical change applicable to all social scientific specialties, whereas his…Read more
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20Is Science Really a Young Man’s Game?Social Studies of Science 33 (1): 137-49. 2003.It has often been remarked that science is a young man's game. Thomas Kuhn, for example, claims that revolutionary changes in science are almost always initiated by either young scientists or those new to a field. I subject Kuhn's hypothesis to testing. I examine 24 revolutionary scientific figures mentioned in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to determine if young scientists are more likely to make revolutionary discoveries than older scientists. My analysis suggests that middle-aged sci…Read more
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35Does science have a moving target?American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1): 47-58. 2005.Kuhn argues that science does not aim at the truth. Alexander Bird raises concerns form Kuhn's view. I defend Kuhn's claim and argue that insofar as science has a goal it is a moving target.
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4WH Newton-Smith, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Science Reviewed (review)Philosophy in Review 22 (2): 136-128. 2002.
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35The Cambridge Companion to Bacon Markku Peltonen, editor Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, xv + 372 pp., $54.95, $18.95 paper (review)Dialogue 37 (3): 643-. 1998.This is a book review of Markku Peltonen's edited volume, The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, a collection of papers on the philosophy of Francis Bacon.
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15Metascience: reflections on the symposiumMetascience 25 (2): 161-162. 2016.This is an editorial.
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70Systematicity and the Continuity ThesisSynthese 196 (3): 819-832. 2019.Hoyningen-Huene develops an account of what science is, distinguishing it from common sense. According to Hoyningen-Huene, the key distinguishing feature is that science is more systematic. He identifies nine ways in which science is more systematic than common sense. I compare Hoyningen-Huene’s view to a view I refer to as the “Continuity Thesis.” The Continuity Thesis states that scientific knowledge is just an extension of common sense. This thesis is associated with Quine, Planck, and others…Read more
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22Specialization in philosophy: a preliminary studyScientometrics. 2013.I examine the degree of specialization in various sub-fields of philosophy, drawing on data from the PhilPapers Survey. The following three sub-fields are highly specialized: Ancient philosophy, seventeenth/eighteenth century philosophy, and philosophy of physics. The following sub-fields have a low level of specialization: metaphilosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of probability, philosophy of the social sciences, decision theory, and philosophy of race and gender. Highly specialized s…Read more
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147Kuhn's constructionismPerspectives on Science 18 (3): 311-327. 2010.I challenge Hacking's characterization of Kuhn's constructionism. I argue that Kuhn does not believe that nature has no joints. Rather, Kuhn believes there is no unique correct way to cut nature into kinds. I also argue that Kuhn is not an externalist. He believes that disputes in science are resolved on the basis of a consideration of the epistemic merits of the theories. Subjective factors merely ensure that competing theories are developed, and the strengths and weaknesses of the theories are…Read more
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19How Nature changed: Melinda Baldwin: Making Nature: The history of a scientific journal. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015, 309pp, $45 HB (review)Metascience 26 (1): 169-170. 2016.This is a review of Melinda Baldwin's book Making Nature.
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3316A defense of Longino's social epistemologyPhilosophy of Science 66 (3): 552. 1999.Though many agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be difficult. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are aptly described as "social," for they require a number of people to sustain them. These processes, she claims, not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be called "knowled…Read more
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33The role of solidarity in a pragmatic epistemologyPhilosophia 27 (1-2): 273-286. 1999.I critically examine Rorty's social epistemology, specifically his claim that the end of inquiry is solidarity.
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92Shapin's the scientific revolution: What will philosophers find? (review)Social Epistemology 13 (3 & 4). 1999.This is a book review of Steven Shapin's The Scientific Revolution.
K. Brad Wray
Aarhus University
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Aarhus UniversityCentre For Science StudiesRegular Faculty
Aarhus, Denmark
Areas of Specialization
General Philosophy of Science |
Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
General Philosophy of Science |
Epistemology |