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60COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH, DELIBERATION, AND INNOVATIONEpisteme 11 (3): 291-303. 2014.I evaluate the extent to which we could learn something about how we should be conducting collaborative research in science from the research on groupthink. I argue that Solomon has set us in the wrong direction, failing to recognize that the consensus in scientific specialties is not the result of deliberation. But the attention to the structure of problem-solving that has emerged in the groupthink research conducted by psychologists can help us see when deliberation could lead to problems for …Read more
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16Metascience and Neurath’s boatMetascience 24 (2): 171-172. 2015.Otto Neurath compared science to a ship at sea on which the sailors have to repair their vessel as they keep it afloat. Metascience is a ship of a similar sort. Do not worry. There are no repairs to report. But changes are being made at Metascience on an ongoing basis, even as we work to meet our production deadlines. With this, our second issue, we would like to announce some further changes with the journal.Ties Nijseen and Christi Lue who have long been responsible for many of the matters rel…Read more
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1015Invisible hands and the success of sciencePhilosophy of Science 67 (1): 163-175. 2000.David Hull accounts for the success of science in terms of an invisible hand mechanism, arguing that it is difficult to reconcile scientists' self-interestedness or their desire for recognition with traditional philosophical explanations for the success of science. I argue that we have less reason to invoke an invisible hand mechanism to explain the success of science than Hull implies, and that many of the practices and institutions constitutive of science are intentionally designed by scientis…Read more
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133Who has scientific knowledge?Social Epistemology 21 (3). 2007.I examine whether or not it is apt to attribute knowledge to groups of scientists. I argue that though research teams can be aptly described as having knowledge, communities of scientists identified with research fields, and the scientific community as a whole are not capable of knowing. Scientists involved in research teams are dependent on each other, and are organized in a manner to advance a goal. Such teams also adopt views that may not be identical to the views of the individual members of…Read more
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David L. Hull, Science and Selection: Essays on Biological Evolution and the Philosophy of Science (review)International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2): 191-192. 2002.This is a book review of David Hull's edited volume of collected papers, Science and Selection.
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Tony Becher & Paul R. Trowler, Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual Enquiry and the Culture of Disciplines (review)International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3): 317-320. 2003.
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385Success and truth in the realism/anti-realism debateSynthese 190 (9): 1719-1729. 2013.I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, comparing a test of…Read more
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35Science and systematicity: Paul Hoyningen-Huene: Systematicity: The nature of science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, xiii+287pp, £41.99 HB (review)Metascience 23 (1): 1-4. 2014.This is a review of Paul Hoyningen-Huene's book, Systematicity: The Nature of Science.
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96Kuhn and the Discovery of ParadigmsPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (3): 380-397. 2011.I present a history of Kuhn’s discovery of paradigms, one that takes account of the complexity of the discovery process. Rather than emerging fully formed in Structure , the concept paradigm emerged through a series of phases. Early criticism of Structure revealed that the role of paradigms was unclear. It was only as Kuhn responded to criticism that he finally articulated a precise understanding of the concept paradigm. In a series of publications in the 1970s, he settled on a conception of a p…Read more
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71A Critical Introduction to Scientific Realism, by Paul Dicken : London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016, pp. vii + 214, £28.99 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1): 205-206. 2018.
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127The Future of The Structure of Scientific RevolutionsTopoi 32 (1): 75-79. 2013.I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research communities. Kuhn’s later work p…Read more
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142The pessimistic induction and the exponential growth of science reassessedSynthese 190 (18): 4321-4330. 2013.My aim is to evaluate a new realist strategy for addressing the pessimistic induction, Ludwig Fahrbach’s (Synthese 180:139–155, 2011) appeal to the exponential growth of science. Fahrbach aims to show that, given the exponential growth of science, the history of science supports realism. I argue that Fahrbach is mistaken. I aim to show that earlier generations of scientists could construct a similar argument, but one that aims to show that the theories that they accepted are likely true. The pro…Read more
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27Social Selection, Agents' Intentions, and Functional ExplanationAnalyse & Kritik 24 (1): 72-86. 2002.Jon Elster and Daniel Little have criticized social scientists for appealing to a mechanism of social selection in functional explanations of social practices. Both believe that there is no such mechanism operative in the social world. I develop and defend an account of functional explanation in which a mechanism of social selection figures centrally. In addition to developing an account of social selection, I clarify what functional hypotheses purport to claim, and re-examine the role of agents…Read more
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33History of Epistemic Communities and Collaborative ResearchIn James D. Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), Elsevier. pp. 867-872. 2015.Studies of epistemic communities and collaborative research in the social sciences have deepened the understanding of how science works, and more specifically how the social dimensions of scientific practice both enable and impede social scientists in realizing their epistemic goals. Two types of studies of epistemic communities are distinguished: general theories of epistemic communities aim to construct accounts of theoretical change applicable to all social scientific specialties, whereas his…Read more
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20Is Science Really a Young Man’s Game?Social Studies of Science 33 (1): 137-49. 2003.It has often been remarked that science is a young man's game. Thomas Kuhn, for example, claims that revolutionary changes in science are almost always initiated by either young scientists or those new to a field. I subject Kuhn's hypothesis to testing. I examine 24 revolutionary scientific figures mentioned in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to determine if young scientists are more likely to make revolutionary discoveries than older scientists. My analysis suggests that middle-aged sci…Read more
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4WH Newton-Smith, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Science Reviewed (review)Philosophy in Review 22 (2): 136-128. 2002.
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35Does science have a moving target?American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1): 47-58. 2005.Kuhn argues that science does not aim at the truth. Alexander Bird raises concerns form Kuhn's view. I defend Kuhn's claim and argue that insofar as science has a goal it is a moving target.
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15Metascience: reflections on the symposiumMetascience 25 (2): 161-162. 2016.This is an editorial.
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35The Cambridge Companion to Bacon Markku Peltonen, editor Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, xv + 372 pp., $54.95, $18.95 paper (review)Dialogue 37 (3): 643-. 1998.This is a book review of Markku Peltonen's edited volume, The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, a collection of papers on the philosophy of Francis Bacon.
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22Specialization in philosophy: a preliminary studyScientometrics. 2013.I examine the degree of specialization in various sub-fields of philosophy, drawing on data from the PhilPapers Survey. The following three sub-fields are highly specialized: Ancient philosophy, seventeenth/eighteenth century philosophy, and philosophy of physics. The following sub-fields have a low level of specialization: metaphilosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of probability, philosophy of the social sciences, decision theory, and philosophy of race and gender. Highly specialized s…Read more
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70Systematicity and the Continuity ThesisSynthese 196 (3): 819-832. 2019.Hoyningen-Huene develops an account of what science is, distinguishing it from common sense. According to Hoyningen-Huene, the key distinguishing feature is that science is more systematic. He identifies nine ways in which science is more systematic than common sense. I compare Hoyningen-Huene’s view to a view I refer to as the “Continuity Thesis.” The Continuity Thesis states that scientific knowledge is just an extension of common sense. This thesis is associated with Quine, Planck, and others…Read more
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147Kuhn's constructionismPerspectives on Science 18 (3): 311-327. 2010.I challenge Hacking's characterization of Kuhn's constructionism. I argue that Kuhn does not believe that nature has no joints. Rather, Kuhn believes there is no unique correct way to cut nature into kinds. I also argue that Kuhn is not an externalist. He believes that disputes in science are resolved on the basis of a consideration of the epistemic merits of the theories. Subjective factors merely ensure that competing theories are developed, and the strengths and weaknesses of the theories are…Read more
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19How Nature changed: Melinda Baldwin: Making Nature: The history of a scientific journal. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015, 309pp, $45 HB (review)Metascience 26 (1): 169-170. 2016.This is a review of Melinda Baldwin's book Making Nature.
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33The role of solidarity in a pragmatic epistemologyPhilosophia 27 (1-2): 273-286. 1999.I critically examine Rorty's social epistemology, specifically his claim that the end of inquiry is solidarity.
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3316A defense of Longino's social epistemologyPhilosophy of Science 66 (3): 552. 1999.Though many agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be difficult. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are aptly described as "social," for they require a number of people to sustain them. These processes, she claims, not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be called "knowled…Read more
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11David Oldroyd 1936–2014Metascience 24 (1): 3-4. 2015.David Oldroyd died in Sydney on 7 November 2014. Many readers of this journal would know of David’s impressive career as an historian of science and many would have also had the pleasure of knowing David personally. His academic career spanned across England, New Zealand and Australia, and his expertise in history of geology took him to several parts of the world for conferences and research, archival as well as geological, including Europe, China, Turkey, Russia and North America. His experienc…Read more
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92Shapin's the scientific revolution: What will philosophers find? (review)Social Epistemology 13 (3 & 4). 1999.This is a book review of Steven Shapin's The Scientific Revolution.
K. Brad Wray
Aarhus University
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Aarhus UniversityCentre For Science StudiesRegular Faculty
Aarhus, Denmark
Areas of Specialization
General Philosophy of Science |
Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
General Philosophy of Science |
Epistemology |