John Protevi

In this article I will suggest ways in which adding the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze to the mix can complement and extend the 4EA approach to cognitive science. In the first part of the paper, I will show how the Deleuzean tripartite ontological difference (virtual/intensive/actual) can provide an explicit ontology for dynamical systems theory. The second part will take these ontological notions and apply them to three areas of concern to the 4EA approaches: (a) the Deleuzean concept of the virtual will clarify the ontological status of perceptual capacity as sensorimotor skill; (b) the Deleuzean concept of “intensive individuation” will clarify the ontological status of the genesis of perceptually guided behavior; (c) the Deleuzean critique of confusing the actual and the virtual will enable us to intervene in the realism/idealism debate. These aspects will not be addressed sequentially but will be interwoven into an unfolding argument

Anna Cazzullo, one of the leading young Italian scholars, a student of Carlo Sini, has produced a most useful work on the origins of Western thought on metaphor. Cazzullo begins her La verità della parola with a Borges poem in which the birth of logos, as represented by a conversation between "two Greeks, perhaps Socrates and Parmenides," is accompanied by a suppression of myth and metaphor. This dual gesture, in which philosophy originates through the marginalization of other types of discourse, becomes Cazzullo's guiding thread in her reading of contemporary philosophy of metaphor and its relation to Aristotle. The reader familiar with the work of Heidegger and Derrida will recognize their influence on Cazzullo's thematization of this dual gesture, but will not find much analysis of their texts on metaphor. It is difficult, however, to fault an author for narrowing her task, and Cazzullo's accomplishment is certainly deserving of notice on its own accord.

Forthcoming in Cognitive Architecture: from bio-politics to noo-politics, eds. Deborah Hauptmann, Warren Neidich and Abdul-Karim Mustapha INTRODUCTION The cognitive and affective sciences have benefitted in the last twenty years from a rethinking of the long-dominant computer model of the mind espoused by the standard approaches of computationalism and connectionism. The development of this alternative, often named the “embodied mind” approach or the “4EA” approach (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, affective), has relied on a trio of classical 20th century phenomenologists for its philosophical framework: Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.[1] In this essay I propose that the French thinker Gilles Deleuze can provide the conceptual framework that will enable us to thematize some unstated presuppositions of the 4EA School, as well as to sharpen, extend and / or radicalize some of their explicit presuppositions. I highlight three areas here: 1) an ontology of distributed and differential systems, using Deleuze’s notion of the virtual; 2) a thought of multiple subjectification practices rather than a thought of “the” subject, even if it be seen as embodied and embedded; and 3) a rethinking of the notion of affect in order to thematize a notion of “political affect.”[2] I will develop this proposal with reference to Bruce Wexler’s Brain and Culture,[3] a work which resonates superbly with the Deleuzean approach.

Francisco Varela’s work is a monumental achievement in 20th century biological and biophilosophical thought. After his early collaboration in neo-cybernetics with Humberto Maturana (“autopoiesis”), Varela made fundamental contributions to immunology (“network theory”), Artificial Life (“cellular automata”), cognitive science (“enaction”), philosophy of mind (“neurophenomenology”), brain studies (“the brainweb”), and East- West dialogue (the Mind and Life conferences). In the course of his career, Varela influenced many important collaborators and interlocutors, formed a generation of excellent students, and touched the lives of many with the intensity of his mind, the sharpness of his wit, and the strength of his spirit. In this essay, I will trace some of the key turning points in his thought, with special focus on the concept of emergence, which was always central to his work, and on questions of politics, which operate at the margins of his thought. I will divide Varela’s work into three periods – autopoiesis, enaction, and radical embodiment – each of which is marked by a guiding concept; a specific..

As befits a French philosopher of the 1960s, Gilles Deleuze (1925-995), was famous for his antihumanism and his anti-essentialism. Humans are fully part of nature with no supernatural supplement; and essences are not the way to individuate things. That doesn’t seem to leave much room for a Deleuzean human nature, but that’s what I want to try to explore. I’ll take my clue from what he says in A Thousand Plateaus about nomads, who “reterritorialize on their power of deterritorialization.” In other words, they are most at home when on the move. But this isn’t just spatial movement; we can also say that the habit of nomads is to break habits. I’ll make sense of this claim by referring to Bruce Wexler’s Brain and Culture (MIT, 2006), in particular, his claim that humans evolved for a lengthy childhood period of socially mediated neuroplasticity. Human nature on this view is such that we are individuated by our singular patterns of social – somatic interaction. And this in turn is “nomadic” in Deleuze’s sense: our nature is to be so open to our nurture that it becomes second nature. That is, we’re at home wherever home is. There’s an anti-essentialist nuance here, however. It’s children who are most “nomadic,” most plastic. Most adults drift away from nomadism and become sedentary: they want more of the same. But even here we must nuance things: what if “more of the same” means “more change”? In other words, are there adult “nomads”? I think there are. But we’ll need to discuss Deleuze’s ontology first in order to make sense of these claims. Deleuze is an interactive process philosopher: we aren't substances but processes and those processes are not individuated by properties but as singular patterns of social and somatic interaction. The embodied and the embedded aspects of our being intersect – we are bodies whose capacities form in social interaction. And it's in this intersection of the social and the somatic that subjectivity and selfhood emerge – and are sometimes attenuated and even bypassed..

For the most part, this is a fairly literal translation, but I have opted for a few English idioms for the sake of readability. In that spirit, I have kept the original punctuation, which results in very long sentences, but I have inserted paragraph breaks for readability. I mark these inserted breaks with this sign [¶]; unmarked breaks are in the original. In addition to providing the French for difficult translations, I also interpolate a few English words for readability. Translator’s notes appear as endnotes.

Once one of the most important philosophical concepts (it is impossible to think of Plato without erôs, or Aristotle without philia, or Augustine without caritas and cupiditas), love doesn't get much philosophical notice nowadays, at least outside psychoanalytic circles. Or so it seems. But couldn't one just as well say that Derrida and Deleuze think about nothing but love? What have they written that isn't linked rather directly to desire, to alterity, to getting outside oneself, even if "love" isn't among their..