John Protevi

Between Deleuze and Derrida is the first book to explore and compare the work of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida, two leading philosophers of French post-structuralism. This is done via a number of key themes, including the philosophy of difference, language, memory, time, event, and love, as well as relating these themes to their respective approaches to Philosophy, Literature, Politics and Mathematics. Contributors: Eric Alliez, Branka Arsic, Gregg Lambert, Leonard Lawlor, Alphonso Lingis, Tamsin Lorraine, Jeff Nealon, Paul Patton, Arkady Plotnitsky, John Protevi, Daniel W. Smith

To concretize my discussion of relational autonomy and collective intentionality, I present a case study in which we can see several themes in that scholarly literature exemplified in a real‐life event. The event in question is the Megan Rapinoe‐Abby Wambach goal in the quarterfinals of the Women's World Cup of 2011, one of the greatest in all World Cup history (A video clip of the goal can be found at:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0B4q6di‐3fg.). In the case study, I concentrate on the ontological status of two key aspects of soccer, the linking of teammates by a pass, and the emergence of the team from the interactions of players. I use concepts drawn from poststructuralism, phenomenology, and enactivist approaches to embodied cognition.

We begin by treating the antinaturalism of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, and follow that by considering the recent project of “naturalizing phenomenology.” As a transitional figure, we treat Hans Jonas and the weakly emergent status he allows organismic life. In a section on “affirmative naturalism,” we treat Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, and Gilles Deleuze, emphasizing their relation to Spinoza's ethics of joy. We conclude by considering the antinaturalism of continental philosophy positions in critical race theory (Linda Alcoff), gender theory (Judith Butler), and disability studies (Shelley Tremain).

In this paper I attempt to contribute to the developing field of “political philosophy of mind.” To render concrete the notion of “affective frame,” a social situation which pre-selects for salience and valence of environmental factors relative to a subject’s life, I conduct a case study of a deleterious socially instituted affective frame, which, during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, produced individuated circumstances that came crashing down on “essential workers” who were forced into a double bind. We saw here an untenable and ultimately fatal situation that forced a choice between, on the one hand, increasing the risk of their failing to provide financial support for their family if they quit their job or reduced their hours, and on the other, increasing their risk of contracting the virus by continuing to work. The case study will thus be itself an affective frame that will bring to the fore for its readers a nexus of harmful social practices of contemporary American society. Form is reinforced by content here, as this particular affective frame brings forth a further emphasis on affect when we focus on workers simultaneously socialized into roles as breadwinners and as members of the caring professions. For those people, quitting work becomes even more difficult as they come to affirm their self-identity of being providers of affective labor for those in their care at work and of being the affective anchor of family life at home, the one who financially helps keep a roof over the heads of their loved ones as well as being the emotional backbone of the family. Hence the affective frame of “essential workers in Covid times” renders salient and affirmatively valenced their affectively laden self-image as caring helpers of those in need, at home and at work.

The first ever dictionary of continental philosophy to be published.With over 450 clearly written definitions and articles by an international team of specialists, this authoritative dictionary covers the thinkers, topics and technical terms associated with the many fields known as 'continental' philosophy'. Special care has been taken to explain the complex terminology of many continental thinkers. Researchers, students and professional philosophers alike will find the dictionary an invaluable reference tool.Key features include:*in-depth entries on major figures and topics*over 190 shorter articles on other figures and topics*over 250 items on technical terms used by continental thinkers, from abjection [Kristeva] to worldhood [Heidegger]*coverage of related subjects that use continental terms and methods*extensive cross-referencing, allowing readers to relate and pursue ideas in depth.Entries include: Major Figures and Topics: Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Hegel, Heidegger, Husserl, Irigaray, Kant, NietzscheEpistemology, Feminism, German Idealism, Marxism, Phenomenology, Poststructuralism, Time, etc.Other figures and topics covered include: Adorno, Althusser, Arendt, Badiou, Barthes, Bergson, Butler, Haraway, Habermas, Kristeva, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Schelling, Schiller, Weber, Weil, Wittgenstein, Zizek, etc;African Philosophy, Cognitive Science, Death, Ecocriticism, Embodiment, Environmental Philosophy, Modernity, Philosophy of Nature, NeoThomism, Postcolonial Theory, Psychology, Race Theory, Sex / sexuality, Space, Speech Act Theory, Structuralism, Subject, 'Young Hegelians', etc.

I explore Jason Stanley’s notion of ideology. After preliminary remarks on ideology and coercion in social reproduction, I offer a restatement of Stanley’s position on ideology, examining his notion of epistemic harm. I then examine the role of emotion in his thinking as that which binds beliefs to agents, and conclude with an argument for a notion I call “affective ideology” that enables us to connect ideology with the use of force in “coercive social reproduction.”Examino la noción de ideología debida a Jason Stanley. Tras algunas observaciones preliminares sobre ideología y coerción en la reproducción social, ofrezco una reformulación de la posición de Stanley sobre la ideología, examinando su noción de daño epistémico. Examino a continuación el rol de las emociones en su pensamiento, en tanto que son las que vinculan las creencias a los agentes, y concluyo con un argumento a favor de lo que llamo “ideología afectiva”, la cual nos capacita para conectar la idelogía con el uso de la fuerza en la “reproducción social coercitiva”.

The concept of emergence—which I define as the construction of functional structures in complex systems that achieve a focus of systematic behaviour as they constrain the behaviour of individual components—plays a crucial role in debates in philosophical reflection on science as a whole as well as in the fields of biology, social science and cognitive science. In this article I examine how the philosophy of Deleuze and that of Deleuze and Guattari can help us see some of the most important implications of these debates.

Alfredo Ferrarin has written an excellent study of Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle. He clearly states his intention on p. 18: He wishes to examine the “effective presence of Aristotelian themes in Hegel,” particularly that of energeia, in order to follow the way in which “the idea of autoreferential activity in its Aristotelan sense operates in the details and in the particular contents of Hegel’s interpretation [of Aristotle] and in the course of Hegel’s own philosophy.” Bringing together an admirable familiarity with the principal texts, fine linguistic skills, and a wide-ranging knowledge of the secondary literature, Ferrarin presents the reader with a treatment that is careful in its details, clear in its structure, and altogether up to the daunting task it sets for itself. For, as Ferrarin notes several times, the appropriation of Aristotle is so important for Hegel that Aristotle’s thought does not appear confined within a few categories of the Science of Logic or a few spiritual shapes in the Phenomenology of Spirit, but constitutes a pretext, a “model” of a “philosophy of unification” that Hegel takes up at all levels of his own thought.

Both Deleuze in DR and Thompson / Jonas can be fairly said to be biological panpsychists. That‘s pretty much what ―Mind in Life‖ means: mind and life are co-extensive: life = autopoiesis and cognition = sense-making. Thus Mind in Life = autopoietic sense-making = control of action of organism in environment. Sense-making here is three-fold: 1) sensibility as openness to environment; 2) signification as positive or negative valence of environmental features relative to the subjective norms of the organism; 3) direction or orientation the organism adopts in response to 1 and 2. (―Sense of the river‖ is archaic in English, but ―sens unique‖ for ―one-way street‖ is perfectly clear in French.)

In 2005 Mike Wheeler published a very nice book with MIT entitled Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step. Wheeler writes about – and is at the forefront of – a group of researchers calling attention to what we can call 4EA cognition: "embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, affective." The philosophical resource for Wheeler’s “next step” is Heidegger. I think it's time we use Deleuze to take another next step.1 I’m going to use Deleuze’s essay on Lucretius as a lead. There, Deleuze writes about naturalism as demystification. For the 4EA schools, the fight is against myths of the subject.

DEFINING THE LIMITS OF THE FIELD. Because 'consciousness and the body' is central to so many philosophical endeavors, I cannot provide a comprehensive survey of recent work. So we must begin by limiting the scope of our inquiry. First, we will concentrate on work done in English or translated into English, simply to ensure ease of access to the texts under examination. Second, we will concentrate on work done in the last 15 years or so, since the early 1990s. Third, we will concentrate on those philosophers who treat both consciousness and the body together. Thus we will not treat philosophers who look at body representations in culture, nor philosophers who examine socio-political bodily practices with minimal or no reference to consciousness. Finally, even with the philosophers we choose to treat, we cannot be comprehensive and will instead make representative choices among their works. With that being said, we will have a fairly liberal definition of continental philosophy, operationally defined as that which makes (non-exclusive) reference to the classic phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Thus we will include the radical..