Tom Ryckman

Those enlightened philosophers of physics acknowledging some manner of descent from Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’ have long found encouragement and inspiration in the writings of Roberto Torretti. In this tribute, I focus on his “perspective on Kant’s perspective on objectivity” (2008), a short but highly stimulating attempt to extract the essential core of the Kantian doctrine that ‘objects of knowledge’ are constituted, not given, or with Roberto’s inimitable pungency, that “objectivity is an achievement, not a gift.” That essential core Roberto locates in the Kantian notion of apperception, or self-activity, manifested in cognition in the idea of combination (Verbindung) or composition, which, Kant tells us, “among all ideas … is the one that is not given through objects, but can only be performed by the subject itself, because it is an act of self-activity” (B 130). I first rehearse Roberto’s proposal for how an imaginative interplay between sensibility and understanding can be fashioned via the productive imagination or power of reflective judgment (of the third Critique). In this way, the notion of composition in general, unfettered from needless period constraints issuing in “pure forms of sensibility” and “pure concepts of the understanding”, can be seen as the intellectual motor for the “free creation” of concepts celebrated by Einstein and others, furnishing structural scaffolding required to articulate and display physical objects and processes, a conceptual panoply that “cannot be fished out of the stream of impressions”. Roberto emphasizes that historical case studies are needed to evaluate his proposal, suggesting one himself, the continuous conceptual development inaugurated by Riemann’s Habilitätionsschrift (1854) resulting, some hundred years later, in the fiber bundle formalism of modern differential geometry and topology. I sketch a related suggestion, that the gauge groups of modern particle physics are the outcome of a similar line of conceptual advance, a structural scaffolding saving the phenomena of high-energy experiment within the framework of ‘effective field theory.’

Einstein and Hilbert both struggled to reconcile general covariance and causality in their early work on general relativity. In Einstein’s case, this first led to his infamous “hole argument”, a stumbling block that persuaded him early on that generally covariant field equations for gravitation could never be found. After his breakthrough to general covariance in the fall of 1915, the resolution came in form of the “point-coincidence argument.” Hilbert from the beginning took a different view of the “causality problem,” though he shifted his position somewhat in the light of Einstein’s breakthrough in November 1915. Nevertheless, his aim was to establish initial conditions that would lead to a well-defined Cauchy problem in general relativity. Hilbert consistently advocated the use of coordinate conditions in order to obtain solutions of the field equations that would maintain the causal ordering of events. Einstein’s “causality problem” thus differs from that of Hilbert, and the latter was never a victim of Einstein’s “hole argument.”

This collaborative work provides an intellectual portrait of a man known to most students of philosophy today only as a lesser founding member of the Vienna Circle. It makes a strong case for the intrinsic interest and continuing relevance of much of Neurath’s thought to contemporary science studies, considered broadly. Together with several other recent works on Neurath, it forces a substantial revision in any assessment of the Vienna Circle and its legacy. Finally, it describes, in some detail, the often larger-than-life activities of this politically engaged European intellectual in the first, and darker, half of the century. Neurath, it turns out, was quite a remarkable person on several fronts, and at times, simultaneously.

We have yet to fully understand the mariner or the measure to which logical empiricism emerged as a conventionalist response to both traditional Kantian and empiricist epistemology and to the apparent triumphs of “conventionalist stratagems” (in Popper’s aspersive locution) in the foundations of science. By “conventionalism”, however, is here understood a broader sense than customary, an extrapolation of views on the foundations of geometry and physics (associated in the first instance with Poincaré“) to an encompassing epistemological consideration of the development and validity of scientific concepts generally. In this new construal, the concepts of science are neither derivable from sense experience, nor are they transcendentally valid a priori conditions of its possibility. Rather they are “free creations of the human mind” whose provenance is “logically arbitrary”, as Poincare’ and (subsequently) Einstein put it.

Albert Einstein was the most influential physicist of the twentieth century. Less well-known is that fundamental philosophical problems, such as concept formation, the role of epistemology in developing and explaining the character of physical theories, and the debate between positivism and realism, played a central role in his thought as a whole. Thomas Ryckman shows that already at the beginning of his career, at a time when the twin pillars of classical physics, Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell’s electromagnetism, were known to have but limited validity, Einstein sought to advance physical theory by positing certain physical principles as secure footholds. That philosophy produced his greatest triumph, the general theory of relativity, and his greatest failure, an unwillingness to accept quantum mechanics. This book shows that Einstein’s philosophy grew from a lifelong aspiration for a unified theoretical representation encompassing all physical phenomena. It also considers how Einstein’s theories of relativity and criticisms of quantum theory have shaped the course of twentieth-century philosophy of science. Including a chronology, glossary, chapter summaries, and suggestions for further reading, _Einstein_ is an ideal introduction to this iconic figure in twentieth-century science and philosophy. It is essential reading for students of philosophy of science, and also suitable for those working in related areas such as physics, history of science, or intellectual history.

This work examines the foundations of linguistic theory, with particular reference to the status and justification of grammars and theories of language structure. A metatheoretical critique of generative grammar is followed by epistemological motivation for, and presentation of, an alternative conception of language structure due to Harris, together with an approach to its justification. It is proposed that grammars have an informational validity as structures comprised of maximally unredundant equivalence classes whose members all demonstrably 'say the same' over a specified domain. Chapter 1 introduces the issues involved and summarizes the argument. In Chapter 2, the metatheoretical situation in American structural linguistics prior to the advent of generative grammar is reviewed. Among the findings are that familiar attributions to the central figures of this period of a goal of providing "mechanical discovery procedures" for grammars or of attempting to specify linguistic form without regard to meaning are groundless. Chapter 3 situates the first major work of generative grammar in respect to Quine's contemporary proposals for linguistic theory and finds wanting arguments advanced that linguistic form can be identified independently of considerations of meaning. Chapter 4 charts the evolution of generative grammar from a "formal systems" view of grammars and languages to recent proposals concerning "core grammar" and "markedness". It is argued that in pursuit of "explanatory adequacy" generative grammar has increasingly been distanced from the control of empirical evaluation, and that claims seeking a biological locus for abstract grammatical properties are unsubstantiated and problematic in themselves. Chapter 5 provides an epistemological critique of 'information' as employed by recent writers. Grammars--as unredundant characterizations of combinations of linguistic elements that can occur--are characterizations of information. Chapter 6 refers to a prior study presenting a 'grammar' of a sublanguage of cellular immunology. It is shown both how and that a theory of language structure can be empirically validated by enabling the construction of formulas of information that compactly summarize and trace the findings and discussions in research reports of a science.