Robert Sinnerbrink

This paper pursues the lsquo;thinking dialoguersquo; between Hegel and Heidegger, a dialogue centred on Heideggerrsquo;s lsquo;confrontationrsquo; with Hegelrsquo;s Phenomenology of Spirit. To this end, I examine Heideggerrsquo;s critique of Hegel on the relationship between time and Spirit; Heideggerrsquo;s interpretation of the Phenomenology as exemplifying the Cartesian-Fichtean metaphysics of the subject; and Heideggerrsquo;s later reflections on Hegel as articulating the modern metaphysics of lsquo;subjectityrsquo;. I argue that Heideggerrsquo;s confrontation forgets those aspects of Hegelrsquo;s philosophy that make him our philosophical contemporary: Hegelrsquo;s thinking of intersubjectivity and recognition, of the historicity of the experience of spirit, and his critique of modernity. The point of this dialogue is to begin a retrieval of Hegel from Heideggerrsquo;s critical deconstruction, and thus to suggest that the future of Hegelmdash;in Catherine Malaboursquo;s phrasemdash;remains something still to-come

Imagination has been the focus of much philosophical inquiry in recent decades. Although it plays an essential role in linking emotional engagement with ethical experience, imagination has received comparatively little attention in film-philosophy. In this article, I argue that imagination plays an essential role in linking emotional engagement with moral-ethical experience. Drawing on phenomenological, cognitive and aesthetic perspectives, I focus on perceptual imagining and suggest that an account of embodied cinematic imagination — encompassing both perceptual/sensory and propositional/cognitive imagining — is especially relevant to theorizing cinematic experience. The interplay of first-person empathic and third-person sympathetic perspectives is another essential feature of our emotional and ethical engagement with cinema. By synthesizing ‘bottom-up’ sensory, affective responses to audiovisual images, with ‘top-down’ cognitive processes associated with mental simulation, an account of embodied cinematic imagination can explain how emotional engagement and ethical responsiveness work together in our experience of audiovisual narratives.

Understanding Hegelianism explores the ways in which Hegelian and anti-Hegelian currents of thought have shaped some of the most significant movements in twentieth-century European philosophy, particularly the traditions of critical theory, existentialism, Marxism, and poststructuralism. Robert Sinnerbrink begins with an examination of Kierkegaard's existentialism and Marx's materialism. He looks at the contrasting critiques of Hegel by Lukacs and Heidegger as well as the role of Hegelian themes in the work of Adorno, Habermas, and Honneth. Sinnerbrink also considers the rich tradition of Hegelianism in modern French philosophers such as Wahl, Kojeve, Hyppolite, Lefebvre, Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Derrida and Deleuze, who articulated a radical critique of Hegelianism.Throughout Understanding Hegelianism Sinnerbrink foregrounds the Hegelian themes of the unhappy consciousness, the master/slave dialectic, and the struggle for recognition and shows how each has provided fertile concepts for both the development of German critical theory and for French philosophy. He examines the problem of modernity, theories of recognition, and the deconstruction of metaphysics in order to show the legacy of Hegelian thought and also explores some of the recent developments in Anglophone Hegelianism.

This chapter offers a critical discussion of the relationship between poststructuralism and film theory. I commence with a brief account of poststructuralism’s distinctive features. I then turn to the key poststructuralist thinkers such as Derrida and Deleuze, and explore why poststructuralist thinkers themselves may have eschewed reflecting on the medium. I then consider the critique of poststructuralist contribution to film theory, suggesting what elements of that critique remain pertinent. Finally, I consider Deleuze, the only poststructuralist thinker to have focused on cinema, and argue that much of his cinematic philosophy implies a critical distancing from the psycho-semiotic/poststructuralist approach to film theory.

Like the fabled black swan of early epistemological inquiry, ‘Australasian Continental philosophy’ seems a kind of chimera apt to raise doubts rather than certainty. Is there such a mythical creature? Is it nothing more than a pale reflection of more paradigmatic instances found ‘overseas’, as we say in Australia, an Antipodean counterpart to the ‘major’ developments occurring in the United Kingdom or the United States? Or are there distinctive features of this phenomenon that, like the black swan, represent an unexpected variation unique to the Australasian environment? For a movement that one can date as first appearing in the early part of the twentieth century—the publication of John McKellar Stewart’s 1913 critical study of Henri Bergson’s philosophy may serve as a convenient starting point—it is surprising that Continental philosophy in Australia has only recently become a topic of historical interest. Part of the problem is the contested nature of the phenomenon in question. ‘Continental philosophy’ is a term that goes back to the nineteenth-century historical contrast between ‘British empiricism’ and ‘Continental rationalism’ ). It emerges more explicitly, however, with J.S. Mill’s essays on the contrast between Benthamite philosophy and the ‘Germano-Coleridgean doctrine’, the latter being identified with the ‘Continental philosophers’, and ‘the Continental philosophy’ as well as ‘French philosophy’. It takes on its more contemporary meaning, however, only after WWII, especially during the 1950s. The term gives way to the political urgency of Marxism and feminism during the 1970s, gains a new sense of institutional valency during the 1980s and 90s, and has more recently become the subject of meta-philosophical reflection.

Simon Critchley's Infinitely Demanding makes a timely contribution to contemporary debates in ethics and political philosophy. For all its originality, however, one can raise critical questions concerning Critchley's account of the forms of resistance possible within liberal democratic polities. In this article I question the adequacy of Critchley's ethically based neo-anarchism as a response to neo-liberalism, critically analysing the role of ideology in his account of the motivational deficit afflicting capitalist liberal democracies.

The relationship between critical theory and psychoanalysis has a long and interesting history. The first generation of Frankfurt School philosophers, particularly figures such as Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, embraced psychoanalysis in order to explain why, given seemingly propitious historical circumstances, 'the masses' opted for fascism rather than communism during the 1930s. Following the rise of Nazism and the horrors of Auschwitz, Freudian psychoanalytic theory once again proved important, as evinced in Adorno's account of the 'authoritarian personality' and Adorno and Horkheimer's earlier analysis of Nazism and anti-Semitism in the "Dialectic of Enlightenment". Marcuse's famous critique of the domination effects of 'repressive desublimation' is another example of the productive appropriation of psychoanalytic theory as a key element of the critical theory of modernity.

This chapter offers a critical discussion of the idea of filmosophy or film as philosophy. I explore the debate surrounding the idea of “film as philosophy”, distinguishing this approach from more traditional philosophy of film, and suggesting that it has a long history going back to key figures in early film theory. I then focus on the seminal work of Stanley Cavell and Gilles Deleuze, often described as the inaugurators of film-philosophy. Finally, I examine recent proposals concerning the idea of “film as philosophy”, which argue for a more transformative relationship between philosophy and cinema, and offer some concluding reflections on how we might respond to some of the objections raised against this approach.

Audio recording of roundtable discussion between Robert Sinnerbrink, John Mullarkey, Berys Gaut, David Martin-Jones and William Brown held on October 12, 2009 at the University of St Andrews, Scotland. Over the course of at least the last hundred years the intellectual study of cinema has experienced a number of shifts towards and away from theoretical or philosophical attempts to understand the moving image. The twenty-first century sees film-philosophy resurgent, in part due to the interest in cinema that has flourished recently in disciplines like philosophy, and in part due to the interdisciplinary nature of Film Studies. At a time when it is increasingly in vogue to return to theoretical questions previously pushed off the agenda by the dominance of historical approaches to cinema, such as the perennial "What is Cinema?", we are taking this opportunity to ask, "What is Film-Philosophy?" In a context that is witnessing the rise of digital cinema, the global dominance of multi-national media conglomerates, and the worldwide spread of "world cinemas", what role does theory or philosophy play in helping us understand cinema, and indeed, what role can cinema play in transforming philosophy?

How do movies evoke and express ethical ideas? What role does our emotional involvement play in this process? What makes the aesthetic power of cinema ethically significant? Cinematic Ethics: _Exploring Ethical Experience through Film_ addresses these questions by examining the idea of cinema as a medium of ethical experience with the power to provoke emotional understanding and philosophical thinking. In a clear and engaging style, Robert Sinnerbrink examines the key philosophical approaches to ethics in contemporary film theory and philosophy using detailed case studies of cinematic ethics across different genres, styles, and filmic traditions. Written in a lucid and lively style that will engage both specialist and non-specialist readers, this book is ideal for use in the academic study of philosophy and film. Key features include annotated suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter and a filmography of movies useful for teaching and researching cinematic ethics.

As Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney for over 20 years, György Márkus exerted a profound influence on a generation of philosophers and students from many disciplinary backgrounds. His legendary lecture courses, spanning the history of modern philosophy from the Enlightenment through to the late 20th century, were memorable for their breadth, erudition, and philosophical drama. Always modest despite his mastery of the tradition, Márkus’s approach to this history of philosophy never failed to emphasize its continuing role in shaping our inherited understanding of philosophy as ‘its own time comprehended in thoughts’. This is especially true of his contribution to the philosophical discourse of modernity, which we could summarize as comprising an original philosophy of cultural modernity. In what follows, I briefly reconstruct Márkus’s account of the adventures of the concept of culture, focusing on his definitive essay ‘The Path of Culture: From the Refined to the High, From the Popular to Mass Culture’ but also referring to other relevant Márkus texts, offering some critical remarks on his account of culture and its relationship with modern aesthetics, both classical and contemporary.