Robert A. Wilson

Aspirational appeals to human nature convey a view of human nature as unifying, distinguishing, and even celebratory. Such appeals present human nature as what all human beings share in, no matter their other differences, a nature that we might be satisfied with as it is or that we may look to build on or develop. They identify what distinguishes human beings as a group from other kinds of animals (like apes and dogs), from other kinds of living things (like plants and bacteria), and from mere machines (like robots and computers programs). And they present our unified and distinctive nature as valuable and praiseworthy, something that makes human life worthwhile and uplifting. This chapter concentrates on the relationship between such aspirational appeals and their more pernicious operation mediated by processes of eugenification.

Eugenics aims at intergenerational human improvement through populational adjustments. From its origins in the last third of the nineteenth century, eugenics became a social movement with international reach during the first half of the twentieth century. Although the idea of eugenics often calls to mind Nazi Germany and its extensive practices of compulsory sterilization, euthanasia, and genocide during the short period between 1933 and 1945, eugenic practices and policies were widespread earlier in that century and continued beyond the fall of the Nazis. The focus of this chapter is on providing a basic understanding of eugenics and of the ways in which eugenic thinking has been manifest in medicine, healthcare, and bioethics over this longer stretch of time, with special attention to the relationship between eugenics and disability.

Jerry Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way (2000; hereafter Mind) purports to do a number of things. To name three: First, it aims to show what is problematic about recent evolutionary psychology, especially as popularized in Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works (1997). Fodor's particular target here is the rose-coloured view of evolutionary psychology as offering a “new synthesis” in integrating computational psychology with evolutionary theory. Second, Fodor's book poses a series of related, in-principle problems for any cognitive theory that revolve around the putative tension between the local nature of computational processing and the global nature of at least some cognitive processing. And third, it reiterates Fodor's earlier argument, in The Modularity of Mind, for the hopelessness of trying to extend the notion of modularity from “input systems” to “central systems.“

Eugenics aims at intergenerational human improvement through populational adjustments. From its origins in the last third of the nineteenth century, eugenics became a social movement with international reach during the first half of the twentieth century. Although the idea of eugenics often calls to mind Nazi Germany and its extensive practices of compulsory sterilization, euthanasia, and genocide during the short period between 1933 and 1945, eugenic practices and policies were widespread earlier in that century and continued beyond the fall of the Nazis. The focus of this chapter is on providing a basic understanding of eugenics and of the ways in which eugenic thinking has been manifest in medicine, healthcare, and bioethics over this longer stretch of time, with special attention to the relationship between eugenics and disability.

Kin and kinship matter to us. We are social creatures and our kin or relatives are typically high on the list of those most important to us. Kin are those we care for and who care for us. Our family ties provide a sense of where and with whom we belong. Kin matters also impose boundaries on who we relate to and how, including in sexual and other intimate matters. The study of kinship has been a cornerstone of anthropology throughout its history, but kin matters matter beyond the confines of any academic discipline. Kin Matters: Relational Beings in the Fragile Sciences examines three related themes in the philosophy of anthropology concerning kin matters: the nature of relations, incest and its avoidance, and the study of kinship in cultural anthropology. It develops an integrative framework for thinking about kin matters recognizing that there should be much more fluidity between the cognitive, biological, and social sciences—the fragile sciences—than one typically finds both in those sciences and in philosophical reflection on them. Along the way, Kin Matters offers a novel account of relations, challenges culture-first explanations of incest avoidance, and advocates for a redirection in the study of kinship.

Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, Fodor has developed the dark message of The Modularity of Mind regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and the role of recent empirical developments in the cognitive sciences in assessing Fodor's position.

Eugenic thinking involves distinguishing between sorts or kinds of people in terms of the perceived desirable or undesirable traits that those people are likely to transmit to future generations. While eugenics itself is often thought of as an ideology that generated a social movement of global influence from roughly 1900 to 1945, eugenic thinking both pre-dates this period and continues to inform a range of contemporary debates and social policies, including those concerning prenatal screening, transhumanism, population control, and disability. Various sciences, including the then-nascent sciences of psychology and psychiatry, played important roles in early twentieth-century eugenics, and their legacy is reflected in contemporary eugenic thinking and policies. Understanding the history of eugenics and the role of these early sciences of cognition in that history is useful in reflecting further on ongoing forms of eugenic thinking to which the contemporary cognitive sciences are relevant.

Philosophy in community projects provide powerful, immersive introductions to philosophical thinking for both children and tertiary students. Such introductions can jumpstart transformative learning as well as diversify who seeks out philosophy in the longer term, both in schools and in universities. Using survey responses from teachers, parents, participants, staff, and volunteers of two such programs – Eurekamp Oz! and philosothons – we show how participants find value in engaging in communities of inquiry and philosophical thinking more broadly. We argue correspondingly that such philosophy in community projects are an asset to universities, both as highly successful university outreach programs and in offering high school, undergraduate, and postgraduate students mentoring and employment opportunities utilising their growing philosophical skills. For these reasons, philosophy in community programs provide alternative and supplementary pathways into sustained philosophical thinking to those available within traditional philosophy in the classroom approaches.

Transdisciplinary research knits together knowledge from diverse epistemic communities in addressing social-environmental challenges, such as biodiversity loss, climate crises, food insecurity, and public health. This paper reflects on the roles of philosophy of science in transdisciplinary research while focusing on Indigenous and other subaltern forms of knowledge. We offer a critical assessment of demarcationist approaches in philosophy of science and outline a constructive alternative of transdisciplinary philosophy of science. While a demarcationist focus obscures the complex relations between epistemic communities, transdisciplinary philosophy of science provides resources for meeting epistemic and political challenges of collaborative knowledge production.

The ontological turn (OT) is a loose cluster of theoretical approaches within cultural anthropology that advocates a synthetic, overarching way forward for ethnographically oriented cultural anthropology. We argue that in order to contribute substantively to ethnobiology the OT needs to distance itself from a long-standing tradition of thinking within ethnography that assumes some kind of fundamental divide between the natural and the social sciences. This distancing seems especially unlikely in light of the meta-anthropological nature of the OT as primarily a perspective on ethnographic methodology. Instead, we advocate for naturalistic theoretical alternatives for thinking about human sociality, where philosophical innovation develops in concert with ongoing empirical work across the biological, cognitive, and social sciences. We illustrate this perspective by drawing on two naturalistic accounts likely to prove more fruitful for ethnobiological practice, namely, trans-genera models of sociality and progenerative views of kinship.

Who is recognised as a philosopher and what counts as philosophy influence both the content of a philosophical education and academic philosophy’s continuing demographic skew. The “philosophical who” and the “philosophical what” themselves are a partial function of matters that have been passed over in collective silence, even if that now feels to some like a silence belonging to the distant past. This paper discusses some philosophical silences regarding race, gender, and disability in the context of reflection on philosophical education and on philosophical practice in the public sphere. It focuses on Charles Mills’ writings on race, Susan Babbitt’s on race and gender, and on more collaboratively-generated work on eugenics and disability.

Philosophers of biology and biologists themselves for the most part assume that the concept of kin is progenerative: what makes two individuals kin is a direct or indirect function of reproduction. Derivatively, kinship might likewise be presumed to be progenerative in nature. Yet a prominent view of kinship in contemporary cultural anthropology is a kind of constructivism or performativism that rejects such progenerativist views. This paper critically examines an influential line of thinking used to critique progenerativism and support performativism that cites cross-cultural diversity in what I will call kinmaking. I challenge several key assumptions made in moving from this appeal to ethnography to conclusions about kinship and progeneration, arguing that closer scrutiny of both the ethnographic record and inferences that draw on it in fact support progenerative views of both kinship and kinmaking.

The conceptualisation of kinship and its study remain contested within anthropology. This paper draws on recent cognitive science, developmental cognitive psychology, and the philosophy of science to offer a novel argument for a view of kinship as progeneratively or reproductively constrained. I shall argue that kinship involves a form of extended cognition that incorporates progenerative facts, going on to show how the resulting articulation of kinship’s progenerative nature can be readily expressed by an influential conception of kinds, the homeostatic property cluster view. Identifying the distinctive role that our extended cognitive access to progenerative facts plays in kinship delivers an integrative, progenerativist view that avoids standard performativist criticisms of progenerativism as being ethnocentric, epistemically naïve, and reductive.