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20Reply to Himma: Personal Identity and Cartesian IntuitionsPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.In Kenneth Einar Himma’s substantial commentary, there are a number of conceptual misunderstandings I want to get out of the way first. This will allow us to see the core of his contribution much clearer. On page 2, Himma writes about the problem of “explaining how it is that a particular phenomenal self is associated with a set of neurophysiological processes.” This philosophical question is ill posed: no one is identical to a particular phenomenal self. “Phenomenal self” must not be conflated …Read more
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19Reply to Livet: Meta-abeyance?PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.Let me begin by pointing out a number of potential misunderstandings in Pierre Livet’s densely written commentary. In the first paragraph, Pierre Livet writes, “phenomenal transparency involves an implication of the existence of the entities represented”. This is what I call the “extensionality equivocation”. As explained at length in BNO, “phenomenal transparency” has been a technical term in philosophy at least since G. E. Moore’s paper The Refutation of Idealism. In BNO, I offered a refined n…Read more
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19Reply to Weisberg: No direction home—searching for neutral groundPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.I have learned a lot from Josh Weisberg’s substantial criticism in his well-crafted and systematic commentary. Unfortunately, I have to concede many of the points he intelligently makes. But I am also flattered by the way he ultimately uses his criticism to emphasize some of those aspects of the theory that can perhaps possibly count as exactly the core of my own genuine contribution to the problem—and nicely turns them back against myself. And I am certainly grateful for a whole range of helpfu…Read more
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18Reply to Hobson: Can there be a First-Person Science of Consciousness?PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.Allan Hobson praises and accuses me. He praises me for being empirically informed. And he accuses me of being a “third-person half-some-one”. Specifically, he encourages me to come out of the closet, share some of my own first-person phenomenological experiences, and stop hiding behind neurophenomenological case studies taken from the existing scientific literature. Which I will do, below. But let us first begin with a matter of conceptual controversy.
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17Teaching Philosophy with Argumentation Maps: Review of Can Computers Think? The Debate by Robert E. Horn (review)PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 5. 1999.
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14The philosophy of dreaming and self-consciousness: What happens to the experiential subject during the dream state?In Deirdre Barrett & Patrick McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming Vol 3: Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives, Praeger Publishers/greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 193-247. 2007.
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13Subjectivity and mental representationIn Ulla Wessels & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen, De Gruyter. pp. 668-681. 1994.
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12Reply to Legrand: Content from the Inside OutPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.In the current debate, very few people have penetrated as deeply into the self-model theory of subjectivity and have developed such a scholarly expertise on the project as a whole as Dorothée Legrand has done. In the last sentence of her commentary, Legrand alludes to the ugly consequences I have to face after calling the book Being No One: I am suddenly confronted with people from all over the world who are stomping their feet on the ground like stubborn children, claiming that they definitely …Read more
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8Zeitfenster im Gehirn und die Einheit des Bewußtseins. Der Zusammenhang zwischen phänomenalem Bewußtsein und subsymbolischer InformationsverarbeitungIn Hans Lenk & Hans Poser (eds.), Neue Realitäten. Herausforderung der Philosophie: Xvi. Deutscher Kongreß Für Philosophie Berlin 20.–24. September 1993, De Gruyter. pp. 246-260. 1995.
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3Self-deception and the dolphin model of cognitionIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness, Mit Press. 2015.
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2Open MIND Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. Volume 2, (edited book)MIT Press. 2016.
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1Constraining consciousness: Towards a systematic catalogue of explanandaConsciousness and Cognition 9 (2). 2000.
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Das Leib-Seele-Problem in den achtziger JahrenConceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 25 99-114. 1991.
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Einheit und Vielheit. XIV. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie 21.-26. September 1987 in GiessenAllgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 13 (2): 49. 1988.
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Funktionalismus, Intentionalität und mentale ModelleEthik Und Sozialwissenschaften 3 (4): 479. 1992.
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Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examplesIn Rahul Banerjee & Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of brain and mind: physical, computational, and psychological approaches, Elsevier. 2008.
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Empirische Perspektiven aus Sicht der Selbstmodell-Theorie der Subjektivitaeat: Eine Kurzdarstellung mit BeispielenStudia Z Kognitywistyki I Filozofii Umysłu 7 (1). 2013.
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First-order embodiment, second-order embodiment, third-order embodimentIn Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition, Routledge. 2014.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |