Godehard Brüntrup

In continental philosophy of religion, the hermeneutics of narratives takes a central role. Analytic philosophy of religion, on the other hand, considers religious statements mostly as assertions of fact. It examines the logical form and semantics of religious statements, addresses their logical commitments, and examines their epistemological status. Using the example of a passage in the Book of Job, it is investigated whether the methods of analytic philosophy are also suitable for analyzing religious narratives. The question is explored whether there is a genuine form of knowledge, besides propositional factual knowledge, which is bound to the form of narration. Particular attention will be paid to the inter-personal pragmatic embeddedness of narratives. The connection between second-personal knowledge and narratives is examined. Using the historical example of Ignatius of Loyola's theory of religious knowledge, it is argued that propositional argumentative knowledge is only one form of religious knowledge among others. The others are second-personal and narrative in character. Having thus established this distinct form of knowledge, it is asked whether our best empirical knowledge of the neurophysiological basis of intuitive and non-argumentative cognition provides a foundation for better understanding inter-personal religious cognition within narratives.

The main topic of this paper will not be the notoriously difficult metaphysical question of freedom and determinism. An act of will is either determined by a causal chain of previous events or is a mere chance event. In either case there seems to be no room for freedom. This question is of such a high level of conceptual generality that it applies not only to human freedom but to any being that acts for reasons, even beings that lack a brain. In this paper I try to answer the question whether freedom is possible for beings endowed with a brain. Can a being whose mental life involves a functioning brain determine its own actions? I will proceed in two steps. First, I will discuss a recent experiment that seems to prove empirically that freedom of the will is an illusion. I will argue that this kind of research is methodologically misguided. Then I will go on to discuss some of the metaphysical issues that must be dealt with if one wants to address the question whether freedom of the will is possible for a being endowed with a brain. And then I will ask if such a metaphysics is compatible with our best empirical theories.

Recent debates in philosophy of mind seemingly have resulted in an impasse. Reductive physicalism cannot account for the phenomenal mind, and nonreductive physicalism cannot safeguard a causal role for the mental as mental. Dualism was formerly considered to be the only viable alternative, but in addition to exacerbating the problem of mental causation, it is hard to square with a naturalist evolutionary framework. By 1979, Thomas Nagel argued that if reductionism and dualism fail, and a non-reductionist form of strong emergence cannot be made intelligible, then panpsychism-the thesis that mental being is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the universe-might be a viable alternative. But it was not until David Chalmers' The Conscious Mind in 1996 that debates on panpsychism entered the philosophical mainstream. Since then the field has been growing rapidly, and some leading philosophers of mind as well as scientist have argued in favor of panpsychism. This book features contemporary arguments for panpsychism as a genuine alternative in analytic philosophy of mind in the 21st century. Different varieties of panpsychism are represented and systematically related to each other in the volume's 16 essays, which feature not only proponents of panpsychism but also prominent critics from both the physicalist and non-physicalist camps.

In May 1998, a distinguished group of philosophers met in Munich to discuss the rationality of theism. This volume is a collection of the papers read at that conference. While in recent years the rationality of theistic belief has been widely discussed, the Munich conference was an event of some moment in the history of philosophical dialogue: for the first time German- and English-speaking philosophers of religion, representatives of both the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon traditions, joined together to grapple with a common philosophical theme. This multiplicity of perspectives brought a unique richness to the analysis of rationality that no one tradition by itself could provide. Readers will find that richness displayed in the pages of this book. Professional philosophers will find here a great deal to stimulate and challenge them; but graduate students, capable undergraduates, and all others with a serious interest in the philosophy of religion will be well rewarded for their efforts to come to grips with these thought-provoking papers.

SummaryIn Germany, Holm Tetens is an influential analytic philosopher of science, mind, and logic. For many years he had been arguing within the widely accepted framework of naturalism and atheism. It came, to put it mildly, as a surprise to the entire philosophical community in Germany when he published a book defending theism in 2015. In this book “Thinking God” he claims that physicalism is an incomplete account of reality, because the mental and ideal realm cannot be reduced to the physical realm. As an alternative, he develops a version of theistic idealism which stands in the tradition of “panentheism”. Human subjectivity is fully embedded into the all-encompassing divine subjectivity. In dealing with the problem of theodicy, he then argues that the hope for eternal life and salvation by a supremely good being makes life more meaningful, esp. because it offers a prospect for justice to the countless victims of history. To Tetens, the worldview of naturalism and the worldview of theistic idealism are on the one hand both equally rational and defensible. On the other hand, both cannot be defeated by knock-down arguments. In closing, he urges his peers in philosophy to take the question of God seriously again. Shortly after the publication of the book, the Catholic Academy of Bavaria and the Munich School of Philosophy jointly organized an international master class on Tetens’s views which was taught by himself. The papers published in this issue grew out of this master class. For each paper by a young scholar there is also a reply by Tetens. The following editorial addresses specifically the German-speaking audience. It was thus not translated into English. All original papers discussing Tetens’s views and his replies to these, however, were written in English for the sake of reaching a larger worldwide readership.

Ein zentrales Thema des christlichen Glaubens wird in diesem Textbuch von fuhrenden zeitgenossischen Philosophen und Philosophinnen beleuchtet. In systematischer Anordnung werden neben deutschsprachigen "Klassikern" und neuen Originaltexten auch einige der einflussreichsten Autoren der angelsachsischen Debatte in Ubersetzung zuganglich gemacht. Auch diese von der analytischen Philosophie gepragten Texte wurden teilweise eigens fur diesen Band geschrieben oder uberarbeitet. Die Auseinandersetzungen im kontinentaleuropaischen protestantischen und katholischen Denken um Seele, Unsterblichkeit und leibliche Auferstehung in der Mitte des letzten Jahrhunderts werden hier auf lebendige und begrifflich prazise Weise weitergefuhrt. Die Religionsphilosophie und die Theologie werden am Reichtum der Argumente und Positionen nicht vorbeigehen konnen. Mit Texten von Oscar Cullmann, Gisbert Greshake, Gerd Haeffner, Thomas Schartl, Eleonore Stump, Peter van Inwagen, Dean Zimmerman, Alvin Plantinga, William Hasker, Lynne Baker, Hud Hudson und Godehard Bruntrup.