Santiago Ginnobili

Seleccionar los modelos científicos a enseñar es una tarea difícil. En el caso de la Biología Evolutiva existe un complicado panorama debido a los numerosos modelos desarrollados con posterioridad a la teoría sintética de la evolución. En este contexto, es habitual que desde la divulgación se presente la endosimbiosis como una modificación revolucionaria contraria al darwinismo. Desde este punto de vista, el darwinismo supondría una visión de la naturaleza centrada principalmente en la competencia. La endosimbiosis mostraría, en contraposición, la importancia de la cooperación. En este trabajo cuestionaremos esta imagen, frecuente entre el profesorado, y mostraremos cómo, de hecho, la correcta caracterización de la endosimbiosis presupone la visión darwiniana de la naturaleza, siendo ambas teorías complementarias. Finalmente, extraeremos las consecuencias didácticas de nuestro enfoque.

One of the most important things that the Darwinian revolution affected is the previous teleological thinking. In particular, the attribution of functions to various entities of the natural world with explanatory pretensions. In this change, his theory of natural selection played an important role. We all agree on that, but the diversity and heterogeneity of the answers that try to explain what Darwin did exactly with functional biology are overwhelming. In this paper I will try to show how Darwin modified previous functional biology. Pre-Darwinian naturalists did not hesitate to attribute functions in which, for example, the traits of one species were in the service of other species. I will try to show that this has consequences on the discussion regarding the nature of functional language, since the main approaches, the systemic and the etiological, do not adequately account for these changes and therefore do not account for the way functional biology regulates the kind of legitimate functions. I will outline a possible new solution to this problem: appropriate functional attributions in Darwinian functional biology could be regulated by a theory or a set of laws that provide the criteria for determining its fundamental concepts.

In this article we scrutinize what can be called an "experimentalist dogma" presupposed in Pablo Melogno's analysis of empirical incommensurability in the chemical revolution. According to Melogno, the fact that experimental methods were preserved throughout the chemical revolution was an indication that there were no relevant perceptual differences between Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier. In order to refine Melogno's general analysis, we will present a taxonomy of varieties of empirical incommensurability and discuss their relationships. To exemplify this categorization, and to show its metatheoretical adequacy, we will apply it to the neuronist revolution, that is, to the process of discovery of the neuron in the late 19th and early 20th centuries within neuroanatomy, taking as our main case study the controversy between Camillo Golgi and Santiago Ramón y Cajal. From the analysis of the controversies regarding dendritic spines and stellate cells of the cerebellum, in particular, we question the experimentalist dogma, highlighting how, in these controversies, the conservation of experimental practices does not guarantee the similarity of perceptual contents. Moreover, we will argue that, all other experimental conditions being equal, differences in experiential content between Golgi and Cajal are best explained by differences in their commitments to incompatible conceptual schemes.

The Price equation provides a comprehensive representation of evolutionary processes. Since its original formulation by George Price, it has been used to model a variety of phenomena in quantitative genetics and related fields. However, there is no consensus on the explanatory power of the equation. In this article we aim to clarify its place within modern evolutionary theory. To this end, we first state the basic concepts from which the Price equation can be derived as a theorem. From this axiomatization, we conclude that the Price equation is not explanatory in itself. It merely provides a phenomenological description of evolutionary processes. We argue that its role is analogous to that of Galilean kinematics in classical mechanics. Both the Price equation and Galilean kinematics function as conceptual frameworks that define the basic features of the behavior of a class of systems. Practitioners are encouraged to theorize further on these frameworks to find the possible explanation of this behavior in various specific scenarios. Thus, despite its phenomenological character, the Price equation integrates different fields of evolutionary biology by providing a common formalization of their shared explanandum.

In recent times, the exponential growth of sequenced genomes and structural knowledge of proteins, as well as the development of computational tools and controlled vocabularies to deal with this growth, has fueled a demand for conceptual clarification regarding the concept of function in molecular biology. In this article, we will attempt to develop an account of function fit to deal with the conceptual/philosophical problems in that domain, but which can be extended to other areas of biology. To provide this account, we will argue for three theses: (1) some authors have confused metatheoretical issues (about the meaning and application criteria of terms) with metaphysical ones (about teleology); this led them to (2) look for explicit definitions of “function”, in terms of necessary and sufficient criteria of application, in order to make the concept of function eliminable; however, (3) if one leaves metaphysical worries aside and focuses on functional attribution practices, it is more adequate to say that the concept of function has an open texture. That is, that a multiplicity of application criteria is available, none of which is sufficient nor necessary to attribute a function to a trait, and which only in concert form a clear picture. We distinguish this thesis from some usual forms of pluralism. Finally, we will illustrate this account with a historical reconstruction of the ascription of a water transport function to aquaporins.

It is often assumed that analytic philosophy cannot be treated in a Kuhnian way, since what characterizes philosophical practice is not a disciplinary matrix with paradigmatic exemplars of theoretical and empirical problem solving. We propose to challenge this assumption by arguing that at least in some areas of analytic philosophy one can find disciplinary matrices in the Kuhnian sense and, above all, exemplary cases that give rise to a metatheoretical problem-solving program. In particular, we will focus on meta-theoretical structuralism and its notion of T theoricity. We will show that the work of historical-philosophical analysis carried out by Lorenzano (2008) is a paradigmatic example that has been replicated by several subsequent works, extending the range of application of the disciplinary matrix.

Theoreticity and unification are two main issues discussed in philosophy of science. The first attempts to clarify the different roles of concepts used in a scientific theory. The second concerns the role of unification in scientific explanation and scientific progress. Both discussions have followed separate, independent paths. In this paper, we examine the interrelatedness of these two notions by focusing on classical particle mechanics and the theory of natural selection. We claim that they are interconnected in two distinct ways. On the one hand, a theory’s unifying power relies on the presence of some theoretical concepts that apply to heterogeneous phenomena through the assumption of a (sometimes unstated) general principle. On the other hand, a sensible application of the theoreticity criterion to these integrating concepts requires the unification not being spurious. We conclude that a correct determination of the theoreticty status requires analyzing how specific applications of different parts of a theory interact with each other.

The observational-theoretical distinction has played a central role in the philosophy of science from logical empiricism onwards. Developments within the discipline have shown that such a distinction hides two non-identical distinctions: observational vs. non-observational and theoretical vs. non-theoretical. Likewise, metatheoretical structuralism proposed a more sophisticated treatment of theoricity in terms of the operational dependence or independence of concepts from the theories in which they appear. Despite this remarkable sophistication, it is still generally accepted that the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical concepts coincides with the explanatory vs. non-explanatory and testing vs. non-testing distinctions. Ginnobili and Carman argued for the independence between theoricity and explanation. In this paper we will focus on testing and argue for its independence from both theoricity and explanation. To do so, we propose an account of theory testing based on the framework of metatheoretical structuralism and apply it to natural selection theory and cladistics.

It is not always considered that the discussion about the objective or subjective nature of beauty occurred partly in natural history, within the framework of the Darwinian revolution. The approaches of many pre-Darwinian naturalists assumed the existence of absolute standards of beauty. This idea was a presupposition in some versions of the great chain of being and in the idea that beauty was an objective characteristic of creation that could explain the possession of many traits of organisms. In this paper I will show how Darwin explicitly confronted both views throughout his work.

Desmond and Moore point out that the key to understanding Darwin’s The Descent of Man is his abolitionist motivation and his advocacy that races constitute subspecies. Roberta Millstein raises some doubts about the importance of this motivation. She points out that the inclusion of the extensive section devoted to non-human animals is not justified by Darwin’s treatment of humans per se, because his explanation of the origin of races is peculiar. In this sense, she argues that Darwin’s specific explanation of the origin of races does not confirm the central importance that Desmond and Moore give to Darwin’s abolitionism. In this paper I have two different aims. On the one hand, to show that the human case actually is based on the treatment of nonhuman animals, and consequently, Darwin’s argument is not as poor as Millstein believes. My second goal, taking Millstein’s challenge seriously, is to show that Darwin’s explanation of the origin of races does confirm the Desmond and Moore thesis in a deeper sense than the one they propose themselves. For the anti-slavery motivation could not only explain the fact that Darwin sees all humans as forming the same species, but the specific explanation he gives for the origin of races.

En este artículo sostenemos que, en aquellos casos en los cuales la capacidad _ explanandum _ de un análisis sistémico o mecanicista constituye una función biológica, globalmente, la función explica la estructura y no a la inversa, a pesar de que en algunos casos particulares, el orden en que se determinan los conceptos participantes en la explicación no coincide con el orden de la explicación. Para defender esta tesis, adoptaremos una concepción mínima de explicación basada en la idea de subsunción ampliativa del estructuralismo e ilustraremos las diferencias entre el orden de la explicación y el orden de determinación de los conceptos mediante un estudio de caso tomado de la afasiología moderna.

Algunos aspectos de La expresión de las emociones de Charles Darwin pueden resultar intrigantes, pues, en la explicación de cómo tales expresiones se originan, Darwin casi nunca apela a la selección natural. En cambio, apela principalmente a la idea de que movimientos voluntarios se asocian a emociones, volviéndose por hábito innatos e involuntarios al heredarse a la descendencia. Si bien Darwin da varias razones para defender esta explicación, en este trabajo trataré de mostrar que, si se entiende el libro sobre las expresiones en relación con los objetivos explícitos e implícitos de El origen del hombre, el asunto se entiende mejor. En particular, resulta interesante la tesis que Desmond y Moore plantean respecto a la importancia de los ideales antiesclavistas de Darwin a la hora del tratamiento de las razas. Defenderé en este trabajo que el enfoque de Desmond y Moore puede extenderse al libro acerca de las expresiones. Específicamente, estableceré vínculos entre la explicación del origen de las razas y la explicación del origen del rubor. Palabras clave: Charles Darwin, La expresión de las emociones, El origen del hombre, Rubor, Antiesclavismo.

In a recent book, McShea and Brandon argue that the observed diversity and complexity of life are explainable by a principle they call the “zero-force evolutionary law” or “ZFEL”. Although this principle would be implicit in many explanations given by biologists, it would have never been made explicit. Assuming that this idea is interesting, and that the authors are right, we will discuss the metatheoretical way in which they present said principle, as being a part of probability theory. This allows the authors to claim that probability theory provides the reductive basis for all evolutionary biology. We will defend, in accordance with them, that ZFEL is not a solely biological principle, but not because it is a part of probability theory, but rather because it is a specific version of the principle of common cause.

En este trabajo presentamos los fundamentos teóricos de una propuesta para el abordaje didáctico de concepciones teleológicas de los y las estudiantes en la enseñanza de la Biología. La propuesta en cuestión supone acudir al modo en que Darwin lidió con las concepciones teleológicas dominantes entre sus contemporáneos, para proponer una estrategia general a través de la cual se podría incidir sobre las intuiciones teleológicas de los estudiantes, de modo que se pueda facilitar el aprendizaje de la teoría de la selección natural. Sugeriremos también que esta propuesta implica un modo original de apelar a la analogía entre el cambio teórico en la Historia de la Ciencia y el aprendizaje de las ciencias.

En este trabajo reflexionaré acerca de las relaciones entre la filosofía y la didáctica de la ciencia, centrándome en especial en las ideas de Thomas Kuhn. Estas relaciones resultan bastante complejas, pues, las preocupaciones didácticas y de comunicación pública de la ciencia se encuentran en el centro de los objetivos de la filosofía de la ciencia de comienzos de siglo XX así como del contexto de escritura de La estructura de las revoluciones científicas. Por otro lado, el enfoque de Kuhn fue influyente sobre la didáctica de la ciencia. La discusión de tales relaciones me permitirá, por una parte, señalar la tensión, sobre la que Kuhn ha discutido mucho, entre la especialización y la incomunicación entre diferentes comunidades científicas. Para Kuhn el dogmatismo es una parte esencial al progreso científico. Intentaré mostrar que esta idea forma parte de la ideología kuhniana más que un corolario de su enfoque. Finalmente, intentaré mostrar diferentes sentidos en los que las ideas kuhnianas pueden ser relevantes (y lo han sido) para la didáctica de la ciencia. Palabras clave: Filosofía de la ciencia, Didáctica de la ciencia, Thomas Kuhn, Inconmensurabilidad Abstract In this paper I will reflect on the relations between philosophy and the didactics of science, focusing in particular on the ideas of Thomas Kuhn. These relations are quite complex, since didactic and public communication of science concerns are at the heart of the objectives of the philosophy of science at the beginning of the 20th century as well as of the context of the writing of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. On the other hand, Kuhn's approach was influential on the didactics of science. The discussion of such relationships will allow me, on the one hand, to point out the tension, about which Kuhn has discussed a lot, between specialization and incommunication between different scientific communities. For Kuhn dogmatism is an essential part of scientific progress. I will try to show that this idea is part of Kuhnian ideology rather than a corollary of his approach. Finally, I will try to show different ways in which Kuhnian ideas can be (and have been) relevant to the didactics of science. Keywords: Philosophy of science, Science education, Thomas Kuhn, Incommensurability.

Abstract One of the most important things that the Darwinian revolution affected is the previous teleological thinking. In particular, the attribution of functions to various entities of the natural world with explanatory pretensions. In this change, his theory of natural selection played an important role. We all agree on that, but the diversity and heterogeneity of the answers that try to explain what Darwin did exactly with functional biology are overwhelming. In this paper I will try to show how Darwin modified previous functional biology. Pre-Darwinian naturalists did not hesitate to attribute functions in which, for example, the traits of one species were in the service of other species. I will try to show that this has consequences on the discussion regarding the nature of functional language, since the main approaches, the systemic and the etiological, do not adequately account for these changes and therefore do not account for the way functional biology regulates the kind of legitimate functions. I will outline a possible new solution to this problem: appropriate functional attributions in Darwinian functional biology could be regulated by a theory or a set of laws that provide the criteria for determining its fundamental concepts. Resumen: Una de las cosas más importantes a las que la revolución darwiniana afectó es el pensamiento teleológico previo. En particular, la atribución de funciones a diversas entidades del mundo natural con pretensiones explicativas. En este cambio, su teoría de la selección natural desempeñó un papel importante. Todos estamos de acuerdo en ello, pero la diversidad y heterogeneidad de las respuestas que tratan de explicar lo que Darwin hizo exactamente con la biología funcional son abrumadoras. En este artículo intentaré mostrar cómo Darwin modificó la biología funcional anterior. Los naturalistas predarwinianos no dudaban en atribuir funciones en las que, por ejemplo, los rasgos de una especie estaban al servicio de otras especies. Intentaré mostrar que esto tiene consecuencias en la discusión sobre la naturaleza del lenguaje funcional, pues los principales enfoques, el sistémico y el etiológico, no dan cuenta adecuadamente de estos cambios y, por tanto, no dan cuenta de la forma en que la biología funcional regula el tipo de funciones legítimas. Esbozaré una posible nueva solución a este problema: las atribuciones funcionales apropiadas en la biología funcional darwiniana podrían estar reguladas por una teoría o un conjunto de leyes que proporcionen los criterios para determinar sus conceptos fundamentales.

La memética constituye un enfoque sobre la evolución cultural que se ha encontrado en el foco de la discusión y recolectado críticas de diverso tipo en las últimas décadas. El propósito de nuestro trabajo consiste en indagar si, más allá de las críticas y defensas existentes, puede considerarse que existe actualmente algún programa de investigación que pueda caracterizarse adecuadamente como memético. Nos centraremos, específicamente, en el ámbito del estudio de la evolución cultural de los cantos de aves, pues allí algunos autores han utilizado la palabra «meme» para referirse a los ítems culturales bajo estudio. Sin embargo, no todos utilizan la palabra, pues, probablemente por su carácter controversial, ha caído en desuso. Eso implica que para cumplir con el objetivo de nuestro trabajo no pueda apelarse a análisis bibliométricos. Por este motivo elucidaremos los diferentes sentidos en los que puede caracterizarse a la memética. Nuestro objetivo es defender que en el área de cantos de aves se pueden encontrar investigaciones que responden a la perspectiva memética en todos los sentidos señalados. Texto del resumen en castellano o en el idioma que está redactado.

One of the most widely used procedures applied to non-human animals or pre-linguistic humans is the “violation of expectation paradigm”. Curiously there is almost no discussion in the philosophical literature about it. Our objective will be to provide a first approach to the meta-theoretical nature of the assumptions behind the procedure that appeals to the violation of expectation and to extract some consequences. We show that behind them exists an empirical principle that affirms that the violation of the expectation of certain mental rules generates surprise. We then proceeded to discuss the nature of these “mental rules”. We show that, as is often the case with theoretical concepts proposed by theories, they do not have a fixed interpretation. This will allow us to show that the usual relationship found in the developmental psychology literature between this experimental paradigm and cognitive approaches (which interpret experimental results in terms of higher-level mental activities) is not necessary. Finally, we relate this experimental design with the mark test and the inequity aversion test and discuss the possible ampliation of the application of the empirical principle of violation of expectation.

A given explanatory theory T falls into circular reasoning if the only way to determine its explanandum is through the application of T. To find an underlying theory T′ that determines T′s explanandum helps us save T from this accusation of circularity. We follow the structuralist view of theories in presenting and dealing with this issue, by applying it to particular theories. More specifically, we focus on the relationship between the Darwinian theory of common ancestry and the determination of homologies.

En este trabajo discutimos la extensión de la influencia que el pensamiento de Richard Owen tuvo sobre el de Charles Darwin. Además, se intentará mostrar lo heterogéneo de tal influencia, que va desde teorías específicas a giros retóricos. Esta influencia es en muchos casos subestimada, dando la sensación de que la novedad darwiniana consistió únicamente en mirar con ojos desprejuiciados lo que los otros no habían visto. Esta visión resulta injusta con Owen, y también con el esfuerzo conceptual llevado adelante por Darwin con las piezas brindadas por sus precursores. Finalmente, este es un caso interesante para entender el tipo de novedad aportada por las revoluciones científicas y el modo sofisticado en que tal novedad se sustenta sobre el trabajo de los enfoques previos.

El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar las relaciones entre los modelos de optimalidad y la selección natural. Defenderemos que esas relaciones pueden dividirse en dos tipos, en tanto hay dos tipos de explicaciones seleccionistas, que llamaremos “históricas” y “ahistóricas”. Las explicaciones históricas revelan como una población dada adquiere un rasgo que es adaptativo en ese ambiente e involucran muchas generaciones, variación, etc. Las explicaciones ahistóricas, explican por qué, en determinado momento, ciertos tipos de organismos tienen un mayor éxito reproductivo que otros. Mostraremos que los modelos de optimalidad pueden jugar un rol en la determinación del explanandum de las explicaciones histórica seleccionistas, esto es, que ayudan a reconocer qué rasgos son adaptativos. Por otra parte, mostramos que los modelos de optimalidad nos permiten determinar a veces la parte del explanans de las explicaciones ahistóricas (particularmente, el concepto de fitness). The goal of this paper is to analyze the relations between optimality models and natural selection. We contend that these relationships can be divided into two kinds, as there are two kinds of natural selection explanations, which we call “historical” and “ahistorical”. Historical explanations reveal how a given population acquires a trait which is adaptive in its environment, and involves many generations, variations, etc. Ahistorical ones, explain why, at a given moment, certain kinds of organisms have a greater reproductive success than others. We show that optimality models can play a role in determining the explanandum of historical selectionist explanations, that is, they help us to recognize which traits are adaptive. And, on the other hand, that optimality models sometimes allow us to determine part of the explanans of ahistorical explanations (particularly, the concept of fitness).

La tesis del holismo de la confirmación aparece por primera vez presentada de manera explícita y extensa en los escritos de Duhem. Años después, es defendida por Quine, pero no en base a la discusión de teorías científicas particulares, sino en relación con su posición semántica. Desde entonces las relaciones entre el holismo semántico y el holismo de la contrastación han sido discutidas, aunque generalmente de un modo algo despegado del análisis de teorías específicas y sus relaciones. Pretendo mostrar a partir del análisis de un caso, el de las relaciones entre la genética de poblaciones y la teoría de la selección natural, un sentido en el que el holismo de la confirmación puede ser derivado del holismo semántico. The thesis of the confirmation holism appears for the first time explicitly and extensively in the writings of Duhem. Years later, it is defended by Quine, but not based on the discussion of particular scientific theories, but in relation to its semantic position. Since then, the relations between semantic holism and confirmation holism have been discussed, although generally somewhat detached from the analysis of specific theories and their relations. I intend to show from the analysis of a case, that of the relations between population genetics and the theory of natural selection, a sense in which the holism of confirmation can be derived from semantic holism.

How questions and why questions interact in complex ways within biological practice. One of the most fruitful accounts to think about this relation is the widely known systemic approach, which has its origin mainly in the works of Robert Cummins (1975, 1983). As we will show, this approach effectively manages to capture much of what biologists do, especially in areas such as molecular biology, neuroscience and neuroethology. Our aim with this work is to discuss the metatheoretical status of the presuppositions behind systemic analysis. We will hold that these assumptions are of an empirical nature, and that they can be reconstructed as parts of a theory

La tesis del holismo de la confirmación aparece por primera vez presentada de manera explícita y extensa en los escritos de Duhem. Años después, es defendida por Quine, pero no en base a la discusión de teorías científicas particulares, sino en relación con su posición semántica. Desde entonces las relaciones entre el holismo semántico y el holismo de la contrastación han sido discutidas, aunque generalmente de un modo algo despegado del análisis de teorías específicas y sus relaciones. Pretendo mostrar a partir del análisis de un caso, el de las relaciones entre la genética de poblaciones y la teoría de la selección natural, un sentido en el que el holismo de la confirmación puede ser derivado del holismo semántico.

En un libro reciente McShea y Brandon defienden que la diversidad y la complejidad de la vida se explican, principalmente, por la acción de un principio que llaman “la ley evolutiva de fuerzas cero” o “ZFEL”. Tal principio actuaría de un modo implícito por detrás de muchas explicaciones de la biología, pero nunca habría sido explicitado. Asumiendo que esta idea es interesante, y que los autores en cuestión tienen razón, discutiremos el modo metateórico en que presentan dicho principio, como siendo parte de la teoría de la probabilidad. Esto permite a los autores afirmar que la teoría de la probabilidad brindaría la base reductiva para toda la biología evolutiva (dado que consideran que otros principios, como el de selección natural, también serían parte de la teoría de la probabilidad). Defenderemos que, efectivamente, ZFEL no es propio de la biología únicamente, pero no por formar parte de la teoría de la probabilidad, sino por tratarse de una versión específica del principio de causa común. In a recent book, McShea and Brandon argue that the observed diversity and complexity of life are explainable by a principle they call the “zero-force evolutionary law” or “ZFEL”. Although this principle would be implicit in many explanations given by biologists, it would have never been made explicit. Assuming that this idea is interesting, and that the authors are right, we will discuss the metatheoretical way in which they present said principle, as being a part of probability theory. This allows the authors to claim that probability theory provides the reductive basis for all evolutionary biology. We will defend, in accordance with them, that ZFEL is not a solely biological principle, but not because it is a part of probability theory, but rather because it is a specific version of the principle of common cause.

The propensity account of fitness intends to solve the classical tautologicity issue by identifying fitness with a disposition, the ability to survive and reproduce. As proponents recognized early on, this account requires operational independence from actual reproductive success to avoid circularity and vacuousness charges. They suggested that operational independence is achieved by measuring fitness values through optimality models. Our goal in this article is to develop this suggestion. We show that one plausible procedure by which these independent operationalizations could be thought to take place, and which is in accordance with what is said in the optimality literature, is unsound. We provide two independent lines of reasoning to show this. We then provide a sketch of a more adequate account of the role of optimality models in evolutionary contexts and draw some consequences.