Franca d'Agostini

Esistono metodi filosofici? L’articolo si propone di rispondere alla domanda dapprima mettendo in discussione l’idea che la filosofia sia un’attività ‘extrametodica’, poi esaminando i principali metodi e tecniche messi a punto dalla filosofia contemporanea. Si perviene così a una definizione di filosofia come tentativo di risolvere problemi ‘fondamentali’, che, perciò, procede servendosi di diversi metodi, ciascuno dei quali basato su diverse ‘supervalutazioni’ di tesi relative a concetti tipici, quali ‘realtà’, ‘verità’, ‘conoscenza’.Are there philosophical methods? The article tries to answer this question, at first by discussing the idea of philosophy as an ‘extra-methodical’ activity, then by examining the principal techniques and methods worked out in contemporary philosophy. A definition of philosophy as an attempt to solve ‘fundamental’ problems is also assumed. Such an attempt, is argued, is usually developed by using different methods, each of them depending on different ‘supervaluations’ of theses concerning reality, truth, knowledge, and other typically philosophical concepts

The central thesis of JC Beall’s paraconsistent Christology is that Christ, being human and divine, is a contradictory being, and a rational Christology can accept it, since logic nowadays does not exclude the possibility of true contradictions. In this paper, I move from Beall’s theory and I present an alternative view. I quote seven statements of the so-called ‘Athanasian Creed’ which synthesizes the results of conciliar Christology. The aim of the Creed is to combat monophysitism by stressing the duplicity and unity of Christ: two (incompatible) natures inseparably joined in only one person. I note that the two-in-one principle, so intended, may be seen as an ancestor of what has been called ‘conjunctive paraconsistency’, whereby there could be true contradictions but contradictories cannot be separately true. I specifically oppose this view to Beall’s idea of Christ’s human divinity (or divine humanity) as a glut, showing that in the conjunctive account, true contradictions do not require any overlapping or joint ascription of truth and falsity.

This paper advances a version of the theory whereby logic had deep origins in democracy, by re-reading Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen. Democracy, ‘the government by debate’, called political (and scientific) attention to the inferential abilities of citizens and to politicians’ ability of taking advantage of them. Sophists, in particular, discovered that people’s inferences follow constant repeatable forms, that these forms have impact on choices and decisions concerning public good, and then by dominating them you dominate politics in democracy. With the Encomium Gorgias launched these ideas, so laying the ground for Aristotle’s science of deduction.

A new idea of ‘contradictory Christology’ has been recently advanced by JC Beall (The contradictory Christ. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021a). This paper does not enter the debate whether Christ double nature instantiates a contradiction or does not. It aims to point out a possible view about the Christological problem similar to Beall’s view but more focused on the metaphysical consequences of admitting a treatment of the Christological paradox in dialetheic terms, as a case of ‘true contradiction’. In Beall’s account, the glut-theoretic approach can improve the conception of logic presupposed in theological discussions, giving new suggestions for the development of an updated ‘logic of Christology’. I move in the other direction, exploring whether the philosophical reflection on Christology could give new insights for paraconsistency and the study of inconsistencies in general. More specifically, I claim that the idea of the unity of contradictories in Christ’s being both divine and human may give some support to the idea of conjunctive paraconsistency, whereby true conjunctions of contradictories do not admit of Simplification. After an introduction which presents the main argument, I summarize the theory of conjunctivism in paraconsistency, then I focus on the (pseudo) Athanasian Creed, wherein the two natures – one person principle is defended against monophysism.

Over the course of his career, Gianni Vattimo has assumed a number of public and private identities and has pursued multiple intellectual paths. He seems to embody several contradictions, at once defending and questioning religion and critiquing and serving the state. Yet the diversity of his life and thought form the very essence of, as he sees it, the vocation and responsibility of the philosopher. In a world that desires quantifiable results and ideological expediency, the philosopher becomes the vital interpreter of the endlessly complex. As he outlines his ideas about the philosopher's role, Vattimo builds an important companion to his life's work. He confronts questions of science, religion, logic, literature, and truth, and passionately defends the power of hermeneutics to engage with life's conundrums. Vattimo conjures a clear vision of philosophy as something separate from the sciences and the humanities but also intimately connected to their processes, and he explicates a conception of truth that emphasizes fidelity and participation through dialogue

Over the course of his career, Gianni Vattimo has assumed a number of public and private identities and has pursued multiple intellectual paths. He seems to embody several contradictions, at once defending and questioning religion and critiquing and serving the state. Yet the diversity of his life and thought form the very essence of, as he sees it, the vocation and responsibility of the philosopher. In a world that desires quantifiable results and ideological expediency, the philosopher becomes the vital interpreter of the endlessly complex. As he outlines his ideas about the philosopher's role, Vattimo builds an important companion to his life's work. He confronts questions of science, religion, logic, literature, and truth, and passionately defends the power of hermeneutics to engage with life's conundrums. Vattimo conjures a clear vision of philosophy as something separate from the sciences and the humanities but also intimately connected to their processes, and he explicates a conception of truth that emphasizes fidelity and participation through dialogue

Contrariamente a quanto si dice, non esistono oggi “molte filosofie”, ma un unico benché multiforme orientamento scettico, che definisce - con gradi di maggiore o minore radicalità - la “razionalità minimale” all'opera in qualsiasi discorso filosofico. Al centro (o al cuore) di questa grande koiné scettica agisce profondamente, ma con effetti avvertibili, l'idea che sia difficile o impossibile afferrare, o riconoscere, o definire la verità. Ma è davvero così? In quale senso può essere vero che la verità non esiste, o è indefinibile, ineffabile, inafferrabile? Il libro ricostruisce la storia di un solo enunciato, “la verità non esiste”, e delle sue traduzioni e parafrasi: dai sofisti e dagli antichi scettici fino a Nietzsche e alle teorie contemporanee sulla scomparsa della verità. È una storia controversa, fin da principio segnata dalla consapevolezza che a normali condizioni logiche non si può negare la verità: perché se è vero che la verità non esiste, allora almeno una verità esiste. La ricostruzione storica aiuta a capire che la verità è “innegabile” come altri concetti fondamentali della tradizione filosofica: come l'essere, il pensiero, il linguaggio. Cosí come non può essere vero che la verità non esiste, non si può pensare l'assenza di pensiero, e dire l'assenza di linguaggio. Ma esistono, essere, pensiero, verità, linguaggio? La tesi del libro è che non ci si può disfare della verità (esattamente come non ci si può disfare di altri concetti-fondamenti) se e in quanto si intende rimanere all'interno della filosofia, ossia di un discorso preliminare e generale (e in una certa misura libero e neutrale) su teorie, visioni della realtà, modi di dare conto della realtà.

My discussion addresses the differences between analytic and continental philosophy concerning the use of logic and exact reasoning in philosophical practice. These differences are mainly examined in the light of the controversial dominance of Hegel's concept of logic in twentieth-century continental philosophy. The inquiry is developed in two parts. In the first, I indicate some aspects of the analytic -continental divide, pointing to the role that the topic 'logic and philosophy' plays in it. In the second part, I give a short account of the views of logic which are typical of the three main trends of continental philosophy. I also suggest how, with the aid of some typical analytical devices, some continental 'anti-logical' attitudes may be corrected, on their own terms