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Scientia media and Freedom to Do OtherwiseIn Christian Kanzian Winfried Löffler Josef Quitterer (ed.), The Ways Things Are - Studies in Ontology Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2011, Ontos. 2011.
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44The value problem in epistemology is to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Or so it is commonly construed. Various solutions to the quandary have been proposed, but so far none has gained wide acceptance. Perhaps, then, we should abandon the idea that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This is what we shall argue, but with one important qualification: Knowledge is not generally more valuable than mere true belief. Certain epistemic contexts, however, are…Read more
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167Process Reliabilism and the Value ProblemTheoria 77 (3): 201-213. 2011.Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar kind in the futu…Read more
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1872Das KonsequenzargumentIn Rolf W. Puster (ed.), Klassische Argumentationen der Philosophie, Mentis. pp. 275-296. 2013.The paper reconstructs causal and theological versions of the consequence argument against the compatibility of free will and determinism and discusses the most influential objections to them.
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166Reliabilism and the extra value of knowledgePhilosophical Studies 157 (1): 93-105. 2012.Goldman and Olsson ( 2009 ) have responded to the common charge that reliabilist theories of knowledge are incapable of accounting for the value knowledge has beyond mere true belief. We examine their “conditional probability solution” in detail, and show that it does not succeed. The conditional probability relation is too weak to support instrumental value, and the specific relation they describe is inessential to the value of knowledge. At best, they have described conditions in which knowled…Read more
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1012Kunst, Kontext und ErkenntnisIn Christoph Jäger & Georg Meggle (eds.), Kunst und Erkenntnis (Art and Knowledge), Mentis. pp. 9-39. 2005.
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440Religious experience and epistemic justification: Alston on the reliability of mystical perceptionIn Carlos Ulises Moulines and Karl-Georg Niebergall (ed.), Argument und Analyse, Mentis. pp. 403-423. 2002.I discuss Alston's theory of religious experience and maintain that his argument to the effect that it is rational to suppose that the 'mystical doxastic practice' is epistemically reliable does not stand up to scrutiny. While Alston's transitions from practical to epistemic rationality don't work here, his arguments may be taken to show that, under certain conditions, it is not epistemically irresponsible to trust one's religious experiences.
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461Is Coherentism Coherent?Analysis 67 (4). 2007.In ‘A reductio of coherentism’ (Analysis 67, 2007) Tom Stoneham offers a novel argument against epistemological coherentism. ‘On the face of it’, he writes, ‘the argument gives a conclusive reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. But that cannot be right, can it?’ (p. 254). It could be right, but it isn’t. I argue that coherentists need not accept the central premises of Stoneham’s argument and that, even if these premises were acceptable and true, Stoneham’s reductio woul…Read more
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Autorität der Ersten Person und emotionale VerdrängungE-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 4. 2006.
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37Privileged Access and RepressionIn Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle, De Gruyter. pp. 59-80. 2002.
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417Analytische Religionsphilosophie - Eine EinführungIn Analytische Religionsphilosophie, Utb. pp. 11-51. 1998.
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692Wittgenstein über Gewissheit und religiösen GlaubenIn Florian Uhl and Artur R. Boelderl (ed.), Die Sprachen der Religion, . pp. 221-256. 2003.
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517Prolegomena zu einer philosophischen Theorie der Meta-EmotionenIn Barbara Merker (ed.), Leben mit Gefühlen, Mentis. pp. 113-137. 2009.
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126Determinismus und Verantwortung: Was kann das Konsequenzargument?Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1): 119-131. 2009.In his recent book Willensfreiheit Geert Keil defends a version of libertarianism. Yet he criticizes a flagship argument for incompatibilism. Van Inwagen's consequence argument, Keil thinks, relies on an irrelevant premise when it claims that agents have no choice about the remote past. I argue that Keil's charge rests on a misunderstanding. I then sketch why discussions of the consequence argument should focus on the question whether or not a certain version of rule Beta is valid
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47Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreements (Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium) (edited book)Ontos Verlag. 2012.The present volume collects papers that were presented at the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium “Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement” 2011 in Kirchberg. Contributors include: P. Baumann, A. Beckermann, E. Brendel, J. Bromand, G. Brun, M. David, W. Davis, C. Elgin, E. Fischer, W. Freitag, S. Goldberg, J. Greco, E. Harcourt, A. Kemmerling, M. Kober, D. Koppelberg, A. Koritensky, H. Kornblith, M. Kusch, M. Lee, N. Miscevic, K. Munn, B. Niederbacher, E. J. Olsson, C. Piller, R. Raaa…Read more
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98Kunst und Erkenntnis (Art and Knowledge) (edited book)mentis. 2005.Dient Kunst der Erkenntnis? Vermittelt sie Einsichten oder Wissen? Und wenn ja: auf welche Weise? Sind ästhetische Urteile wahr oder falsch? Beruht unsere Wertschätzung von Kunst auf ihren kognitiven Funktionen? Zu diesen Fragen, die zu den klassischen Themen der Kunstphilosophie gehören, beziehen zehn Philosophen aus dem deutschen Sprachraum in Originalbeiträgen Position. Der Band dokumentiert den gegenwärtigen Stand der Kontroversen zwischen kognitivistischen und nichtkognitivistischen Theorie…Read more
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27Religiöse Erfahrung und epistemische ZirkularitätDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 53 (2). 2005.
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819Looking into meta-emotionsSynthese 192 (3): 787-811. 2015.There are many psychic mechanisms by which people engage with their selves. We argue that an important yet hitherto neglected one is self-appraisal via meta-emotions. We discuss the intentional structure of meta-emotions and explore the phenomenology of a variety of examples. We then present a pilot study providing preliminary evidence that some facial displays may indicate the presence of meta-emotions. We conclude by arguing that meta-emotions have an important role to play in higher-order the…Read more
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531Affective ignoranceErkenntnis 71 (1). 2009.According to one of the most influential views in the philosophy of self-knowledge each person enjoys some special cognitive access to his or her own current mental states and episodes. This view faces two fundamental tasks. First, it must elucidate the general conceptual structure of apparent asymmetries between beliefs about one’s own mind and beliefs about other minds. Second, it must demarcate the mental territory for which first-person-special-access claims can plausibly be maintained. Trad…Read more
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286Contextualist approaches to epistemology: Problems and prospectsErkenntnis 61 (2-3). 2004.In this paper we survey some main arguments for and against epistemological contextualism. We distinguish and discuss various kinds of contextualism, such as attributer contextualism (the most influential version of which is semantic, conversational, or radical contextualism); indexicalism; proto-contextualism; Wittgensteinian contextualism; subject, inferential, or issue contextualism; epistemic contextualism; and virtue contextualism. Starting with a sketch of Dretske's Relevant Alternatives T…Read more