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64Rationality in AgreementSocial Philosophy and Policy 5 (2): 1. 1988.Gauthier's title is potentially misleading. The phrase “morals by agreement” suggests a social contract theory of morality according to which basic moral principles arise out of an actual or hypothetical agreement. John Rawls defends a hypothetical agreement version, arguing that the basic principles of justice are those that would be agreed to in an initial position of fair equality. I myself defend an actual agreement version, arguing that the moral principles that apply to a person derive fro…Read more
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65Explaining Value: And Other Essays in Moral PhilosophyOxford University Press UK. 2000.Explaining Value is a selection of the best of Gilbert Harman's shorter writings in moral philosophy. The thirteen essays are divided into four sections, which focus in turn on moral relativism, values and valuing, character traits and virtue ethics, and ways of explaining aspects of morality. Harman's distinctive approach to moral philosophy has provoked much interest; this volume offers a fascinating conspectus of his most important work in the area.
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Das Wesen der Moral. Eine Einführung in die EthikZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 38 (1): 148-151. 1984.
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494ThoughtPrinceton University Press. 1973.Thoughts and other mental states are defined by their role in a functional system. Since it is easier to determine when we have knowledge than when reasoning has occurred, Gilbert Harman attempts to answer the latter question by seeing what assumptions about reasoning would best account for when we have knowledge and when not. He describes induction as inference to the best explanation, or more precisely as a modification of beliefs that seeks to minimize change and maximize explanatory coherenc…Read more
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198Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Normativity (review)Philosophical Studies 154 (3). 2011.Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Normativity Content Type Journal Article Pages 435-441 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9737-y Authors Gilbert Harman, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, 1879 Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116 Journal Volume Volume 154 Journal Issue Volume 154, Number 3.
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7Philosophy of languageIn Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on truth, meaning, and the mental, Oxford University Press. pp. 39. 2012.
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33Skepticism and foundationsIn Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Press. pp. 1--11. 2003.
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1Thought, SelectionsIn Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Epistemology: An Anthology, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 194. 2000.
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746According to moral relativism, there is not a single true morality. There are a variety of possible moralities or moral frames of reference, and whether something is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, etc. is a relative matter—relative to one or another morality or moral frame of reference. Something can be morally right relative to one moral frame of reference and morally wrong relative to another. It is useful to compare moral relativism to other relativisms. One possible com…Read more
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2027. Reflections on Language, by Noam Chomsky; On Noam Chomsky: Critical EssaysIn Bernard Williams (ed.), Essays and Reviews: 1959-2002, Princeton University Press. pp. 133-140. 2014.
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30Glüer, Kathrin., Donald Davidson: A Short IntroductionReview of Metaphysics 67 (1): 162-164. 2013.
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44In (Harman 2007) I argued “that a purely objective account of conscious experience cannot always by itself give an understanding of what it is like to have that experience.” Following Nagel (1974), I suggested that such a gap “has no obvious metaphysical implications. It [merely] reflects the distinction between two kinds of understanding,” objective and subjective, where subjective understanding or “Das Verstehen” (Dilthey 1883/1989) of another creature’s experience involves knowing what it is …Read more
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70Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning 1 (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1): 173-179. 2007.Jason Stanley’s Knowledge and Practical Interests is a brilliant book, combining insights about knowledge with a careful examination of how recent views in epistemology fit with the best of recent linguistic semantics. Although I am largely convinced by Stanley’s objections to epistemic contextualism, I will try in what follows to formulate a version that might have some prospect of escaping his powerful critique.
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24Book Review:Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition: A Theory of Judgment. Howard Margolis (review)Ethics 100 (1): 200-. 1989.
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59Scott Sehon argues for a complex view about the relation between commonsense psychology and the physical sciences.1 He rejects any sort of Cartesian dualism and believes that the common-sense psychological facts supervene on the physical facts. Nevertheless he asserts that there is an important respect in which common-sense psychology is independent of the physical sciences. Despite supervenience, we are not to expect any sort of reduction of common-sense psychology to physical science, nor are …Read more
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