Charlotte Witt

There is a surprising number of deformed animal kinds mentioned in Aristotle’s biological works. The number is surprising because, according to the standard understanding of deformed animals in Aristotle, it should be zero. And the number is significant because there are just too many deformed kinds at too many classificatory levels mentioned in too many works to dismiss them as a minor aberration or as an infiltration of folk belief into biology proper. This paper has two goals. The first is to develop an interpretation of deformed animal kinds in Aristotle, which focuses on the meaning of deformity applied to kinds. The second goal is to draw out the consequences of that interpretation for our understanding of Aristotle’s view of normal animal kinds. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the meaning of deformity tells us about Aristotle’s view of normal animal kinds.

What is gender? This chapter addresses this question by drawing on literary and imaginative resources rather than philosophical argument or dictionary definitions. To illuminate gender in the present, the author uses the parable of Height Society where Talls and Shorts stand in for the gender binary. The author also borrows from _The Left Hand of Darkness_ by renowned science fiction writer Ursula LeGuin to spark thinking about future possibilities of gender beyond the binary. Throughout, the author discusses the history of gender binary language and proposes a social constructivist view of gender. Differences between gender and sex are explained, and the author explains the importance of intersexual approaches to the topic of gender as well.

The bionormative family concept is prejudicial against families with children who are not genetically related to their parents. The aim of this chapter is to critique two philosophical arguments that might seem to support the bionormative family concept. In “Family History” and other essays, J. David Velleman (2005, 2008) argues that the biological family plays an essential role in the healthy psychological development of children. In “Blood is thicker than water, _nicht wahr_?”, Robert Wilson (2008a) claims that the biocentred family is a key element in the development of human sociality. This chapter concludes that neither of these arguments gives us reason to accept the bionormative concept of the family. Since bionormativity about the family unfairly stigmatizes some families, we ought to give it up.

Book 1 of Aristotle’s _De Anima_ extensively discusses two characteristics of the soul: the soul as the source of motion of the living being, and the soul as the seat of perception and cognition. The following conclusions are drawn on the nature and function of the soul. The soul is not a magnitude and not material; it is a substance and not an attribute; it is a unity, and the principle of unity is not material continuity. The soul is the origin of perception and motion, and of psychological processes such as emotions and desires. An adequate account of how the soul causes perception, motion, and the like must not attribute motion to the soul.

Book 1 of Aristotle’s De Anima extensively discusses two characteristics of the soul: the soul as the source of motion of the living being, and the soul as the seat of perception and cognition. The following conclusions are drawn on the nature and function of the soul. The soul is not a magnitude and not material; it is a substance and not an attribute; it is a unity, and the principle of unity is not material continuity. The soul is the origin of perception and motion, and of psychological processes such as emotions and desires. An adequate account of how the soul causes perception, motion, and the like must not attribute motion to the soul.

Introduction : kith, kin, and family / Sally Haslanger and Charlotte Witt Adoption and its progeny : rethinking family law, gender, and sexual difference / Drucilla Cornell Open adoption is not for everyone / Anita L. Allen Methods of adoption : eliminating genetic privilege / Jacqueline Stevens Several steps behind : gay and lesbian adoption / Sarah Tobias A child of one’s own : property, progeny, and adoption / Janet Farrell Smith Family resemblances : adoption, personal identity, and genetic essentialism / Charlotte Witt Being adopted and being a philosopher : exploring identity and the "desire to know" differently / Kimberly Leighton Real othering : the metaphysics of maternity in children’s literature / Shelley Park Accidents and contingencies of love / Songsuk Hahn ; comments by Harry Frankfurt Abuse and neglect, foster drift, and the adoption alternative / Elizabeth Bartholet Feminism, race, and adoption policy / Dorothy Roberts Racial randomization / Hawley Fogg-Davis You Mixed?: racial identity without racial biology / Sally Haslanger.

Social Goodness presents an original, externalist answer to the question of the source or origin of social role normativity. Rather than ground social normativity in the attitudes of persons, the book argues for an externalism that roots social role normativity in the social world itself, in its positions, institutions, and larger architecture. The core insight of externalism is that the function or structural feature of an enterprise or activity can bring with it normative demands quite independently of the attitudes of those who engage with it. According to the artisanal model, just as a carpenter, a ceramicist, or a chef is responsive to and evaluable under a set of artisanal norms or techniques, so too is a mother and or an academic or a president. The source of normativity is the technique/expertise, and these are independent of the preferences, endorsements, or recognitive attitudes of individuals. The artisanal model for social role normativity has resources to explain both the “stickiness” or persistence of social norms, and our ability to criticize existing norms and to engage in normative self-creation—to create new normative selves. The artisanal model also has resources to capture and express the social situatedness, locality, and materiality of social roles. The relational ontology of social roles, implicit in the artisanal model, provides a useful frame to consider both hierarchical and oppressive social relations.

Substance and Essence in Aristotle is a close study of Aristotle's most profound—and perplexing—treatise: Books VII-IX of the Metaphysics. These central books, which focus on the nature of substance, have gained a deserved reputation for their difficulty, inconclusiveness, and internal inconsistency. Despite these problems, Witt extracts from Aristotle's text a coherent and provocative view about sensible substance by focusing on Aristotle's account of form or essence. After exploring the context in which Aristotle's discussion of sensible substance takes place, Witt turns to his analysis of essence. Arguing against the received interpretation, according to which essences are classificatory, Witt maintains that a substance's essence is what causes it to exist. In addition, Substance and Essence in Aristotle challenges the orthodox view that Aristotelian essences are species-essences, defending instead the controversial position that they are individual essences. Finally, Witt compares Aristotelian essentialism to contemporary essentialist theories, focusing in particular on Kripke's work. She concludes that fundamental differences between Aristotelian and contemporary essentialist theories highlight important features of Aristotle's theory and the philosophical problems and milieu that engendered it.