Jörg Noller

Betrachtet man das breite Spektrum an produktiven Wechselwirkungen zwischen den beiden Kulturnationen Italien und Deutschland, so ist es verwunderlich, dass die italienische Philosophie in Deutschland immer noch als „terra incognita“ (Ugo Perone) gelten darf. Darum bringt dieser Band das ‚transalpine‘ Wechselspiel von Rezeption und Transformation im deutsch-italienischen Denken exemplarisch zur Sprache. Im Zentrum stehen die Bereiche der Aufklärung (Vico, Herder), der klassischen deutschen Philosophie (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), der Philosophie des Risorgimento (Rosmini, Gioberti) und der Philosophie der Gegenwart (Luigi Pareyson und die Turiner Schule).

Kant’s moral philosophy is challenged by the so-called “Socratic Paradox”: If free will and pure practical reason are to be identified, as Kant argues, then there seems to be no room for immoral actions that are to be imputed to our individual freedom. The paper argues that Kant’s conception of rationalizing helps us to avoid the Socratic Paradox, and to understand how immoral actions can be imputed to our individual freedom and responsibility. In rationalizing, we misuse our capacity of reason in order to construct the illusion according to which we are not bound to the absolute demand of the moral law, but rather subject to exceptions and excuses. Finally, the paper interprets the three rules of “common sense” in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment in terms of an antidote to rationalizing.

Are we essentially human animals or persons? The aim of this paper is to find a middle way between animalism and constitutionalism and to develop a concept of a person's life which avoids their problems. I will argue for the following thesis: As humans we are persons, but we are persons not in the sense of certain abilities which distinguish our biological kind, but by an intersubjective form of our life. Therefore, I will strictly distinguish between the biological species form of human beings and the life form of humans as persons. This allows me to develop an account of the personal life form which unifies metaphysics and value without succumbing to the naturalistic fallacy.

In recent times, Kant’s theory of the moral feeling of respect has increasingly come to the centre of Kant research. His diverse and seemingly contradictory characterisations of this feeling in particular have led to continued controversial discussion. While a number of scholars try to understand the special role of respect in Kant by isolating this feeling from its conceptual context or solely referring to its role as moral motivation, I will concentrate on the systemic position of respect within the framework of Kant’s theory of the autonomy of reason. Furthermore, I will try to elucidate the different characterisations of respect given by Kant, referring not only to his ethics, but also to his general theory of transcendental idealism. Examining the special place of respect within Kant’s transcendental idealism, I will plead for a compatibilist reading of respect, according to which the “intellectualist” as well as the “affectivist” view both hold true. This is motivated by interpreting respect as a volitional structure featuring rational as well as emotional dimensions.

What constitutes personhood? How are persons and their bodies related? What is the relationship between personhood and value? The Unity of a Person: Philosophical Perspectives explores the current debates surrounding the philosophy of personal identity and offers a fresh approach to this important topic. It is original in bringing together three approaches to personal identity that are traditionally treated separately: the metaphysical, the phenomenological and the social. By examining these three areas this volume establishes connections between the underlying metaphysical issues surrounding personal identity and the specific forms of personal existence such as self-consciousness, action, and normativity. Topics discussed include personhood and animalism, process ontology, self-identity over time, sociality and personhood, and the normative status of personhood. With chapters by an outstanding international roster of contributors, this collection will be of great interest to those studying personal identity and the nature of the self in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and phenomenology.

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Kant’s theory of error in theoretical and practical terms, not only from a moral-psychological perspective, but also from the broader perspective of his transcendental philosophy. Kant’s theory of error will be interpreted as a central part of his transcendental philosophy, insofar as it is related to his doctrine of reason. For it is precisely Kant’s theory of dialectic as the »logic of appearance« that deals with the reasons that concern theoretical error as well as moral misconduct and that traces theoretical and practical error back to a common root: the phenomenon of rational self-deception.

From a philosophical point of view, the concept of Willkür is highly problem-atic. Although the word »Willkür« can be originally translated as »choice of the will«, which means a kind of indi-vidual freedom, it has, over the last 300 years, experienced a semantic pejora-tion, and now often stands for mere »arbitrariness«. The article examines the philosophical ambivalence of the concept of Willkür. It defends this con-cept from the charge that it is no con-sistent thought and rehabilitates it both historically and systematically. First, it exposes the pre-Kantian concept of the »liberum arbitrium voluntatis« in Augustine, Aquinas, and Leibniz’ »franc arbitre«, which demonstrate the positive sense of the concept. Then it explores the systematic role of Willkürin Kant’s philosophical work. Finally, it addresses contemporary attempts to revitalize this concept in the analytic debate on freedom.

This paper examines two different conceptions of dialectics in Plato’s work based on paradigmatic passages in the dialogues Meno and Politeia. I will focus on the Greek word for »dialectic« and various related words in relevant passages in order to determine the conceptions of dialectic from their specific textual context. In particular, I will focus on those passages in which the word »dialegesthai« stands in contrast to other words such as »eristics« or »rhetoric«. The examinationthus proceeds in a performative way: it develops the content of dialectics as a concept throughthe formal method of the content itself, namely conceptual definition. In other words: to define theconcept of dialectics means to define what conceptual definition means.