Kwan Hong Tan

This thesis conducts a critical analysis of the practical weaknesses and theoretical gaps in Western ethical philosophies, specifically examining consequentialism, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics. Through systematic examination, it is demonstrated that these traditions, while offering valuable insights, contain significant limitations that hinder their application in complex moral situations. Consequentialism struggles with calculation difficulties and justice considerations; deontological ethics exhibits inflexibility and disregard for consequences; virtue ethics lacks clear action guidance and suffers from cultural relativity. Building upon this analysis, this thesis proposes Integrative Ethical Pluralism (IEP), a novel ethical framework that addresses these limitations by integrating multiple ethical dimensions through dynamic processes that are sensitive to context and developmental factors. IEP recognizes four fundamental dimensions of ethical consideration—consequential, deontological, aretaic, and relational—and provides mechanisms for their integration through reflective equilibrium, dimensional weighting, narrative coherence, and practical wisdom. Empirical evidence from moral psychology, cross-cultural studies, and neuroscience supports this integrative approach. The thesis concludes that IEP offers a more comprehensive and practically applicable ethical framework that maintains theoretical coherence while addressing the complexities of moral life in contemporary society.

This thesis presents a comprehensive examination of consciousness and its relationship to scenarios involving cloning, mind uploading, and digital immortality. Through extensive analysis of existing consciousness theories, personal identity frameworks, and contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, I develop a novel theoretical framework called the Quantum-Temporal Consciousness Model (QTCM). This model demonstrates that consciousness is fundamentally non-copyable, temporally-embedded, and irreducibly singular. The QTCM resolves classical problems in personal identity theory while providing testable predictions about the nature of conscious experience. The implications extend beyond academic philosophy to practical questions about human enhancement, artificial intelligence development, and the ethical treatment of conscious entities. This work challenges prevailing assumptions about the transferability of consciousness and provides a rigorous foundation for understanding why consciousness cannot be duplicated, uploaded, or digitally preserved.

This thesis critically examines the question of whether people are truly becoming happier amidst ongoing global socio-economic transformations. Employing a mixed-methods approach, the study integrates quantitative analysis of longitudinal data from major international surveys (including the Gallup World Poll and World Values Survey) focusing on life evaluation trends since the mid-2000s, with qualitative synthesis of existing literature and theoretical frameworks. A conceptual model emphasizing the interplay of "Health" (material/physical well-being), "Hope" (agency/aspirations), and "Harmony" (social/environmental context) guides the analysis. Findings reveal a complex picture: the unweighted global average life satisfaction has exhibited relative stagnation over the past two decades, suggesting no significant net increase in happiness for humanity as a whole during this period. However, this global average masks considerable heterogeneity, with marked increases in subjective well-being observed in some nations (often developing economies undergoing rapid poverty reduction), counterbalanced by stagnation or decline in others, including several high-income countries. The analysis underscores the critical importance of non-economic factors—such as social support, institutional trust, personal freedom, and mental health—in mediating the relationship between economic development and subjective well-being, reaffirming the limitations of GDP as a sole measure of societal progress and the nuances of the Easterlin Paradox. It is concluded that, based on recent evidence, progress towards greater happiness is neither universal nor guaranteed. The thesis advocates for a more holistic, human-centered approach to development, prioritizing policies that foster well-being across multiple life domains beyond mere economic growth.

This paper critically responds to Peter Eastman’s 2014 essay, The Perpetual Emptiness of Academic Philosophy, which accuses contemporary academic philosophy of abandoning its existential and metaphysical roots. Through engagement with existentialist traditions, contemporary critiques, and philosophical methodologies, this essay challenges the view that academic philosophy is wholly sterile or irrelevant. While acknowledging the discipline’s increasing specialization and perceived inaccessibility, the paper argues that its analytical rigor remains vital for addressing complex human questions. Drawing on sources such as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, contemporary scholarship, and responses from Eastman’s critics, the author proposes that academic philosophy still retains the capacity to explore meaning, purpose, and fulfilment—particularly when its traditions are critically integrated with ancient wisdom and public-facing discourse. Ultimately, this work calls for a renewed commitment to bridging scholarly precision with existential relevance, advocating for a more accessible and reflective philosophical practice.

The mind-body problem remains a central challenge in consciousness studies, with physicalist monism – the view that all mental phenomena are ultimately physical – serving as a dominant paradigm. This paper investigates the limits of physicalist monism in explaining subjective experience by adopting an interdisciplinary approach that integrates phenomenological philosophy and neuroscience. From the phenomenological perspective, first-person analyses reveal fundamental features of consciousness (such as qualia, intentionality, temporality, and embodiment) that resist reduction to purely physical processes. Neuroscientific findings, while illuminating the neural correlates and functional mechanisms of mind, continue to confront the “hard problem” of explaining why brain activity is accompanied by an inner qualitative life. Through a critique that spans phenomenology’s rich descriptions of experience and neuroscience’s empirical insights, the paper argues that reductive materialist accounts fall short of bridging the explanatory gap between objective brain states and the lived reality of experience. This analysis carries significant implications for the mind-body problem and for consciousness research: a purely physical ontology appears insufficient to fully account for mind. The findings call for a more nuanced framework that accommodates the irreducible first-person dimension of consciousness, potentially through new philosophical models or integrative methodologies (e.g. neurophenomenology) that can more comprehensively address the nature of consciousness.

This paper introduces the Emergent Moral Ecology (EME) framework as a novel approach to addressing the complexities of moral responsibility in artificial intelligence (AI) systems. As AI technologies become increasingly autonomous and integrated into critical societal functions, traditional models of moral agency—grounded in anthropocentric concepts like consciousness, free will, and intention—prove inadequate for attributing responsibility. The EME framework reconceptualizes responsibility not as an intrinsic property of agents but as an emergent, context-sensitive function within sociotechnical systems comprising humans, AI entities, institutions, and environments. Drawing from systems theory, ethics of care, process philosophy, and ecological metaphors, the framework posits that moral responsibility arises from the dynamic interactions and relational configurations of the components within these moral ecologies. It introduces foundational principles such as ecological emergence, moral gradients, contextual activation, reciprocal shaping, and temporal extension. Through multidimensional analysis—ontological, relational, contextual, and developmental—the framework offers a rigorous, adaptable tool for ethically assessing and guiding the deployment of AI systems. Case studies involving autonomous vehicles, medical diagnostics, and algorithmic decision-making demonstrate its practical relevance. The EME framework ultimately advocates for a shift from agent-centered ethics to ecology-centered responsibility, offering a philosophically robust and practically viable path for AI governance in an era of moral complexity.

This thesis investigates the perplexing philosophical problem posed by states of existence that defy traditional binary categorization, occupying a liminal space between being and non-being. Such states, where existence is asserted yet simultaneously deemed non-existence, and where non-existence paradoxically constitutes a form of existence, challenge foundational ontological assumptions prevalent in both Western and Eastern thought. A comprehensive review of existing frameworks—spanning classical metaphysics, Eastern philosophies, existentialism, and contemporary quantum physics—reveals significant limitations in their capacity to adequately conceptualize and analyze this paradoxical "in-between" state. Classical logic struggles with apparent contradictions, Eastern concepts often lack analytical precision for formal application, existentialism remains largely anthropocentric, and quantum interpretations face issues of scale and observer-dependence. To address these gaps, this work introduces a novel theoretical framework centered around five core concepts: Ontological Liminality, Modal Oscillation, Perspectival Ontology, Ontological Gradience, and Relational Manifestation. This framework provides a nuanced, multi-dimensional approach capable of accommodating ontological indeterminacy, temporal fluctuation, observer-constituted reality, degrees of existence, and the emergence of being through relationships. Logical arguments are presented to establish the coherence and explanatory power of the framework, demonstrating its applicability across diverse domains, including quantum phenomena, consciousness, social constructs, and digital entities. Visual representations are employed to illustrate the core concepts and their integration. The thesis concludes by summarizing the framework's contributions to ontology, acknowledging its limitations, and suggesting avenues for future research into the multifaceted nature of existence at the threshold of non-existence.

This thesis addresses the enduring philosophical paradox of a state of being that lies between conventional existence and non-existence—a state whose existence is defined by its non-existence, and whose non-existence constitutes a form of existence. Traditional metaphysical frameworks, often constrained by binary logic, struggle to adequately conceptualize such liminal states. This work proposes a novel theoretical framework, Ontological Liminality Theory (OLT), to address this challenge. OLT integrates insights from contemporary metaphysics, analytic philosophy, philosophy of mind, Eastern philosophical traditions, and empirical findings from quantum physics, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence research. The framework is built upon five core concepts: Modal Oscillation, Perspectival Ontology, Ontological Gradience, Relational Manifestation, and Emergent Phenomenality. These concepts are synthesized within a multidimensional Liminal Ontology Matrix, providing a nuanced apparatus for mapping and analyzing entities that defy binary classification. The thesis presents rigorous logical arguments supporting OLT, grounded in recent peer-reviewed literature and empirical evidence, particularly concerning the ontological status of AI systems and virtual entities. Visual diagrams illustrate the core concepts and their integration. OLT offers a new paradigm for understanding existence, moving beyond binary constraints to accommodate the complexities of quantum phenomena, consciousness, social constructs, and the burgeoning realm of digital being, thereby providing a more robust and empirically relevant approach to contemporary ontological challenges.

This thesis explores the philosophical and psychological question of whether happiness should be regarded as the ultimate purpose in life. Drawing from diverse theoretical traditions, including Aristotelian ethics, utilitarianism, existentialism, and contemporary psychological studies, the research critically evaluates happiness as a life goal. Through an interdisciplinary lens, the study examines definitions, limitations, and contextual variances of happiness, addressing subjective well-being, eudaimonia, and meaning-making processes. Ultimately, the thesis argues that while happiness remains a compelling and universally desired pursuit, it may be insufficient as a sole or primary life objective. A more comprehensive framework—encompassing purpose, growth, resilience, and relational values—is proposed. This contribution expands the discourse by positioning happiness not as an end, but as a by-product of more profound life pursuits.