Charbel N. El-Hani

The controversy over the notion of emergence has recently re-emerged But a rigorous debate concerning how it might be explained or defined is often lacking Emergence is discussed here under two strict conditions (l) emergents can be predictable from the knowledge about a system's parts, (ll) emergents can be regarded as dependent on, and deternuned by, the system's micro-structure O'Connor's definmon of an emergent property is taken as a starting-point for a new definmon, incorporating Emmeche and colleagues' analysis of dounward causation and Baas' treatment of emergence It is not necessary to assume that this defintaon might provide the solution to the problem of emergence Rather, theoretical pluralism regarding different pragmatically-workable notions of emergence is welcome The reality of emergents is discussed here from the standpoint of Dennet's mild realism

A recent idea of “ecosystem health” was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s to draws attention to the fact that ecosystems can become ill because of a reduction of properties such as primary productivity, functions and diversity of interactions among system components. Starting from the 1990s, this idea has been deeply criticized by authors who argued that, insofar as ecosystems show many differences with respect to organismic features, these two kinds of systems cannot share a typical organismic property such as health. In recent years, an organisational approach in philosophy of biology and ecology argued that both organisms and ecosystems may share a fundamental characteristic despite their differences, namely, organisational closure. Based on this kind of closure, scholars have also discussed health and malfunctional states in organisms. In this paper, we examine the possibility of expanding such an organisational approach to health and malfunctions to the ecological domain. Firstly, we will see that a malfunction is related to a lower effectiveness in the functional behaviour of some biotic components with respect to other systemic components. We will then show how some introduced species do not satisfactorily interact in an organisational closure with other ecosystem components, thus posing a threat to the self-maintenance of the ecosystem in which they are found. Accordingly, we will argue that an ecosystem can be said to be healthy when it is a vital environment organisationally grounded on its intrinsic capacity to ensure, under favourable conditions, appropriate functional behaviours for ecosystem components and ecosystem self-maintenance.

In the face of planetary crises — from biodiversity loss to climate change to food security — transdisciplinary methods promise effective and just responses through equal collaborations. However, transdisciplinarity also creates complex challenges by bringing together different actors with different frameworks, like scientists, Indigenous and local communities, and policy makers. Successful collaboration among such actors requires navigating different forms of knowledge, worldviews, values, and positions of power. In Transformative Transdisciplinarity, David Ludwig and Charbel N. El-Hani synthesize insights from the philosophy of science and empirical action research to address these challenges through a framework of partial overlaps. On the one hand, the framework highlights the overlapping concerns and perspectives of actors that provide common ground for collaboration and mutual understanding. On the other hand, it emphasizes partialities that require navigating differences and tensions between actors. This book addresses the fundamental epistemological, ontological, and political questions of transdisciplinarity through this framework of partial overlaps, aiming for a transformative vision of collaborative science in the face of planetary crises. This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read on the Oxford Academic platform and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

Poliseli, L. & El-Hani, C.N. Imagination in Science. In L. Tateo, A theory of Imagining, Knowing and Understanding, SpringerBriefs in Psychology. This chapter comments on the book from the perspective of the developments in philosophy of science and intercultural communication. It raises a number of issues to be further discussed in order to continue inquiry into Tateo’s approach. It discusses how imaginative processes are engaged in modeling work in science. It also shows how, facing the environmental challenges that require an innovative thinking, relational empathy can play a rather important role in co-construction of knowledge and understanding through transdisciplinary processes.

Biosemiotics is a growing fi eld that investigates semiotic processes in the living realm in an attempt to combine the fi ndings of the biological sciences and semiotics. Semiotic processes are more or less what biologists have typically referred to as “ signals, ” “ codes, ”and “ information processing ”in biosystems, but these processes are here understood under the more general notion of semiosis, that is, the production, action, and interpretation of signs. Thus, biosemiotics can be seen as biology interpreted as a study of living sign systems — which also means that semiosis or sign process can be seen as the very nature of life itself. In other words, biosemiotics is a field of research investigating semiotic processes (meaning, signification, communication, and habit formation in living systems) and the physicochemical preconditions for sign action and interpretation. (...)

RESUMOO presente artigo analisa processos de alterização na biologia humana e na biomedicina. A alterização é entendida aqui como o processo cultural de produção de alteridades por meio da delimitação, rotulação e categorização das formas possíveis de ser outro, desde um determinado marco de referência sócio-histórico. Ainda que a alterização faça parte de qualquer processo de delimitação de categorias de identidade no seio de uma cultura - e, nesse sentido, possa apresentar visões do outro tanto positivas quanto negativas -, aqui nos interessamos especificamente na alterização como fator de marginalização e exclusão social de diferentes grupos humanos. São analisados diversos processos de alterização operantes nos discursos e nas práticas das ciências biomédicas ao longo de sua história recente, os quais têm conduzido à exclusão social de diferentes categorias de outros, ou a tratá-los como inferiores, em pretendidas bases científicas, ou em função de determinadas práticas institucionalizadas dentro da comunidade científica. Exemplos típicos de grupos marginalizados pelas ciências ocidentais ao longo de sua história incluem as raças não europeias, as mulheres, os homossexuais e os "pobres". O principal objetivo do presente artigo é analisar, na história recente das ciências biomédicas, esses processos de alterização que têm conduzido à marginalização de tais grupos e a considerá-los como inferiores. ABSTRACTThis article analyzes processes of "othering" in human biology and biomedicine. Othering is understood here as the cultural process of production of otherness by means of the delimitation, tagging, and categorization of the possible ways of being "other" within a given socio-historical context. Although othering can be considered as a constitutive aspect of any process of delimitation of identities within a given culture - and in this sense it can present both positive and negative views of the "other" -, in the present article we are specifically interested in processes of othering that lead to the marginalization and social exclusion of different human groups. We will analyze processes of othering, which have operated in the discourses and practices of biomedical sciences throughout their recent history, that have led to the social exclusion of different categories of "others", or to treating them as inferior, and that have supposedly scientific bases or as a consequence of the institutionalization of certain practices within the scientific community. Typical examples of these "others", marginalized by the Western sciences throughout their history, are the non-European "races", women, gay and lesbian people, and the "poor". The main objective of this article is to analyze, in the recent history of the biomedical technosciences, these different processes of othering that have led to the marginalization of such "others" and to treating them as inferior

We present here a digital scenario to simulate the emergence of self-organized symbol-based communication among artificial creatures inhabiting a virtual world of predatory events. In order to design the environment and creatures, we seek theoretical and empirical constraints from C.S.Peirce Semiotics and an ethological case study of communication among animals. Our results show that the creatures, assuming the role of sign users and learners, behave collectively as a complex system, where self-organization of communicative interactions plays a major role in the emergence of symbol-based communication. We also strive for a careful use of the theoretical concepts involved, including the concepts of symbol, communication, and emergence, and we use a multi-level model as a basis for the interpretation of inter-level relationships in the semiotic processes we are studying.

Transdisciplinary research knits together knowledge from diverse epistemic communities in addressing social-environmental challenges, such as biodiversity loss, climate crises, food insecurity, and public health. This paper reflects on the roles of philosophy of science in transdisciplinary research while focusing on Indigenous and other subaltern forms of knowledge. We offer a critical assessment of demarcationist approaches in philosophy of science and outline a constructive alternative of transdisciplinary philosophy of science. While a demarcationist focus obscures the complex relations between epistemic communities, transdisciplinary philosophy of science provides resources for meeting epistemic and political challenges of collaborative knowledge production.

This article intends to show that the defense of “understanding” as one of the major goals of science education can be grounded on an anti-reductionist perspective on testimony as a source of knowledge. To do so, we critically revisit the discussion between Harvey Siegel and Alvin Goldman about the goals of science education, especially where it involves arguments based on the epistemology of testimony. Subsequently, we come back to a discussion between Charbel N. El-Hani and Eduardo Mortimer, on the one hand, and Michael Hoffmann, on the other, striving to strengthen the claim that rather than students’ belief change, understanding should have epistemic priority as a goal of science education. Based on these two lines of discussion, we conclude that the reliance on testimony as a source of knowledge is necessary to the development of a more large and comprehensive scientific understanding by science students.

This chapter explains emergence in biological organizations through a conception of ontological emergence according to which certain types of dynamical organizations possess irreducible properties that are nevertheless derivable from the substrate. The authors concentrate on the ontological dimension of emergence as the irreducibly causal configuration exhibited by all organizations that manifest persistence and stability in their environment. This is a conception of ontological emergence where the locus of novel causal powers is the configuration of constituents into stable dynamic organizations. There is nothing brute to be explained in the emergence of causal properties in a biological organization; all that is needed is the consideration of its organizational characteristics in terms of same-level and inter-level causal interactions, the type of which is of formal causation for interactions among the constituents of the organization and of efficient causation for interactions among the constituents and the micro-properties of their surrounding emergence base.

Peirce's pragmatic notion of semiosis can be described in terms of a multi-level system of constraints involving chance, efficient, formal and final causation. According to the model proposed here, law-like regularities, which work as boundary conditions or organizational principles, have a downward effect on the spatiotemporal distribution of lower-level semiotic items. We treat this downward determinative influence as a propensity relation: if some lower-level entities a,b,c,-n are under the influence of a general organizational principle, W, they will show a tendency to behave in certain specific ways, and, thus, to instantiate a set of specific processes. Our goal in this paper is to examine the role of downward determination in semiotic systems, conceived as multi-level hierarchical systems.

Terms loaded with informational connotations are often employed to refer to genes and their dynamics. Indeed, genes are usually perceived by biologists as basically ‘the carriers of hereditary information.’ Nevertheless, a number of researchers consider such talk as inadequate and ‘just metaphorical,’ thus expressing a skepticism about the use of the term ‘information’ and its derivatives in biology as a natural science. First, because the meaning of that term in biology is not as precise as it is, for instance, in the mathematical theory of communication. Second, because it seems to refer to a purported semantic property of genes without theoretically clarifying if any genuinely intrinsic semantics is involved. Biosemiotics, a field that attempts to analyze biological systems as semiotic systems, makes it possible to advance in the understanding of the concept of information in biology. From the perspective of Peircean biosemiotics, we develop here an account of genes as signs, including a detailed analysis of two fundamental processes in the genetic information system (transcription and protein synthesis) that have not been made so far in this field of research. Furthermore, we propose here an account of information based on Peircean semiotics and apply it to our analysis of transcription and protein synthesis.

This paper examines the notion of emergence from the perspective of pragmatism, drawing special attention to Donald Davidson’s recent account of the emergence of thought and to Hilary Putnam’s pragmatic realism, which, we argue, can be applied to the question of the reality of emergent properties. Our overall conclusion is that the debate over the concept of emergence actively going on in contemporary metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science should be focused more strongly on the realism issue, even though most emergentists tend to assume a rather straightforward metaphysical realism – a view that ought to be called into question on pragmatist grounds

Ethnobiology has become increasingly concerned with applied and normative issues such as climate change adaptation, forest management, and sustainable agriculture. Applied ethnobiology emphasizes the practical importance of local and traditional knowledge in tackling these issues but thereby also raises complex theoretical questions about the integration of heterogeneous knowledge systems. The aim of this article is to develop a framework for addressing questions of integration through four core domains of philosophy -epistemology, ontology, value theory, and political theory. In each of these dimensions, we argue for a model of “partial overlaps” that acknowledges both substantial similarities and differences between knowledge systems. While overlaps can ground successful collaboration, their partiality requires reflectivity about the limitations of collaboration and co-creation. By outlining such a general and programmatic framework, the article aims to contribute to developing “philosophy of ethnobiology” as a field of interdisciplinary exchange that provides new resources for addressing foundational issues in ethnobiology and also expands the agenda of philosophy of biology.