Tom Stoneham

Almost all who write on Collier note a striking similarity between a short passage in his Clavis Universalis and the famous claim that esse is percipi in Berkeley's Principles. This essay explores that similarity in more detail than has been done before. The comparison forces us to address an issue about the nature of passivity in Berkeley's theory of mind. Two interpretations consistent with the text are offered and one is favoured on the grounds that it makes some of Berkeley's arguments more plausible. The idealisms of Berkeley and Collier are shown to have a common source.

“Why is there something rather than nothing?” is a perennial question of metaphysics. This paper gives a valid form of the subtraction argument, originally presented in Baldwin (1996) to the possibility of an empty world (‘metaphysical nihilism’) supported by modal intuitions, which this paper argues we should accept, making it clear that modal intuitions concern the modal properties of concrete objects and not possible worlds. This form of the subtraction argument is not question begging. The paper concludes that the subtraction argument is persuasive, which means that the question of whether there might have been nothing is not settled by a pre-existing modal theory but by the subtraction argument.

In well-documented cases, it is plausibly unethical to ask trauma sufferers for details relating to their trauma. We propose that the reasons are twofold: First, the details requested are not required by those asking for them; second, the request comes with potential for significant harm for the victim arising from the exchange. Requests meeting these conditions are widespread, including in predominant forms of psychotherapy, so accepting these conditions has surprising and challenging consequences for a wide range of interactions with the victims of trauma, including well-meaning ones. Given these surprising and challenging consequences, we explore what, if anything, could offset the two conditions, focusing primarily on therapeutic interactions, which are sometimes thought to have a distinctive or sui generis character. We conclude that none of the options we consider wholly off-set the two conditions, and that they are only partly off-set by insufficient research into alternatives. We outline implications for the status of treatments which require the recollection of trauma as the default kind of intervention, and for interactions with victims of trauma more broadly.