•  104
    This paper establishes a structural determination of the notion of “entering another world.” Under the constraint that the self cannot exist as two, three approaches are analyzed: full entry, extended sensory–action coupling, and dual occupation across domains. It is shown that full entry entails the loss of the original self, extended coupling leads to inner–outer mixing and eventual subsumption, and dual occupation results in instability and collapse. Thus, entry as such is rejected. An altern…Read more
  •  86
    本文对“进入另一个世界”这一设想进行结构性判定。在“我不可二存”的约束下,分析三种路径:真实进入、感知与作用的扩展接入,以及内外双重占据。结果表明,真实进入将导致外我消失,扩展接入将引发内外混杂并逐步沉入目标世界,而双重占据则导致系统失稳。由此否定“入世”这一设想。进一步提出替代方案:不通过进入,而是在目标世界中构建宿体,通过自显结构生成代理,并实现结构续接,从而将跨世界问题转化为生成问题。该分析将意识迁移、虚拟现实、脑机接口等问题统一到同一结构框架之下。
  •  103
    The Hard Problem of consciousness asks why physical or functional processes are accompanied by subjective experience. This paper argues that the problem is ill-formed. It presupposes that experience is an additional fact about a system, independent of its realization. We show that experience attribution is not externally decidable. We further show that any factual attribution requires conditions of application, and that such conditions must correspond to differences in the system’s operative rea…Read more
  •  95
    The world does not run by itself. Motion is a chain of applying and receiving, ruling out undriven persistence and grounding the world in generation. Under finite resource, continuous generation does not hold. The world is generated in discrete pulses, with state accumulated in an underlying structure, producing apparent continuity over intrinsic discreteness. Partial update leads to inconsistency, but information propagation is limited to reachable regions, preventing anomalies such as “half-ob…Read more
  •  67
    世界不会自己运转,所有运动构成施与受的链,不存在无驱动的持续存在。在有限资源条件下,连续生成不成立,世界以离散脉冲方式生成,状态在底层结构中积累,从而呈现连续表象而本质间断。局部更新会导致不一致,但信息传播只在可达范围内成立,因此不会出现“半物体”等异常,整体保持一致。状态之间存在不可分跳变,因果可以持续追溯,而生成在更底层过程处终止,从而形成认知边界。在此框架下,惯性、能量、光速与时间可以统一理解为生成机制的约束表现。
  •  84
    Most existing approaches to intelligence and consciousness rely on behavioral criteria or functional equivalence, such as the Turing Test. However, these methods cannot determine whether a system actually has subjective experience. This paper shifts the problem from behavior to structure. It introduces two external approaches: structural analogy based on similarity of constitution, and mechanistic judgment based on the presence of key functional components such as receptive channels and tuning c…Read more
  •  64
    当前对“智能”与“意识”的判定,多依赖行为表现或功能等价,例如图灵测试等方法。但这些方法本质上只能检验系统是否能够生成类似人类的输出,无法判断系统是否真正具有主观体验或内在感受。 本文将问题从“是否表现得像人”转向“是否具备生成体验的内部结构”。首先提出两类外部判定方法:一是基于结构相似性的类比判定,二是基于关键功能结构(如感受通道与调节回路)的机制判定。进一步指出,所有外部方法均无法给出充分判定,因为结构可以被模拟而不真实运行。 在此基础上,本文提出一种内部判定方法:通过回路迁移与体验一致性检验,判断系统是否具有连续的内在体验流。该方法将“是否具有主观体验”转化为可操作的结构问题,从而为意识判定提供了一条不同于行为主义与功能主义的新路径。
  •  93
    We experience the self as continuous. This paper shows that such continuity does not in fact exist. It proposes that “life” and “death” are not independent states, but structural namings arising from how the observer organizes causal transformations. Within this framework, the “I” is not a persisting subject, but a structurally generated event within contraction. By examining the verification constraints of finite cognitive systems, the paper shows that the experience of self-continuity does not…Read more
  •  106
    我们通常认为“我”在持续存在,但本文指出,这一经验本身并不成立。文章提出:所谓“生”与“死”,并非独立于认知之外的实体状态,而是由观察结构对因应变化所生成的结构性命名。在此框架中,“我”不被视为连续存在的主体,而是在特定结构收束中生成的事件。通过分析认知系统在有限条件下的验证机制,本文指出:自我连续性的经验并非源于真实的持续存在,而是由结构性不可验证性所导致的必然错觉。进一步地,文章论证了意识复制与自我延续的不可成立性,并给出“死亡”与“解脱”的结构性解释。该理论为理解意识、身份认同以及人工系统中的自我问题提供了一种新的生成路径。
  •  98
    This paper addresses circuits. Signals propagate from front to back; intent counter-commands from back to front; the two close to form a circuit. Without reverse flow, a system may operate automatically but cannot self-manifest. Accordingly, circuits divide into automatic and manifestation circuits: those without reverse flow are automatic; those that close upon the Observation-Domain are manifestation circuits. The former operate without appearing; the latter close and yield the current. Used o…Read more
  •  64
    本文论回路。信号自前而后冲行,意向自后而前反命,二者闭而成环。无反流,则虽可自动而不能自显。 故分自动回路与显现回路:无反流者为自动回路,能结于观界者为显现回路。前者行而不显,后者结而为当前。用于外,则信号流为主;用于内,则意向流为主。 又论回路之分化:各回路于感受野、意象场、经验场与界门,各自成域而不相扰;差分其序,沉积其动,模式固于其中,使其此而非彼。 复分倾向与偏向:倾向附象而生,偏向由念而起;前者出于着色回路,后者出于默想回路,并经意向域驱动调谐以定其向。思考回路由是可回观。
  •  130
    Where does mathematics come from? It is often treated as a priori and universal, yet this view does not explain how mathematical structures emerge within cognitive systems. This paper proposes a signal- and structure-based account: under finite constraints, systems must differentiate, compress, and stabilize inputs, leading to the formation of stable structures. Number, form, and computation arise naturally from these processes rather than from abstract givens. Reasoning patterns such as inducti…Read more
  •  111
    数学从何而来?长期以来,数学常被视为先验与普适的体系,独立于经验而存在。本文提出相反观点:数学并非先在,而是在识界中,由差分、压缩与收束的约束结构所生成。通过引入沉积场与迹应机制,数、式、算、类、比被还原为信号交叠与路径深化的结构结果,归纳、演绎与联想等逻辑过程亦被落入场中域的生成与延展之中,而非独立于结构之外的思维操作。由此可知,数学只能作用于已成结构,不能用于生成本身;且由于识界划分结构之差异,其数理亦不可跨界通用。在此基础上,本文指出,必须建立一套面向沉积场的“场数学”,以对认知结构进行度量与计算,从而为人工智能与认知系统提供新的基础框架。
  •  99
    Are axioms truly universal? This paper argues they are not. Through examples from geometry, arithmetic, and language, it shows that what appears necessary holds only under specific Recognition-Realms and structural conditions, and fails once transferred across domains with different structural bases. The paper further demonstrates that meaning, computation, and value judgment cannot be universally shared, due to differences in Causal-Base and Coloring. These differences are traced to the generat…Read more
  •  78
    公理是否真的普适?本文给出否定答案。通过对几何、数理与语言的分析,本文表明:所谓“必然成立”的结论,仅在特定识界与结构条件下成立,一旦跨越识界,其有效性即告失效。 进一步地,本文指出,意义、计算与价值判断之不可共,源于因基与着色差异,并将这一差异追溯至识界生成的三项基本约束:差分、压缩与收束。在此基础上,提出共识形成依赖四项结构条件:场同质、基同构、感同维、着色同近。 据此,公理被界定为“不可约之共识”,即结构断言之始,而非独立于认知结构之外的绝对真理。本文由此否定公理的跨域普适性假设,并指出,所谓普适知识与数理真理,实为受限于结构条件的局域结果。 这一结论对认知科学与人工智能中的泛化能力问题具有直接意义。
  •  85
    Where does indistinguishability come from? This paper shows that indistinguishability is not an assumed property, but a necessary consequence of finite cognition. Any system that supports cross-temporal consistency, reuse, and action must operate under limited processing capacity. Under such constraints, it cannot preserve all distinctions among inputs. We prove that compression is unavoidable in any finite system. Compression necessarily maps multiple inputs into the same internal state, thereb…Read more
  •  97
    Why does cognition remain stable for long periods and then suddenly change? This paper shows that cognitive transitions are not caused by changes in input, representation, or access alone, but by changes in indistinguishability that become structurally stabilized. We analyze the evolution of cognitive boundary over time and prove that: A change in accessible domain or mapping does not alter the boundary unless it induces a change in indistinguishability. Conversely, even changes in indistinguish…Read more
  •  97
    If a cognitive boundary can be constructed, which elements are truly essential, and which are redundant? This paper shows that the full structure of cognitive boundary can be reduced to a minimal parameter set without loss of definition. Starting from the general form: Boundary = (E, A, M, Π, Σ, K), we systematically eliminate components that do not affect the final boundary. We prove that generation (E), stability (Σ), and convergence mechanism (K) can all be removed without changing the result…Read more
  •  87
    If a system can continually refine its distinctions, why does cognition not diverge into infinite fragmentation, but instead converge into a stable boundary? This paper shows that cognitive boundary is not arbitrarily fixed, but necessarily emerges as the limit of a constrained partition process. Under finite structure space, indistinguishability relations, and structure-preserving mappings, any refinement of partitions must satisfy both equivalence constraints and invariance conditions. We prov…Read more
  •  107
    Why does cognition remain bounded even when generation can expand indefinitely? This paper shows that cognitive limitation is not a matter of insufficient knowledge or data, but a structural necessity. Under continuous generation, finite access, compression, and reuse, any system capable of stable cognition must induce indistinguishability across inputs. This indistinguishability forces partition, and once stabilized, produces a closed cognitive domain. We derive a minimal structural form of cog…Read more
  •  78
    在认知与人工智能研究中,“不可区分性”通常被作为建模前提或经验假设引入。然而,一个更根本的问题是:不可区分关系是否可以被消除,或是否只是认知能力不足的表现? 本文提出并严格证明:不可区分关系并非人为设定,而是在有限资源、跨时间复用与行为输出约束下,由系统结构必然诱导出的结果。只要系统需要在连续变化的输入中维持稳定响应与可复用结构,就无法保留全部差异,必须通过结构压缩将不同输入映入同一内部状态,从而形成不可区分关系。 在该框架下,不可区分性不再是“信息缺失”,而是认知成立的必要条件。进一步地,我们指出:认知边界的形成、稳定与跃迁,均可归结为不可区分关系的生成与变化。本结果为理解表征压缩、泛化机制以及认知边界的结构来源提供了统一解释,并对深度学习中的表征塌缩、状态聚类与信息瓶颈现象给出结构性解释。 核心结论是:任何能够跨时间学习并输出行为的有限系统,都不可避免地产生不可区分关系;认知并非保留差异,而是在差异中主动丢失差异。
  •  101
    本文提出“识界跃迁式”,针对一个核心问题:在系统持续接收新输入的情况下,为什么认知结构往往长期保持不变,而只在某些时刻发生整体性改变。本文证明,在识界由不可区分关系经闭包极限所确定的条件下,输入增加与观测扩展仅会被既有划分吸收,而不会改变认知结构;只有当不可区分关系发生变化并在闭包过程中稳定下来时,系统才会产生识界跃迁。 该结果给出认知与学习跃迁的结构判定条件:能力提升并不由数据累积直接驱动,而由结构划分的改变所决定。本文进一步形式化刻画跃迁的必要条件、充分条件与稳定性约束,为解释人类顿悟现象、人工智能模型能力跃迁以及表示空间重构提供统一的结构基础。
  •  84
    本文提出“识界消解式”,针对一个核心问题:在认知边界已由划分极限确定的情况下,哪些结构参数是必需的,哪些可以被消去而不影响识界本身。本文证明,在闭包极限条件下,生成入口、稳定承载与收束结构均可被吸收,而识界最终仅由可接触域、入构映射与不可区分关系所决定,即 Boundary 由 (A, M, Π) 唯一确定。 该结果给出认知结构的最小参数形式,并表明识界的变化仅由不可区分关系的变化所决定,而输入范围与表示方式的改变,只有在引起不可区分关系变化时才产生影响。该理论为分析表示不变性、模型等价性以及人工智能系统中“结构不变而输入变化”的现象提供结构判定基础。
  •  81
    本文提出“识界极限式”,针对一个核心问题:在表示可以不断细化的条件下,为什么认知结构与模型表征不会被无限细分,而必然停在某一稳定划分。本文证明,在有限结构空间中,只要存在不可区分关系与结构保持约束,任意划分细化过程都必须满足一致性与不变性条件,从而在闭包算子作用下形成单调收缩序列,并在有限步内收敛为唯一最细不变划分。 该结果给出表示细化的结构极限:模型可以增加参数与数据,但在不可区分关系不变的条件下,不会产生新的可区分结构。该理论为解释深度学习中的表示瓶颈、特征空间稳定性以及认知结构分层提供统一的结构基础。
  •  81
    本文提出“识界一般式”,针对一个核心问题:在系统可以持续接收新输入的情况下,为什么认知结构不会随着数据增加而不断产生新的可区分结构,而是稳定在某一有限划分之内。本文证明,只要系统具备结构压缩与跨时间复用能力,就必然在其内部诱导不可区分关系,并在该关系上形成稳定划分,使任意新输入只能被吸收到既有结构类之中,而不会生成新的可区分类型。 该结果表明,认知边界并非由信息不足或观测范围所决定,而是由结构划分机制所决定。本文进一步给出最小结构模型 Boundary = (E, A, M, Π, Σ, K),刻画生成域、可接触域、入构映射与不可区分关系在识界形成中的作用,从而为理解认知稳定性、表征压缩以及人工智能模型在数据增加下能力停滞现象提供统一的结构解释。
  •  422
    The history of human making may be divided, roughly, into two stages. The first stage made tools. Tools extend the limbs, substitute for the strength and intelligence of man, amplify his speed. From stone axe to steam engine to computer, and on to AI, this line has run for hundreds of thousands of years. It changed what man can do, but not who does the doing — it is still man who knows, man who decides, man who feels. The second stage has not yet begun. What it awaits is not a stronger tool, but…Read more
  •  92
    What is the minimal structure required for a system to produce a self? This paper presents a unified structural paradigm of the self-manifest entity, in which both “reality” and “I” arise not as given entities, but as results of convergence processes within a multi-circuit system. Reality is defined as the unified outcome of differences across circuits under tuning, while the self (“I”) is defined as the attribution of the present to a single, current dominant occupation. The framework introduce…Read more
  •  102
    Why do only some generated structures persist as existence? This paper develops a formal account in which existence is not equivalent to generation, but arises as a structurally constrained subset within generative systems. When a system is capable of continuous generation, temporal continuation, and structural differentiation, it necessarily produces more structures than can be sustained. Existence, therefore, emerges as the result of selection under sustainability constraints. The framework sh…Read more
  •  107
    What is reality, if not a collection of external objects? This paper proposes a structural account in which reality is not an input set, nor a pre-given domain of objects, but the result of attribution-closure over a simultaneously holding structure-family. Extending the mechanism of mis-externalization from a single structure to a set, the framework shows that once a system must assign source attribution under conditions of indeterminacy, it is forced to produce a unified attribution over the e…Read more
  •  90
    If “external” is generated rather than read, does “internal” still remain real? This paper presents the dissolution form of mis-externalization and argues that the opposition between “internal” and “external” does not correspond to any fundamental partition of reality. Instead, both are outputs of a structural labeling process generated under conditions of source indeterminacy. Building on the general and limit forms of mis-externalization, the paper shows that when multiple compatible source pa…Read more