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1175The Problem of Unconceived ObjectionsArgumentation 28 (4): 425-436. 2014.In this paper, I argue that, just as the problem of unconceived alternatives provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Science to the effect that a realist view of science is unwarranted, the problem of unconceived objections provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Philosophy to the effect that a realist view of philosophy is unwarranted. I raise this problem not only for skepticism’s sake but also for the sake of making a point about philosophical argumentation, name…Read more
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1578Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-defeatLogos and Episteme 5 (1): 103-110. 2014.In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advance…Read more
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776Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-pickingInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2): 129-148. 2015.In this article, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by P. Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-called Old Induction, like Vickers's, and New Induction, like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias—specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes that Stanford adduces in support of…Read more
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894Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-defeat Arguments: A Reply to HuemerLogos and Episteme 5 (3): 343-350. 2014.In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer’s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer’s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, I argue that Huemer’s reply does not save his Self-defeat Argument for PC from my original o…Read more
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250A Reply to James Marcum’s “What’s the Support for Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis?”Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (11): 21-24. 2015.I reply to James Marcum’s “What’s the Support for Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis? A Response to Mizrahi and Patton”
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916Why the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-beggingThe Reasoner 7 (8): 94-95. 2013.I argue that the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging unless proponents of the argument from zombies can justify the inference from the metaphysical possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism in an independent and non-circular way, i.e., a way that does not already assume the falsity of physicalism.
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1535What is Scientific Progress? Lessons from Scientific PracticeJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (2): 375-390. 2013.Alexander Bird argues for an epistemic account of scientific progress, whereas Darrell Rowbottom argues for a semantic account. Both appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases in support of their accounts. Since the methodological significance of such appeals to intuition is unclear, I think that a new approach might be fruitful at this stage in the debate. So I propose to abandon appeals to intuition and look at scientific practice instead. I discuss two cases that illustrate the way in whic…Read more
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746The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3): 263-278. 2016.According to the antirealist argument known as the pessimistic induction, the history of science is a graveyard of dead scientific theories and abandoned theoretical posits. Support for this pessimistic picture of the history of science usually comes from a few case histories, such as the demise of the phlogiston theory and the abandonment of caloric as the substance of heat. In this article, I wish to take a new approach to examining the ‘history of science as a graveyard of theories’ picture. …Read more
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340On appeals to intuition: a reply to Muñoz-SuárezThe Reasoner 9 (2): 12-13. 2015.I reply to Muñoz-Suárez's objection to my argument by analogy with appeals to authority for the following necessary, but not sufficient, condition for strong appeals to intuition: (PAI) When philosophers appeal to intuitions, there must be an agreement among the relevant philosophers concerning the intuition in question; otherwise, the appeal to intuition is weak.
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235The Role of Justification in the Ordinary Concept of Scientific ProgressJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1): 151-166. 2014.Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom have argued for two competing accounts of the concept of scientific progress. For Bird, progress consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. For Rowbottom, progress consists in the accumulation of true scientific beliefs. Both appeal to intuitions elicited by thought experiments in support of their views, and it seems fair to say that the debate has reached an impasse. In an attempt to avoid this stalemate, we conduct a systematic study of the facto…Read more
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2029Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility?Ratio 28 (1): 1-13. 2015.In this paper, we argue that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’, which is the view that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary metaphysical possibility, is self-defeating. To this end, we outline two reductio arguments against ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’. The first reductio shows that, from supposing that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is true, it follows that conceivability both is and is not conclusive evidence for possibility. The second reductio shows that, from supposing that ‘Weak Modal Ration…Read more
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756More Intuition MongeringThe Reasoner 7 (1): 5-6. 2013.In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition are weak arguments because intellectual intuition is an unreliable belief-forming process, since it yields incompatible verdicts in response to the same cases, and since the inference from 'It seems to S that p' to 'p' is unreliable. Since the reliability of intellectual intuition is a necessary condition for strong appeals to intuition, it follows that appeals to intuition are weak arguments.
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133Against Phenomenal ConservatismThe Reasoner 7 (10): 117-118. 2013.In this paper, I outline a reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism. If sound, this reductio shows that the phenomenal conservative is committed to the claim that appealing to appearances is not a trustworthy method of fixing belief.
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116A Decision Procedure for Evaluating Natural Language ArgumentsAPA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 12 (1): 11-12. 2012.In this paper, I present a decision procedure for evaluating arguments expressed in natural language. I think that other instructors of informal logic and critical thinking might find this decision procedure to be a useful addition to their teaching resources.
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291Why Arguments from Expert Opinion are Weak ArgumentsInformal Logic 33 (1): 57-79. 2013.In this paper, I argue that arguments from expert opinion, i.e., inferences from “Expert E says that p” to “p,” where the truth value of p is unknown, are weak arguments. A weak argument is an argument in which the premises, even if true, provide weak support—or no support at all—for the conclusion. Such arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments unless the fact that an expert says that p makes p significantly more likely to be true. However, research on expertise shows that expert opinion…Read more
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894The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative RealismInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4): 393-407. 2013.In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons t…Read more
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700Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived ObjectionsJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1): 59-68. 2016.In this paper, I outline a reductio against Stanford’s “New Induction” on the History of Science, which is an inductive argument against scientific realism that is based on what Stanford (2006) calls “the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). From the supposition that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is cogent, and the parallel New Induction on the History of Philosophy (Mizrahi 2014), it follows that scientific antirealism is not worthy of belief. I also show that denyin…Read more
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1137Three Arguments Against the Expertise DefenseMetaphilosophy 46 (1): 52-64. 2015.Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, and the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental phi…Read more
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985Essentialism: Metaphysical or Psychological?Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1): 65-72. 2014.In this paper, I argue that Psychological Essentialism (PE), the view that essences are a heuristic or mental shortcut, is a better explanation for modal intuitions than Metaphysical Essentialism (ME), the view that objects have essences, or more precisely, that (at least some) objects have (at least some) essential properties. If this is correct, then the mere fact that we have modal intuitions is not a strong reason to believe that objects have essential properties.
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1788Why Simpler Arguments are BetterArgumentation 30 (3): 247-261. 2016.In this paper, I argue that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In other words, I argue that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments over less simple ones. I sketch three arguments in support of this claim: an argument from mathematical proofs, an argument from scientific theories, and an argument from the conjunction rule.
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490The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too FarSynthese 190 (15): 3209-3226. 2013.In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist’s thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this inte…Read more
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319Ought, Can, and Presupposition: A Reply to Kurthy and Lawford-SmithMethode 4 (6): 250-256. 2015.I report the results of a follow-up study, designed to address concerns raised by Kurthy and Lawford-Smith in response to my original study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Like the results of the original study, the results of the follow-up study do not support the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive. The results of both studies suggest that OIC is probably not a principle of ordinary moral cognition. As I have argued in my paper, I take this to mean that OIC can no …Read more
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1104Why be an Intellectually Humble Philosopher?Axiomathes 26 (2): 205-218. 2016.In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that, as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned, the historical record of Western Philosophy provides a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the historical record of philosophical argumentation, which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative theories and serious problems for those theories, can teach us important lessons about the limits of philoso…Read more
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1326Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ from an Epistemic Point of View?Philosophia 40 (4): 829-840. 2012.In this paper, I argue that the “Ought Implies Can” (OIC) principle, as it is employed in epistemology, particularly in the literature on epistemic norms, is open to counterexamples. I present a counterexample to OIC and discuss several objections to it. If this counterexample works, then it shows that it is possible that S ought to believe that p, even though S cannot believe that p. If this is correct, then OIC, considered from an epistemic point of view, is false, since it is supposed to hold…Read more
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818Ought, Can, and Presupposition: An Experimental StudyMethode 4 (6): 232-243. 2015.In this paper, I present the results of an experimental study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Many philosophers accept as an axiom the principle known as “Ought Implies Can” (OIC). If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my experimental study show that participants…Read more
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105Against Phenomenal Conservatism: a Reply to MorettiThe Reasoner 8 (3): 26. 2014.In this paper, I reply to Moretti's objection to my reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism.
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336Are Seemings Trustworthy? A Reply to PiazzaThe Reasoner 8 (9): 100-101. 2014.I reply to Piazza's objection to my reductio against phenomenal conservatism.
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5186Why Gettier Cases are misleadingLogos and Episteme 7 (1): 31-44. 2016.In this paper, I argue that, as far as Gettier cases are concerned, appearances are deceiving. That is, Gettier cases merely appear to be cases of epistemic failure (i.e., failing to know that p) but are in fact cases of semantic failure (i.e., failing to refer to x). Gettier cases are cases of reference failure because the candidates for knowledge in these cases contain ambiguous designators. If this is correct, then we may simply be mistaking semantic facts for epistemic facts when we consider…Read more
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3392Skeptheism: Is Knowledge of God’s Existence Possible?European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1): 41-64. 2017.In this paper, I sketch an argument for the view that we cannot know (or have good reasons to believe) that God exists. Some call this view “strong agnosticism” but I prefer the term “skeptheism” in order to clearly distinguish between two distinct epistemic attitudes with respect to the existence of God, namely, agnosticism and skepticism. For the skeptheist, we cannot know (or have good reasons to believe) that God exists, since there can be neither conceptual (a priori) nor empirical (a poste…Read more
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