Antonia LoLordo

This book is a genealogy of the concept of a person, as it is used in philosophy, ethics, the law, and everyday life. It asks, what is the concept of a person? How is the concept of a person distinct from the concept of a human being? How is it distinct from the concept of the self? When and why did the concept of a person come into existence? What is the relationship between moral personhood and metaphysical personhood, and how has our conception of that relationship changed over the last two millennia? The book as a whole argues for two main claims. First, the concept of a person, like other central concepts used in philosophy and everyday life, has gained its significance not through definition but through the accretion of layers of meaning over centuries. Thus, one can only fully understand the concept by learning its history. Second, the concept of a person has five main strands: persons are particulars, roles, entities with special moral significance, rational beings, and selves. Thus, to count someone or something as a person is simultaneously to describe it—as a particular, a role, a rational being, and a self—and to prescribe certain norms concerning how it may act and how others may act toward it.

In the Essay, John Locke articulates a theory of the origin and governance of knowledge and belief that serves the needs of science on the one hand and our moral lives on the other. This chapter places more emphasis on the moral dimensions of Locke's epistemology than on its scientific dimensions. Locke's epistemology of science has received rather more scholarly attention than his moral epistemology. For another, his contributions to moral epistemology are more original and more significant than his contributions to the epistemology of science. Things are quite different when it comes to the sort of assent that constitutes probability, for Locke's account of probability is fully saturated with ethical considerations. By treating moral beliefs and knowledge as acquired through experience and reasoning about it, Locke sets forth a notion of morality as something that can and indeed must be debated and investigated rather than simply taken for granted.

This book is a genealogy of the concept of a person, as it is used in philosophy, ethics, the law, and everyday life. It asks, what is the concept of a person? How is the concept of a person distinct from the concept of a human being? How is it distinct from the concept of the self? When and why did the concept of a person come into existence? What is the relationship between moral personhood and metaphysical personhood, and how has our conception of that relationship changed over the last two millennia? The book as a whole argues for two main claims. First, the concept of a person, like other central concepts used in philosophy and everyday life, has gained its significance not through definition but through the accretion of layers of meaning over centuries. Thus, one can only fully understand the concept by learning its history. Second, the concept of a person has five main strands: persons are particulars, roles, entities with special moral significance, rational beings, and selves. Thus, to count someone or something as a person is simultaneously to describe it—as a particular, a role, a rational being, and a self—and to prescribe certain norms concerning how it may act and how others may act toward it.

There has recently been a resurgence of interest in the early nineteenth century Scottish philosopher Mary Shepherd. This Element is intended to provide an overview of Shepherd's system, including her views on the following wide range of topics: causation, induction, knowledge of the external world, matter, life, animal cognition, the relationship between mind and body, the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, miracles, and the nature of divine creation. The author also provides an overview of relevant secondary literature and argues for their own interpretation of Shepherd's metaphysics.

In several early 19th century works, Mary Shepherd articulates a theory of causation that is intended to respond to Humean skepticism. I argue that Shepherd's theory should be read in light of the science of the day and her conception of her place in the British philosophical tradition. Reading Shepherd’s theory in light of her conception of the history of philosophy, including her claim to be the genuine heir of Locke, illuminates the broader significance of her attempt to reinstate reason as the source of scientific knowledge. Reading Shepherd's theory in light of the science of the day helps make plausible her claim that there are robust natural kinds in nature, defined by their causal powers: this is precisely what then-recent advances in chemistry hold.

We look at some interesting and important episodes in the life of early modern Epicureanism, focusing on natural philosophy. We begin with two early moderns who had a great deal to say about ancient Epicureanism: Pierre Gassendi and Ralph Cudworth. Looking at how Gassendi and Cudworth conceived of Epicureanism gives us a sense of what the early moderns considered important in the ancient tradition. It also points us towards three main themes of early modern Epicureanism in natural philosophy, which we then discuss at greater length: atomism, materialism about the mind or soul, and the denial of providence, which was often accompanied by deflationary explanations of religious belief.