Peter Richard Forrest

Enlightenment critics of religion were like those zealous gardeners who prune trees to stumps. My title references the zeal of Immanuel Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, and of Ludwig Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity. Avoiding these excesses, I seek the synthesis of Catholicism and the Enlightenment. This book is intended as the second part of a trilogy, following Intellectual, Humanist and Religious Commitment (Forrest 2019). The third part, Divine Presence is intended as a work of speculative theology with the aim of showing that the Catholic doctrines are not so extravagant intellectually as to exclude the commitment urged at the end of this book.1 The three books address different, although overlapping, audiences. The first two assume a loss of epistemic innocence, by which I mean the normal human condition of belief in all sorts of things without questioning—about religion in particular. Epistemic innocence is not the same as accepting things on authority. The relation is that there is widespread innocent acceptance of authority, despite autonomy being one of the myths of our civilization. One important difference is that having read Linda Zagzebski (2012), say, we might come to accept some authorities even after losing any epistemically innocent trust in them.2 Chapter 5 presents a case for Catholicism from the authority of tradition. I do not seek to undermine epistemic innocence. For I share many beliefs with the innocent, and we should not sacrifice truth to reason—the latter is merely the means to achieving the former. My audience in this work consists, however, of those who have either lost or never had innocent religious beliefs. Divine Presence will be directed at another audience, those who appreciate speculative metaphysics. My retort to those not interested in such speculation is, “Take my word for it that there is some intellectual cost in holding Catholic doctrines, but not so much as to exclude reasonable commitment.” I am making a case for Catholicism, by which I mean Generic, or as I now prefer to call it, Essential Catholicism.3 This case is within the scope of reason, that is normal human reasoning. More controversially, it is also within the scope of humanism, by which I mean an appreciation of the actual or potential grandeur of human beings, who are endowed with reason and free will.4 Humanity and divinity are two species of the same genus.5 To be sure, we are much less powerful and knowledgeable, but neither power nor knowledge confer greater worth. What does show God to be greater than us is our moral failure, both individually and collectively: there is much human goodness but also much human depravity. The most significant difference between myself and God is that God is holy, I am not. The most significant difference between ourselves collectively and God is that God is holy, we are not.6 This humanist thesis supports a literal understanding of the Eastern Orthodox idea of theosis that the holy, especially saints such as Mary, are divinized (see O’Carroll 1987). They are parts of God although not in the same way as the three divine Persons. Hence moderate devotion to Mary and other saints does not detract from the worship of God. Humanism enables us to reply to the objection that theosis is a mere metaphor because we differ in kind from divine Persons.

As part of his Constructive Empiricism, Van Fraassen commends agnosticism about the existence of the unobservable entities posited by the physical sciences. This position of Scientific Agnosticism is compatible with the acceptance, in his sense, of Science. For to accept Science is, he says, to accept it as empirically adequate, but to refrain from deciding between the realistically interpreted theory and the as-if variant, according to which the observations are as if the theory is correct but the theory is not correct. My purpose in this paper is to argue, against van Fraassen, that we—or at least most of us—should embrace Scientific Realism not Scientific Agnosticism.

THE ARTICLE IS AN ATTACK ON THE MYSTERY OR REDUCTION DILEMMA FOR SUPERVENIENCE. THIS IS THE DILEMMA THAT EITHER SUPERVENIENCE IS MYSTERIOUS OR THE SUPERVENIENT IS REDUCIBLE TO THE SUBVENIENT. A NONMYSTERIOUS, NONREDUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF SUPERVENIENCE IS PROPOSED, BASED ON THE METAPHYSICAL SPECULATION THAT SUPERVENIENT TERMS AND PHRASES APPLY TO OBJECTS WHOSE INTRINSIC NATURES THEMSELVES HAVE AN APPROPRIATE PROPERTY. SINCE THIS IS A PROPERTY OF A NATURE IT IS A PROPERTY OF A PROPERTY, THAT IS, A GRAND-PROPERTY. SUPERVENIENCE FOLLOWS FROM THIS HYPOTHESIS QUITE NONMYSTERIOUSLY, BY APPEAL TO THE INDISCERNIBILITY OF IDENTICALS. THE METAPHYSICAL SPECULATIONS REQUIRED MIGHT SEEM EXTRAVAGANT. A LARGE PART OF THE PAPER IS DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT THEY ARE NOT EXTRAVAGANT.

My enquiry will be within the scope of two suppositions. The first is that Space is continuous, not discrete. The second is that we are to adopt realism about either points or regions or both. That does not, however, preclude a choice of categories—substance or property—for these entities. Thus we could think of either regions or points as properties of the things in those regions or at those points. Alternatively, we could think of regions or points as substances which themselves have properties.

The book comprises an enquiry into what quantum theory shows us about the world. Its aim is to sort out which metaphysical speculations are tenable and which are not. After an initial discussion of realism, the author provides a non-technical exposition of quantum theory and a criticism of the proposal that quantum theory should make us revise our beliefs about logic. He then discusses the various problems and puzzles which make quantum theory both interesting and perplexing. The text defends three markedly different speculations. The first of them, the "determinate particle speculation", is shown to involve both a view which proposes determinate locations and velocities for particles and the opposite. With the "wave speculation" particles are seen as different again: here the professor proposes a radically original view of particles as polywaves. In the final chapter, he compares the competing particle theories and shows that two ostensibly opposing views are in fact compatible. He goes on to discuss the implications of quantum theory for our understanding of persons. The work assumes no prior knowledge of quantum theory and confines the necessary mathematical details to end-notes.

If persons persist from one time to another they do so, I claim, by perduring, that is by having temporal parts. First I argue that if persons endure, that is persist without having temporal parts, then they have time-dependent properties. Next, I argue that if enduring persons change by having time-dependent properties, then fatalism, or, more accurately, ontological determinism, holds. Hence those of us who consider that ontological determinism is incompatible with our own experience of responsibility have reason to reject the thesis that persons endure. This is significant because endurance might otherwise be thought to cohere better with belief in responsibility than perdurance.

The book is drawn from the Tarner lectures, delivered in Cambridge in 1993. It is concerned with the ultimate nature of reality, and how this is revealed by modern physical theories such as relativity and quantum theory. The objectivity and rationality of science are defended against the views of relativists and social constructionists. It is claimed that modern physics gives us a tentative and fallible, but nevertheless rational, approach to the nature of physical reality. The role of subjectivity in science is examined in the fields of relativity theory, statistical mechanics and quantum theory, and recent claims of an essential role for human consciousness in physics are rejected. Prospects for a 'Theory of Everything' are considered, and the related question of how to assess scientific progress is carefully examined.

In this paper I provide an ontology for the co‐variant vectors, contra‐variant vectors and tensors that are familiar from General Relativity. This ontology is developed in response to a problem that Timothy Maudlin uses to argue against universals in the interpretation of physics. The problem is that if vector quantities are universals then there should be a way of identifying the same vector quantity at two different places, but there is no absolute identification of vector quantities, merely a path‐relative one.My solution to the problem is to use the mathematical characterization of vectors as differential operators on scalar fields. On the proposed hypothesis a scalar field is a conjunctive state of affairs, and vector and tensor fields are relations instantiated by scalar fields

Armstrong holds the Supervenience Theory of instantiation, namely that the instantiation of universals by particulars supervenes upon what particulars and what universals there are, where supervenience is stipulated to be explanatory or dependent supervenience. I begin by rejecting the Supervenience Theory of instantiation. Having done so it is then tempting to take instantiation as primitive. This has, however, an awkward consequence, undermining one of the main advantages universals have over tropes. So I examine another account hinted at by Armstrong. This is the Operator Theory of instantiation, by which I mean the theory that universals are operators, and that a particular instantiates a monadic universal because the universal operates on the particular, resulting in the state of affairs. On this theory the state of affairs supervenes on the instantiation rather than vice versa. In the second part of the paper I develop this theory of universals as operators, including an account of structural universals, which are useful for accounts of modality and of mathematics.

I argue for the following four theses: (1) The Dread Thesis: human beings should fear having false religious beliefs concerning some religious doctrines; (2) The Radical Uncertainty Thesis: we, namely most human beings in our culture at our time, are in a situation where we have to commit ourselves on the truth or falsity of some propositions of ultimate importance; (3) The Radical Choice Thesis: considerations of expected loss or gain do not always provide guidance as to how to commit ourselves on matters of religious doctrine that are both radically uncertain and of ultimate importance; (4) The Scandal Thesis: radical choice on matters of ultimate importance is neither good nor inevitable, but due to the collective failure of philosophers of religion. Then I consider some inadequate responses: playing the faith card; contra-Pascalian decision theory; spiritual chauvinism; that faith presupposes uncertainty; the older pachyderm; irony, subjectivity, relativism and non-cognitivism; tainted truth; and muddling through. Finally I submit that the way forward is quite simply to become better philosophers.

Starting from the acceptance of the Egalitarian Principle I exhibited a version which I considered too lax (BEP) and one I considered too strict (NEP), arriving at a version (MEP) which allows that there can be tolerance-limiting reasons for adhering to traditions but only if they are based on unreasoned knowledge claims. In fact, I hold that the situation most of us find ourselves in restricts such claims on religious topics to very general ones. Hence the choice between NEP and MEP is not significant.It follows that we should take up one of two positions concerning religious traditions: either we argue from the shared assumptions of a variety of traditions without genuine participation in any of them; or we justify participation in one of them by noting various marks of reliability, such as serendipitous understanding