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Peter Richard Forrest

University of New England (Australia)
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 More details
  • University of New England (Australia)
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Armidale, New South Wales, Australia
Areas of Interest
Philosophy, Misc
  • All publications (127)
  •  69
    Answers to Prayers and Conditional Situations
    Faith and Philosophy 15 (1): 41-51. 1998.
    In this paper I defend the Direct Actualisation of Conditional Situations as a way of explaining how God answers prayers without assuming that God acts on the world after the prayer is made. My hypothesis states that God, in creating, brings about conditionals without either preventing the antecedent or bringing about the consequent. I compare this hypothesis with some rivals, notably the appeals to foreknowledge and to middle knowledge.
    Philosophy of ReligionPrayer
  •  1
    Difficulties with physicalism, and a programme for dualists
    In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 1993.
    Dualism, MiscPhysicalism about the Mind, MiscOther Anti-Materialist Arguments
  • Can a SoufflĂ© Rise Twice? Van Inwagen's Irresponsible Time-travellers
    In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 5, Oxford University Press Uk. 2009.
  •  47
    Acquaintance with Universals
    Metaphysica 18 (1): 1-13. 2017.
    In this paper I argue that the problems solved by universals require not merely that we know they exist but that we know them by acquaintance. I begin by explicating this thesis of acquaintance with universals. I then show how it solves some familiar problems. After that I reply to the objection that something weaker will do such as David Lewis' distinction between natural and artificial classes of possibilia.
  •  142
    An Examination of John Schellenberg’s Austere Ultimism:: Review of J. L. Schellenberg: 1) Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 2005 ISBN: 978-0801443589, hb, 242pp.; 2) The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism, 2007, ISBN: 978-0801445545, hb, 342pp.; and 3) The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion, 2009, ISBN: 978-0801447808, hb, 288pp.; Ithaca: Cornell University Press (review)
    Sophia 52 (3): 535-551. 2013.
    Philosophy of ReligionArguments Against Theism, Misc
  •  96
    Einstein's Genie: Spacetime out of the Bottle, by Graham Nerlich: Montreal: Minkowski Institute Press, 2013, pp. viii + 216, $US18 (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4): 829-832. 2016.
    Space and Time
  •  2
    Conflicting Intuitions about Space
    In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location, Oxford University Press. pp. 117-132. 2014.
    This chapter argues that we have inconsistent intuitions about the structure of space (or spacetime, or some stuff, the aether, that fills space or spacetime). A contradiction is obtained from eleven premises, each of which is either directly intuitive or supported by intuitions. The use of so many premises results from the desire to exhibit as clearly as possible the places where one might decide some intuition is to be undermined. Nonetheless the argument for inconsistency is straightforward: …Read more
    This chapter argues that we have inconsistent intuitions about the structure of space (or spacetime, or some stuff, the aether, that fills space or spacetime). A contradiction is obtained from eleven premises, each of which is either directly intuitive or supported by intuitions. The use of so many premises results from the desire to exhibit as clearly as possible the places where one might decide some intuition is to be undermined. Nonetheless the argument for inconsistency is straightforward: our intuitions support the existence of a _supersponge_, namely a region of less than the total volume but not disjoint from any connected part of space of positive diameter. But the complement of a supersponge is an intuitively impossible region. Yet, intuitively a region of less than maximal volume must have a complement. So some intuition must be abandoned.
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