Uwe A. Meixner

Der Kausalbegriff gehört zu den, gerade in der Gegenwart, am häufigsten in Anspruch genommenen philosophischen Begriffen. In Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftstheorie, der Philosophie des Geistes, in der Handlungstheorie und der Sprachphilosophie taucht er immer wieder in zentraler Funktion auf. Für die Philosophie ist die Deutung des Kausalbegriffs daher von größter Bedeutung. Das vorliegende Buch ist ein Leitfaden zum Kausalbegriff. In seinem ersten Teil wird eine detaillierte Explikation dieses Begriffs geboten, die auf eine neuartige Fassung der nomologischen Regularitätstheorie und die Formulierung einer Logik der Kausalität hinausläuft. Im zweiten Teil wird diese Explikation in einer umfassenden kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der Literatur zu den verschiedenen Themen, die sich mit dem Kausalbegriff verbinden, weiter begründet und verteidigt. Dabei ergibt sich ein umfassendes Panorama des gegenwärtigen Standes der kausalitätstheoretischen philosophischen Diskussion - mit teilweise weit zurückreichenden Perspektiven in die Vergangenheit. Zur Sprache kommen u. a. die folgenden Themen: probabilistische und Sine-qua-non-Kausalität, kausale Überdeterminierung und Präemption, die Probleme der kausalen Notwendigkeit und des kausalen Vorrangs, Physikalisierung der Kausalität, Retrokausalität, die Deutungen des Ereignisbegriffs und Agens- versus Ereigniskausalität.

The paper first distinguishes ontological priority from epistemological priority and unilateral ontic dependence. Then explications of ontological priority are offered in terms of the reducibility of the actual existence or identity of entities in one ontological category to the actual existence or identity of entities in another. These explications lead to incompatible orders of ontological priority for individuals, properties of individuals and states of affairs. Common to those orders is, however, that the primacy of the category of individuals is abandoned. This primacy is challenged in the paper also by epistemological arguments, and an onto-anthropological explanation is offered for the very common but false idea that individuals are ontological prior to all other kinds of entities. Finally ontological priority is discussed with respect to a fully specified system of ontological categories.

Until quite recently, mind-body dualism has been regarded with deep suspicion by both philosophers and scientists. This has largely been due to the widespread identification of dualism in general with one particular version of it: the interactionist substance dualism of Réné Descartes. This traditional form of dualism has, ever since its first formulation in the seventeenth century, attracted numerous philosophical objections and is now almost universally rejected in scientific circles as empirically inadequate. During the last few years, however, renewed attention has begun to be paid to the dualistic point of view, as a result of increasing discontent with the prevailing materialism and reductionism of contemporary scientific and philosophical thought. Awareness has grown that dualism need not be restricted to its traditional form and that other varieties of dualism are not subject to the difficulties commonly raised against Descartes' own version of it. Interest in these alternative versions of dualism is growing fast today, because it seems that they are capable of capturing deep-seated philosophical intuitions, while also being fully consistent with the methodological assumptions and empirical findings of modern scientific work on the human mind and brain. The object of this book is to provide philosophers, scientists, their students, and the wider general public with an up-to-date overview of current developments in dualistic conceptions of the mind in contemporary philosophy and science.

Der cartesische DuaUsmus besteht nicht in der Behauptung, daß die Person und ihr Körper voneinander verschieden sind, sondern in der stärkeren Behauptung, daß sie beide ohne den anderen existieren können. Können ist dabei in einem außerordentlich schwachen Sinn zu nehmen, nämlich im Sinne der analytischen Möglichkeit. Descartes' Argument für diese Behauptung in der 6. Meditation ist im Rahmen der modal-epistemischen Logik als logisch korrektes Argument präzisierbar; daneben auch sein mit dem ersteren verquicktes Argument dafür, daß es eine essentielle Eigenschaft von ihm sei, eine res cogitans zu sein, aber keine, eine res extensa zu sein. Das Problem der Annehmbarkeit der Prämissen reduziert sich auf die Frage, ob es analytisch möglich ist, daß eine Person existiert, ohne mit einem Körper verbunden zu sein. Im Sinne von Descartes' Personbegriff gilt dies, im Sinne unseres Personbegriffes jedoch nicht. Welcher von den beiden Personbegriffen vorzuziehen ist, ist eine offene Frage.

In Plato's Parmenides we find on the one hand that the One is denied every property , and on the other hand that the One is attributed every property . In the course of the history of Platonism , these assertions - probably meant by Plato as ontological statements of an entirely formal nature - were repeatedly made the starting points of metaphysical speculations. In the Mystical Theology of the Pseudo-Dionysius they became principles of Christian mysticism and negative theology. I shall show that the two assertions can each be interpreted within the ontological framework of ancient and medieval logic in such a manner that it becomes true, and I shall make plausible that they were understood, with regard to their logical core, by pagan and Christian Platonic metaphysicians just as is indicated by that interpretation. The mentioned ontological framework is basically the Boolean algebra of first-order properties. The main points of the interpretation are on the one hand the identification of the One with the maximal element of the algebra of properties, and on the other hand two alternative intuitively prominent mereological definitions of ontic predication

In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it is argued that the classical conception is more satisfactory than the two modern ones, not only regarding phenomenal adequacy, but also on the grounds of epistemological considerations. In the second part, the paper argues that classical intentionality is not naturalizable, that is, physicalizable. Since classical intentionality exists (in the experiences that display it), the non-naturalizability of classical intentionality implies psychophysical dualism.

The paper provides new perspectives for a dualistic conception of mental causation by putting causation that originates in a nonphysical self into an evolutionary perspective. Nonphysical causation of this type - free agency -, together with nonphysical consciousness, is regarded as being not only compatible with physics, but also as having a natural place in nature. It is described how free agency can work, on the basis of the brain, and how it can be compatible with the result of the Libet-experiment. The necessary condition for the existence of free agency is that the physical macro-world is indeterministic to a degree that is relevant for living beings, that is, for their survival and well-being. From an evolutionary point of view, and on the basis of the facts of consciousness, it is more likely than not that this condition is in fact fulfilled.