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Uwe A. Meixner

Universität Augsburg
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  •  Publications
    161
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 More details
  • Universität Augsburg
    Institut für Philosophie
    Regular Faculty
Universität Regensburg
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1986
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Religion
1 more
  • All publications (161)
  •  27
    Ontologically Minimal Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic
    In Georg Meggle & Julian Nida-Rümelin (eds.), Analyomen 2, Volume I: Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, De Gruyter. pp. 124-130. 1997.
    Intuitionistic Logic
  •  33
    An onto-nomological theory of modality
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1): 47-72. 2006.
    This paper is dedicated to the formulation of a restricted theory of ontic modality (for example, I do not address questions that arise when modal operators interact with quantifiers, although some of the theoretical developments presented here certainly suggest such questions). As will be seen, notwithstanding its restrictions, the theory has a pleasing richness to it, as well as formal rigor and intuitive satisfactoriness. It also offers an unusual perspective on modality.
  •  1
    Metaphysik im postmetaphysischen Zeitalter (edited book)
    with Peter M. Simons
  •  66
    Joseph E. Brenner, Logic in Reality , Springer 2008
    Metaphysica 9 (2): 247-250. 2008.
    Metaphysics and Epistemology
  •  203
    An alternative semantics for modal predicate-logic
    Erkenntnis 37 (3). 1992.
    The semantical framework is fundamentally intensional: neither possible worlds nor sets as basic entities, but rather, besides individuals, propositions, properties and relations (in intension). Logical truth is defined in terms of logical form (without mentioning this notion) without employing sets of models and the concept of truth in a model. Truth itself is explicitly defined (without recursion); the truth-conditions for the logical constants of the object-language become theorems derivable …Read more
    The semantical framework is fundamentally intensional: neither possible worlds nor sets as basic entities, but rather, besides individuals, propositions, properties and relations (in intension). Logical truth is defined in terms of logical form (without mentioning this notion) without employing sets of models and the concept of truth in a model. Truth itself is explicitly defined (without recursion); the truth-conditions for the logical constants of the object-language become theorems derivable from the axioms for "to intend"--the basic semantical relation
  •  1
    Husserl transzendentaler Idealismus als Supervenienzthese. Ein interner Realismus
    In Manfred Frank & Niels Weidtmann (eds.), Husserl und die Philosophie des Geistes, Suhrkamp. 2010.
    Husserl: IdealismHusserl: Realism
  •  7
    The Emergence of Rational Souls
    In Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in science and philosophy, Routledge. pp. 6--163. 2010.
    Emergence
  •  21
    Essential Conceptions of Events
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 76 183-194. 2000.
  •  105
    Review of Yujin Nagasawa, God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (8). 2008.
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessThe Knowledge Argument
  •  17
    Chapter III: On Intending
    In Defending Husserl: A Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company Versus Phenomenology, De Gruyter. pp. 247-350. 2014.
  • On Some Realisms Most Realists Dont't Like
    Metaphysica 1 (2). 2000.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyRealism and Anti-Realism
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