Mark Sagoff

Richard Stopford, in criticizing my defense of purist restoration, attributes to me and refutes a metaphysical view I do not have concerning the identity and persistence conditions of an art work. I took for granted the ordinary idea of identity as continuity-in-space-and-time-under-a-sortal-concept, such as statue. I argued that Michelangelo’s Pietà remained the same statue after it was disfigured but that the damage was irreparable. By fixing molded prosthetics to the ruined work of art, the Vatican introduced a macaronic element into one’s aesthetic attitude toward the Pietà by making one attend simultaneously, without any visual guidance as to which is which, to parts of the statue that were completed by Michelangelo’s hand and intended to be a work of art and pieces added in the twentieth century for an different purpose, e.g., to make viewing the statue less disconcerting than a recognition of the damage would demand. An integral restoration, in contrast, allows one both to envision the art work as created and to grieve for what has been lost.

This paper argues that the new biotechnologies will affect the natural environment primarily in two ways: by bringing relatively “wild” areas, such as forests and estuaries, under domestication, and by forcing areas now domesticated, such as farms, out of production, because of surpluses. The problem of the safety of biotechnology—the risk of some inadvertent side-effect—seems almost trivial in relation to the social and economic implications of these intentional uses. The paper proposes that we should be more concerned about the successful uses of biotechnology than about the possible mishaps or failures

Surplus-not simply scarcity-provides a reason to preserve the natural environment. Although advances in biotechnology have made it possible to manipulate, alter, and replace ecological and evolutionary processes in order vastly to increase the production of economically valuable commodities, e.g., seafood in estuaries, the huge surpluses likely to result threaten fishing communities with the same economicdepression and social dislocation that farming communities have already experienced. In this context, protecting the biological status quo not only expresses an admirable affection and respect for nature, but also makes economic sense by taking unneeded resources out of production.

This essay explores three case studies that illustrate the exemplary use of economic analysis in environmental decision-making. These include: 1) the creation of a market in tradable grazing rights in the American West; 2) a cost analysis that facilitated a negotiated rulemaking at a power plant in Arizona; and 3) a conception of production-based pollution allowances that led to an agreement for regulating Intel microprocessor production plants. The paper argues that cost–benefit analysis may be less useful than other kinds of economic analysis that can guide and inform rather than judge and second-guess the outcome of negotiated and collaborative decision-making

Ecologists may apply their science either to manage ecosystems to increase the long-run benefits nature offers man or to protect ecosystems from anthropogenie insults and injuries. Popular reasons for supposing that these two tasks are complementary turn out not to be supported by the evidence. Nevertheless, society recognizes the protection of the “health” and “integrity” of ecosystems to be an important ethical and cultural goal even if it cannot be backed in detail by utilitarian or prudential arguments. It is a legitimate purpose of ecological science, moreover, to describe and help society preserve ecosystem “health” and “integrity,” insofar as these are considered as privative qualities.

Mark Sagoff draws on the last twenty years of debate over the foundations of environmentalism in this comprehensive revision of The Economy of the Earth. Posing questions pertinent to consumption, cost-benefit analysis, the normative implications of neo-Darwinism, the role of the natural in national history, and the centrality of the concept of place in environmental ethics, he analyses social policy in relation to the environment, pollution, the workplace, and public safely and health. Sagoff distinguishes ethical from economic questions and explains which kinds of concepts, arguments, and processes are appropriate to each. He offers a critique 'preference' and 'willingness to pay' as measures of value in environmental economics and defends political, cultural, aesthetic, and ethical reasons to protect the natural environment.

Mark Sagoff has written an engaging and provocative book about the contribution economics can make to environmental policy. Sagoff argues that economics can be helpful in designing institutions and processes through which people can settle environmental disputes. However, he contends that economic analysis fails completely when it attempts to attach value to environmental goods. It fails because preference-satisfaction has no relation to any good. Economic valuation lacks data because preferences cannot be observed. Willingness to pay is benchmarked on market price and thus may reflect producer cost not consumer benefit. Moreover, economists cannot second-guess market outcomes because they have no better information than market participants. Mark Sagoff's conclusion is that environmental policy turns on principles that are best identified and applied through political processes. Written with verve and fluency, this book will be eagerly sought out by students and professionals in environmental policy as well as informed general readers.

In this paper I criticize what many economists recommend: namely, that land use regulations should simulate what markets would do were all resources fully owned and freely exchanged. I argue that this “efficiency” approach, even if balanced with equity considerations, will result in commercial sprawl, an environment that consumers pay for, but one that appalls ethical judgment and aesthetic taste. I showthat economic strategies intended to avoid this result are inadequate, and conclude that ethical and aesthetic as well as economic principles are needed to guide policies governing the use of land

This paper interprets Kant's theory of right on analogy with his theory of truth. The familiar distinction is presented between the mental act and its object: e.g. between the act of believing and the belief; the perceiving and the thing perceived; the act of willing and the action willed. The act of mind is always private; different people, however, can perceive and believe the same or contradictory things. The notion of truth depends (for Kant) on the intersubjectivity or universalizability of the mental object. It might seem that the act intended as well as the act of intending must be private, however, because I can will only my own actions; but Kant suggests that I may will not as myself but as one of a community: the logical subject of the intending may not be I but We. Kant had in mind the community of rational beings; Bradley and Green relativize the community to national groups.