Mark Sagoff

This paper describes two frameworks—utilitarian and Kantian—society uses to make decisions concerning environmental management and, in particular, species protection. The utilitarian framework emphasizes the consequences of choices for prior preferences. A perfectly competitive market, on this model, correctly values environmental resources. The Kantian approach identifies rules appropriate to recognized situations given the identity of the decision maker. It relies on democratic political processes and institutions to provide the means by which citizens determine the identity of their community—its moral character and aspirations—and match appropriate rules to recognized situations. This paper argues that markets do not fail in any general way in measuring the economic value of plants and animals. Market prices, in general, correctly represent the marginal or exchange value of species. If society legislates against extinction, this must be understood as an exercise in Kantian decision making in view of the moral value of species, not as an attempt to “correct” a market failure or to promote social welfare or utility.

Many consumers view genetically engineered foods with suspicion partly because the food industry has taught them to do so. Consumers learn from advertisements and labels that the foods they buy are all natural only to realize that that is not the case. The food industry wishes to embrace the efficiencies offered by advances in genetic engineering, but this technology belies the image of nature to which the food industry constantly and conspicuously appeals. Consumers who believe genetically modified foods are not “natural” will regard them as risky and undesirable.

David Steen and co-authors in this journal offer a philosophical argument to support an “Evolutionary Community Concept” to identify what they call “evolutionary communities.” They describe these as “unique collections of species that interact and have co-evolved in a given geographic area” and that include “co-evolved dependencies between different parts of a community.” Steen et al. refer to the coevolution of assemblages, collections, communities, dependencies, interspecific and abiotic interactions, and traits, but they do not define “co-evolution” or provide an example in which co-evolution has been demonstrated. There may be as many ways to explain interactions among species as these interactions themselves; they may result, for example, from ecological fitting and phenotypic plasticity. In this paper, I argue that standard Darwinian Theory explains intraspecific microevolution or descent with modification within an interbreeding and potentially continuous population. The power, mechanism, or force that causes interspecific co-evolution, especially at the community scale, requires further explanation.

Richard Stopford, in criticizing my defense of purist restoration, attributes to me and refutes a metaphysical view I do not have concerning the identity and persistence conditions of an art work. I took for granted the ordinary idea of identity as continuity-in-space-and-time-under-a-sortal-concept, such as statue. I argued that Michelangelo’s Pietà remained the same statue after it was disfigured but that the damage was irreparable. By fixing molded prosthetics to the ruined work of art, the Vatican introduced a macaronic element into one’s aesthetic attitude toward the Pietà by making one attend simultaneously, without any visual guidance as to which is which, to parts of the statue that were completed by Michelangelo’s hand and intended to be a work of art and pieces added in the twentieth century for an different purpose, e.g., to make viewing the statue less disconcerting than a recognition of the damage would demand. An integral restoration, in contrast, allows one both to envision the art work as created and to grieve for what has been lost.